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Abstract 
 
My dissertation offers the first sustained engagement with the question of violence in the works 
of Jacques Derrida and Theodor Adorno.  I argue that the conjunction of questions of violence 
and with those of “life” indicates a profound sympathy in their thinking and suggests the need to 
develop a critical dialogue between discourses of life (ecology, environmental science, etc) and 
philosophy.  In early works such as Of Grammatology and “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 
Derrida and Adorno contend that the structures of thought, meaning, and signification are 
necessarily incomplete and, as such, are always marked by violent exclusions.  “Archē-violence” 
and “dialectics” are names for this originary violence.  Both Derrida and Adorno argue that this 
violence fundamentally shapes thought’s relationship to the world.  The notions of “reparatory 
violence” and “interpretation” in the works cited above give way in later texts to notions of 
“sovereignty,” “autoimmunity,” “identity thinking,” and “exchange” as ways to understand the 
passage from structural to empirical violence.  Of particular interest is the relationship between 
violence and “life.”  In their later works (Rogues, The Beast and the Sovereign Lectures, Minima 
Moralia, and Negative Dialectics, etc), this relation emerges both in terms of the violent denial 
and annihilation of life implied in the reductive logics of “logocentrism” and “identitarian 
thinking,” and in the question of “animal life,” the question of who counts as “human,” and who 
or what can be included in the “human” community.  Hence, my dissertation situates the 
historical and philosophical concern for violence in relationship to the questions of “life” and, in 
so doing, enters into the growing conversation surrounding violence and environmentalism that 
can be heard across the humanities.
 4
Introduction 
  
Towards the end of his Frankfurt Address, Derrida sketches seven chapters of a “dream 
book” he would wish to write “to interpret the history, the possibility, and the honor of this prize 
[The Adorno Prize]” (Derrida, F 177/45).1  Concerning the last of these dream chapters, Derrida 
writes: 
Finally I get to the chapter I would most enjoy writing, because it would take the 
least trodden but in my view one of the most crucial paths in the future reading of 
Adorno.  It would be about what we call, in the singular—which has always 
shocked me—the Animal.  As if there were only one of them.  (F 180/54) 
This chapter would examine the indications in Adorno’s work of a “critical ecology” or what 
Derrida prefers to call a “deconstructive ecology:” “a revolution in thought and action that we 
[humans] need, a revolution in our dwelling together with these living things that we call 
animals” (PM 180/54).  This critical ecology would be a complete change in our ways of 
thinking and acting in relationship to other living creature.  This shift would necessarily entail a 
challenge to the logic by which humans historically have reduced the multiplicity of animal life 
(including the human animal) by grouping all under the singular concept Animal (a move which 
has legitimated humanity’s domination of nature and devalued what is animal in humans).  
Derrida suggests that Adorno’s work pushes us to think these concepts and this logic in a new 
way.  This “revolution” would be in no way alien to Derrida’s own work, as this “critical 
ecology” could just as easily be called a “deconstructive ecology.”  Hence, there is something in 
this question of the animal that resonates through the work of both Adorno and Derrida and 
                                                 
1 Derrida, Jacques. “Fichus,” in Paper Machine. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2005, 177; Fichus: Discours de Francfort. Paris: Galilée, 2002, 45.  Hereafter abbreviated F. 
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forms a junction point between the two. 2  Derrida argues that this “critical” or “deconstructive” 
ecology emerges in Adorno’s work in opposition to “two formidable forces.”   
On the one hand, says Derrida, Adorno’s ecology opposes “the most powerful idealist 
and humanist tradition of philosophy” (F 180/55).  It challenges the intellectual tradition that 
attempts to separate fundamentally what is human from what is animal.  This separation forms 
the basis for justifying or naturalizing the “sovereignty or mastery [Herrschaft] of man over 
nature” (F 180/55).  Thus what is at stake in Adorno's ecology is the very basis for humanity’s 
mastery of nature and general claim to sovereign control.3  Adorno is particularly concerned with 
the idealism, emerging from Kant, that “feels only hate for human animality” (F 180/55).  He 
goes so far as to contend that in idealism “animals play a role virtually the same as Jews in a 
fascist system (die Tiere spielen fürs idealistische System virtuell die gleiche Rolle wie die Juden 
furs faschistische)” (F 181/55-56).4  Here Adorno is making a structural claim.  In idealism, 
animality names that which must be excluded and annihilated in order to secure the purity, which 
is to say, the superiority, mastery, and sovereignty of idealism.  For the idealist, we can be human 
only insofar as we are utterly cleansed of animality and particularly cleansed of what is animal in 
us.  Built into the logic of idealism is the exclusion, degradation, and annihilation of the 
animality of the human being.  This logic then leads to a self-denying, self-destructive notion of 
                                                 
2 Derrida makes clear in a number of texts that the question of the animal is central to his work.  For example, in a 
2002 interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco entitled “Violence Against Animals” Derrida says “[t]he ‘question of the 
animal’ is not one question among others, of course.  I have long considered it to be decisive (as one says), in itself 
and for its strategic value; and that’s because […] it also represents the limit upon which all the great questions are 
formed and determined, as well as all the concepts that attempt to delimit what is ‘proper to man,’ the essence of the 
future of humanity, ethics, politics, law, ‘human rights,’ ‘crimes against humanity,’ ‘genocide,’ etc” (FWT 62).  For 
What Tomorrow…A Dialogue. Translated by Jeff Fort.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.  Also see    
but Adorno wrote almost nothing explicitly on animality. 
3 Adorno’s clearest critique of humanity’s assumed mastery over nature comes in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.  Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002.  Dialektik der Aufklarung: Philosophische Fragmente, Gesammelte Shriften, 
Volume 3 (written with Max Horkheimer). Frankfurt am Main: Sukrkamp Verlag, 1996.  Hereafter abbreviated DE.     
4 Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.  Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998, 80. 
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human subjectivity.  Hence, Derrida contends that Adorno’s critical ecology opposes any force 
that would attempt to justify itself through the absolute separation of humans from animals and 
that such a separation is the fundamental gesture of fascism.     
On the other hand, citing a fragment from Dialectic of Enlightenment entitled “Man and 
Beast,” Derrida says that Adorno’s critical ecology would resist the “ideology concealed in the 
troubling interest in animals, that the fascists, the Nazis, and the Führer did in fact seem to show, 
sometimes to the point of vegetarianism” (F 181/56).5  While concerned with the idealist attempt 
to separate fundamentally humanity from animality, Adorno is equally concerned with what 
appears in fascism as an attempt to equalize humans and animals.  Principled vegetarianism 
(whether Hilter’s or otherwise) often rests on the notion that because humans and animals share 
some capacity or faculty (to suffer for instance) there is a moral obligation to extend to animals 
considerations typically reserved for humans (for example, not being killed for food).  This 
position would appear to be starkly opposed to the absolute domination of animality by humans.  
However, Adorno worries that this kind of equalizing of humans and animals actually conceals a 
profound hatred of animality.   
Extending certain rights or considerations to some species of non-human animals or to 
some particular set of such animals, allows one to avoid the explicit claim to anthropocentrism—
I’m not anthropocentric.  I don’t even eat animals.  However, nothing in this logic of interest or 
care necessarily contests the fundamental ascendancy of humans over animals, as the very 
decision of what kinds of animality deserve recognition remains squarely within the control of 
humans.  In the fragment Derrida cites, Adorno compares this kind of ideological interest to the 
concern for the feminine in patriarchal societies.6  The glorification of the feminine under 
                                                 
5 DE 203-212/282-292. 
6 DE 207/285-286. 
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patriarchy does nothing to contest patriarchy.  In fact, it may ultimately reinforce and extend it, 
as this interest allows patriarchal power to claim that it is in fact not patriarchal—How can we be 
patriarchal?  We love the feminine so much.  It is this potential to reinforce and extend the 
exclusion and hatred of animality, which is the “troubling ideology concealed in the interest in 
animals.”  Such an ideology takes an interest in animals (or women, or nature) only ever more 
thoroughly to enslave the objects of interest.  This interest in animals legitimates more 
thoroughly the sovereignty of humans over nature.  Derrida thus sees a critical or deconstructive 
ecology in Adorno’s work that resists both the absolute separation of humans from animals and 
the reduction of animality to humanity.  It contests humanity’s fundamental claim to sovereign 
mastery but stops short of simply doing away altogether with the notion of mastery.  
How is it possible to think or mark the difference between humans and all other forms of 
life (and in truth the ways in which all other forms of life differ from each other) without 
reducing or determining all these differences merely as lesser forms of human life?  This is the 
question that a critical or deconstructive ecology would set itself:  How is it possible to think and 
to act—dare I say to live—difference within similarity?  Seen in this light, a critical ecology 
strikes to the heart of many of the central concerns of both Derrida and Adorno: identity, 
difference, meditation, exchange, sovereignty, mastery, ideology, life, death etc.  It connects with  
Derrida’s desire in Rogues to think a “shared sovereignty” and Adorno’s notion of non-
identitarian thinking.7  It suggests that all these concerns are fundamentally connected to the 
questions of violence and animality, both the question of violence against animals, and of 
                                                 
7 Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005, 86/126.  Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison. Paris: Galilée, 2003. Hereafter abbreviated R.  
Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: Continuum, 1973, 147/150; Negative Dialektik, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 6. Frankfurt en Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996. Hereafter abbreviate ND. 
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violence to what is animal in humans.  It would seem then that Derrida’s and Adorno’s projects 
intersect around the issues of violence and animality.   
Derrida points to these issues as bearing upon the deconstructive project and critical 
theory in a fundamental way.  My project attempts to follow out this connection paying 
particular attention to the issue of violence and its connection to questions of life.  I argue that 
concerns for violence and, more specifically, violence against life, are basic to the character and 
orientation of both Derrida’s and Adorno’s thought.   A study of the way each of these thinker 
approaches violence exposes the remarkable affinity between their projects and marks their 
difference from other thinkers within the Western philosophical tradition.  It suggests further, as 
Derrida says, that there is a contribution in both these projects to the discourses of ecology.  My 
intention is to support three fundamental claims.  First, I argue that questions of violence and life 
shape and orient the thinking of both Derrida and Adorno.  Second, I contend that their shared 
concern for questions of violence and life mark a previously under-theorized connection between 
their critical projects generally.  Third, this connection shows an ecological dimension inherent 
in both their thought.      
Chapter One explores the foundational role of violence in Derrida's thinking, specifically 
as it arises in Of Grammatology.8  By following the development of this exclusionary violence 
through the figures of “writing,” “originary violence,” and “reparatory violence", this chapter 
traces the way Derrida articulates violence as the irreducible possibility of exclusion within all 
acts of signification, meaning, and thought.  I show how Derrida connects the “originary” 
structural violence of “writing” to all forms of empirical violence through a “reparatory” 
delimiting of the openness of originary difference.  For Derrida, all violence emerges from a 
                                                 
8 Jacques Derrida. Of Grammatology: Corrected Edition. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; De La Grammatologie. Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967. Hereafter cited as G. 
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basic logic of exclusion.  In particular, he connects this exclusionary violence to the violence of 
ethnocentrism.  Every instance of reparatory violence marks who or what will be included and 
excluded, who or what will be counted or passed over, who or what belongs on the inside—who 
or what is autochthonous.  A look at Derrida’s critique of Lévi-Strauss allows me to explicate the 
character and importance of this connection between reparatory violence and ethnocentrism.  
This discussion opens the way to show how, while maintaining that every appearance involves 
reparatory violence, Derrida "qualifies" his notion of exclusionary violence.  I then argue that  
his qualifications mark the sites at which the concentration of exclusionary violence can be 
expected.  In particular, Derrida contends that exclusionary violence is inherently linked to 
ethnocentrism, and therefore always involves questions of the ethnos: questions of race, 
nationality, language, culture, and ultimately questions of what it means to be human as opposed 
to animal.  Hence, I hold that the unavoidable exclusionary violence present in every act of 
signification is, for Derrida, always already a violence involving life.  It is the unavoidability of 
this violence to life that determines Derrida’s fundamental resistance to discourses of non-
violence.   
Chapter Two examines Derrida's critique of discourses of non-violence as a means to 
explore further his notion that violence is unavoidable.  I show that Derrida resists the notion of 
non-violence as marking a power or site free from violence because of his worry that establishing 
the purity of non-violence forecloses the question of violence and, in doing so, denies the 
unavoidability of violence.  I trace, through his reading of Levinas and Benjamin, the link he 
makes between foreclosing the question of violence and “subjectivity,” “ipseity,” and ultimately 
“sovereignty.”  He argues that the problem with this kind of sovereign foreclosure is that it tends 
toward “the worst.”  I then proceed to show how the writings on non-violence by Emmanuel 
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Levinas, Hannah Arendt, and Walter Benjamin do in fact foreclose the question of violence and 
non-violence, by attempting to establish the purity of the non-violent in opposition to the violent.   
I expose this moment of foreclosure in Levinas’s work, through a reading of Derrida’s 
“Violence and Metaphysics.”  I argue that in this essay Derrida concerns himself primarily with 
Levinas’s unwillingness to explain how he can identify, name, and know the violent when, by his 
own account, the ability to do so appears only through the violence of light and subjectivity.  
Similarly my reading of Arendt maintains that Derrida shares with other critics a concern with 
her attempt to separate violence from power or violent force from non-violent force.  I sketch 
Arendt’s conflicting accounts of the founding relationship between power and violence in On 
Violence and On Revolution, and I argue that Arendt’s separation of power and violence stands at 
odds with her notion of human action as fundamentally indeterminable. 
Lastly, I take up Derrida’s critique of Benjamin in “Force of Law.”  I contend that here 
Derrida makes clear the stakes involved in his concern over discourses of non-violence.  For here 
he argues that the problem created by foreclosing the question of violence is a tendency toward 
the “worst” violence.  This chapter concludes by showing that, in his resistance to non-violence, 
Derrida frames the deconstructive project fundamentally as a critique of non-violence.  
Furthermore, Derrida's own critique of non-violence clarifies his notion of “sovereignty,” as the 
power to make a decision about what constitutes the violent and the non-violent, the power to 
decide on which life can be damaged or sacrificed with impunity.    
Chapter Three explores the importance of violence in Adorno’s work through the figures 
of “identity” and “exchange.”  Following from Adorno’s claim that “pain” and “negativity” are 
“the moving forces of dialectical thinking,” exclusionary violence and particularly violence to 
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life can be marked as a fundamental category of negative dialectical method.9   Here I note a 
profound sympathy and continuity between the work of Adorno and Derrida.  I show that, for 
Adorno, the dialectical logic of identity structurally and unavoidably weaves exclusionary 
violence into all acts of signification, meaning, and thought.  Adorno conceives this violence as 
operating by the exclusion of the unique spatio-temporal aspects of objects, leading to a logic by 
which subjectivity dominates objectivity, particularly the objectivity that is the living subject.  I 
explore Adorno's contention that this reduction of the life of subjects occurs socially through the 
“principle of exchange” and the reduction of subjects, under capitalism, to “wage workers.”10  
Adorno asserts that this reduction leads subjects into a self-destructive relationship to their own 
lives, a relationship I parallel with Derrida’s notion of autoimmunity.  Thus, I point to two 
confluences between the work of Derrida and Adorno.  Both projects are oriented by a 
commitment to the irreducibility of exclusionary violence, and both deny the feasibility of 
resisting violence simply by rejecting it.        
Beginning with a discussion of Adorno’s resistance to discourses of non-violence as 
shown in his critiques of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, Chapter Four develops the 
connection between questions of violence and questions of life in both Adorno and Derrida.  The 
argument establishes that Adorno, like Derrida, resists any notion of non-violence as a power or 
site free from violence.  His resistance emerges from a concern that such claims suppress their 
own inherent dialectical logic, allowing naturalization of the current state of the world and 
affirming history as a reflection of the essence of the world.   
I argue that the stakes of Adorno's concerns with the discourses of non-violence are seen 
most clearly in his critique of Heidegger which is remarkably similar to Derrida's.  Chapter Four 
                                                 
9 ND 202/202.  
10 ND 146/149. 
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concludes that Adorno’s resistance to the discourses of non-violence clarifies his orientation to 
these discourses, the import in his work of questions of life, and his marked continuity with 
Derrida.  Further it defines critical theory as a critique of non-violence fundamentally concerned 
with the “naturalization” of ‘life.”   
Ultimately my aim is to show that questions of violence and life are central to the work of 
both Derrida and Adorno, producing a remarkable and previously under-theorized affinity 
between the deconstructive project and critical theory.  Furthermore I find an inherently 
ecological vein in the concern of both their thinking, a vein oriented by questions of coexistence 
and particularly the violence of coexistence.  In fact Adorno speaks of a critical ecology and 
Derrida of a deconstructive ecology.  In examining what a critical ecology might mean, I hear it 
as a challenge to ask, "What do our actions, systems, and structures live on?"  For a system of 
thinking or way of life that refuses to attend consciously to what it eats runs the risk of pandemic 
violence that consumes everything in its path and finally devours itself.          
 13
Chapter One:  
Foundational, Reparatory, and Empirical Violence in the Work of Jacques Derrida 
 
“La cruauté est toujours à l’œuvre.” 
--Jacques Derrida 
 
 The question of writing is, in the work of Jacques Derrida, everywhere accompanied by 
violence.  For example, in Of Grammatology one reads that “Rousseau and Lévi-Strauss are not 
for a moment to be challenged when they relate the power of writing to the exercise of violence” 
(Derrida, G 106/156).  A bit later, in that same text, Derrida unequivocally states that “we 
[Derrida], like Lévi-Strauss, conclude that violence is writing” (Derrida, G 135/195).  The 
association of writing with violence is hardly unique to Derrida’s thinking emerging from Plato 
to Saussure.11  This association emerges from a notion of speech as more present than writing, 
the notion that writing sacrifices the presence of speech to thought in a way that necessarily does 
violence to thought.  Working through the relationship between writing and violence is a major 
preoccupation of Derrida’s early work, figuring prominently not only in Of Grammatology but 
also in essays from Writing and Difference and even spectrally in Speech and Phenomenon.12  
Despite the central role given to the interrelation of violence and writing in Derrida’s work little 
of the scholarship has looked closely at exactly what he means by the term violence and the way 
in which violence sits, in many respects, at the heart of both the deconstructive project and the 
                                                 
11 See James K. A. Smith The Fall of Interpretation. Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 116-129. 
12 Jacques Derrida. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1978; L’écriture et la difference. Éditions du Seuil, 1967.  Hereafter cited as WD.  Speech and Phenomena: 
And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs. Edited by John Wild. Translated by David B. Allison. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973; La Voix et le Phénomène. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.  
Hereafter cited as SP.  The French word violence never appears in the text of La Voix et le Phénomène.  However, 
Derrida speaks in that text of phenomenology as “tormented,” and, in a crucial footnote, he links his exploration of 
phenomenology to his understanding of writing.  In particular, he suggests that questions of phonetic and non-
phonetic writing could be graphed onto his concerns with Husserlian phenomenology, and he suggests that such a 
graphing “endangers” Husserl’s entire system.  One can thus see that in all Derrida’s early works, even those not 
explicitly concerned with the question of writing and violence, these themes are never absent.  See SP 4/5, 27-28/29.     
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trajectory of Derrida’s later work on sovereignty, law, and animality. 13  This is not to suggest 
that commentators have ignored Derrida’s focus on questions of violence, particularly in his later 
political works.  However, in the main, existing scholarship little acknowledges the constitutive 
role concerns over violence play in Derrida’s thinking, and there is as yet no account that traces 
how questions of violence influence the methodology and entire trajectory of Derrida’s corpus.   
This chapter aims first to clarify the link between violence and writing as a preface to 
exploring how the structural violence of “writing” leads to other forms of physical and psychical 
violence, particularly around issues of exclusion, language, the nation-state, and animality.  I 
begin by outlining Derrida’s understanding of writing and its relationship to violence. 
 
I: Originary Reparations: The “Violence” Before “Violence” 
 In Of Grammatology Derrida defines writing as “not only the physical gestures of literal 
pictographic or ideographic inscription, but also the totality of what makes it [pictographic or 
ideographic inscription] possible” (Derrida, G 9/19).  Writing designates both the literal marks 
on the page or screen and that which makes such marking possible.  Beyond the merely literal 
notion of writing understood in the strict sense of the inscribing of words, Derrida uses “writing” 
to name the possibility of inscription and representation in general, the possibility that something 
can represent or stand in for something else.  Writing is simultaneously the condition for there 
being a discernable difference between any two things (whether these be objects, signs, ideas, 
affects, etc) and the set of symbols that marks these differences.  Writing thus constitutes a 
                                                 
13 There are several notable exceptions to this general trend, texts that emphasize both the issue of violence and the 
continuity between the concerns of Derrida’s early and later work.  Jack E. Marsh Jr. “Of Violence: The Force and 
Significance of Violence in the early Derrida” Philosophy Social Criticism 35 (2009): 269-286.  Marko Zlomistic, 
Jacques Derrida’s Aporetic Ethics. New York: Lexington Books, 2007; David Wood. The Step Back: Ethics and 
Politics after Deconstruction. New York: SUNY Press, 2005. Christopher Johnson’s System and Writing in the 
Philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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differential system in two senses.  On the one hand, writing is a differential system of signs,14 
such as any set of inscriptions; and, on the other hand, it is the structural possibility of difference 
itself—the fact that there is any discernable difference between one thing and another.15  Existing 
as both these differential moments, writing is necessary for the constitution and production of 
meaning. 
Following the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida conceives meaning as conditioned 
by difference.  Meaning and signification require difference, as there would otherwise be no 
intelligible distinction between a thing and its representation, between the signifier and the 
signified.16  In a world without an irreducible difference between signifiers and signifieds there 
could be no language, thought, or meaning, since every word and idea would be 
indistinguishable from the thing for which it is a symbol.  Thus writing is “the origin of meaning 
in general”; writing names the basic differential structure that makes meaning possible (G 
9/19).17  While writing is necessary for meaning to exist, the difference it represents also 
jeopardizes the completeness and purity of all meaning.  
                                                 
14 I use the phrase “differential system of signs” to express the Saussurean notion, with which Derrida agrees, that 
signifiers, words, and symbols only have meaning in relation to other signifiers, words, or symbols.   
15 These two senses of “differential system” parallel the two meanings Derrida ascribes to différance.  On the one 
hand, the notion of writing as a differential system of signs expresses difference as deferral, the relaying and also 
delaying of meaning from one sign to another.  On the other hand, the notion of writing as originary difference 
expresses difference as differentiation, the spatial or logical distinctness of one thing from another.  For a full 
discussion of différance see “Differance” in Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of 
Signs. Edited by John Wild. Translated by David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 129-
160.  “La Différance.” Theorie d’ensemble Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968.         
16 See G 14/26 and also WD 281/412 where Derrida writes “as soon as one seeks to demonstrate in this way that 
there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or play of signification henceforth has no limit, 
one must reject even the concept and word ‘sign’ itself—which is precisely what cannot be done.  For the 
signification ‘sign’ has always been understood and determined, in its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a 
signified, a signifier different from its signified.”  The sign, in order to be a concept that makes any sense at all, 
requires a discernable difference between the signifier and the signified.    
17 Nietzsche argues something very similar in his essay “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.”  In this essay, 
Nietzsche shows that “truth” and by extension meaning emerges out of language.  It is only at the point at which one 
has an agreed upon set of designations that one can begin to question the “truth” or “meaning” of an object.  This 
link to Nietzsche is particularly interesting for my project, as Nietzsche constantly connects questions of meaning 
and truth to questions of the “human” and the “non-human”.  In fact, Nietzsche suggests that the very notion of the 
“human” has a direct relationship to meaning, truth, and language.  Hence, the question of the “human” and of the 
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If meaning and signification require an irreducible moment of difference, and if writing is 
the moment of difference, then it follows that writing (and all modes of representation) must 
always fall short of full representation of the signified.  They must leave some aspect of the thing 
unrepresented.  The inherent demand for difference necessitates this “failure.”  A signifier can 
never absolutely represent its signified.  Despite one’s best intentions, one cannot produce a 
symbol or set of symbols that fully describe any object, for words are always different from the 
things they represent.  Thus, writing comes to mark a paradox at the heart of meaning and 
signification, for in order to represent anything at all, every representational system, mode of 
inscription, and system of writing must leave something unrepresented, eliminating the 
possibility of a “complete” or “pure” representation.18  This paradox is the basis of Derrida’s 
critique of logocentrism.  This critique claims that within any system of signification (figured as 
absence), “writing” undermines in advance language’s assumed identity with the logos (figured 
as presence).19  Speech cannot be pure presence since, as a signifying system, it requires a 
moment of difference or deferral, that is, a moment in which the signified is absence.  It is in this 
claim about the paradoxical structure of language and writing that Derrida will locate the 
problem of “violence.”  
Within the structure of writing exists the paradox that there must be, in every act of 
signification, something that remains unrepresented or excluded.  Derrida recognizes that this 
necessity for exclusion introduces the irreducible possibility of confusion, dissemination, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
“non-human,” of “non-human animals” and “human animals” or non-human “life” and human “life” is always 
already in operation in both Derrida’s and Nietzsche’s work.    
18Derrida also expresses his commitment to constitutive incompleteness in his equating of writing with “metaphor” 
or “metaphoricity.”  Metaphors presupposes a certain incompleteness insofar as they describe some object or 
situation only on the condition that they be something fundamentally different than that which they describe.  See G 
15/27.  Derrida’s most sustained engagement with the question of metaphor comes in “White Mythologies” Margins 
of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 207-272. 
19For a concise account of Derrida’s critique of logocentrism see Christopher Johnson. System and Writing in the 
Philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 66; and Arthur Bradley. 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008, 47-50. 
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misrepresentation within every act of signification.  As he writes in Of Grammatology, “writing, 
obliteration [oblitération] of the proper classed in the play of difference, is the originary violence 
itself: pure impossibility of the ‘vocative mark,’ impossible purity of the mark of vocation” 
(Derrida, G 110/162).  The differential and paradoxical character of writing undermines the 
potential of ever “properly classing” or fully representing any signified, a fact that cancels the 
chance of there ever being a pure, totally accurate and true representation.  The use of 
“obliteration” to translate “oblitération” is a bit misleading.  The English “obliteration” implies 
total annihilation or effacement in a way that the French “oblitération” does not.  In fact, 
“oblitération” never implies total annihilation, connoting rather the “canceling” or “occlusion” 
of something as, for example, the canceling of a postage stamp.  Hence, the language of 
“oblitération” shows that the proper is never completely destroyed without a trace but is rather 
compromised in advance in a way that leaves some trace or remnant of “the proper” as always 
already compromised.  This impossibility of completely representing any object is a structural 
facet of writing, signification, and meaning.  However, as the language of oblitération suggests, 
this moment of distortion or canceling implies a material loss, insofar as the structural loss 
during the process of conceptualization leaves some trace, some indication, some scent of the 
exclusion it implies.  I will return to the link between the structural fact of loss and its material 
consequences shortly.  However the point for now is that, given the impossibility of true and 
complete representations, the entire system and logic of signification is throw into question.  
Every signification becomes suspect and corrupt.  Derrida uses the term “originary violence” to 
describe the structural uncertainty implied by this irreducible possibility of corruption and 
misrepresentation.  He then goes on to clarify the nature of this violence and its originary status. 
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Derrida uses the notion of originariness to qualify violence in at least two ways.  On the 
one hand, the originary marks the structural necessity of violence in all modes of signification 
and meaning.  As outlined above, there is no meaning or signification without difference, and, 
consequently, no signification without the structural threat of harm or violence to the signified—
without the threat that some aspect of an object will be excluded from its representation.  On the 
other hand, this “originality” marks structural violence as the origin of all other violence, for 
“[a]nterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense […] there is, as the 
space of its possibility, the violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of 
classification, and of the system of appellations” (G 110/162).  The violence of arche-writing is 
originary insofar as it introduces the possibility and opens the space for all other violence, since 
the irreducible fact of difference, the possibility of contamination, corruption, and 
misrepresentation, must be anterior to any particular instance of such contamination or 
corruption.  Originary violence is, thus, “originary” insofar as it is necessary, structural, and 
anterior to all other forms of violence.  Yet one wonders exactly what kind of violence is 
suggested here, since originary violence cannot be, on this account, physical or psychical 
violence. 
Given that originary violence is structurally necessary, it cannot be physical or psychical, 
since all physical or psychical violence is by definition contingent.  Nothing in the logic of 
arche-violence dictates the necessity of any particular violent act, in the same way that, for 
example, the structural possibility of breaking someone’s arm in no way commands that any 
particular arm be broken.  In addition, the anteriority of originary violence means that such 
violence must precede any violent act; in fact, it must precede the very distinction between 
violence and non-violence as such.  Originary violence opens the possibility of violence, by 
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allowing a distinction between the violent and non-violent, a distinction which is, of course, 
necessary for the appearance of any particular violent act.  Arche-violence, thus, is not violence 
directly perpetrated on the bodies or minds of individuals.  In the strict sense, it is not perpetrated 
at all for it must lack all physical or psychical content.   
Derrida presents originary violence as a “middle voice” between violence and non-
violence, enabling the possibility of all violence but lacking all discernable content.  “True” 
originary violence, if there were such a thing, would be an empty, abstract, and contentless 
“violence” of pure possibility: neither positive nor negative, real nor imagined, good nor evil, 
productive nor destructive.  Such “violence” would be nothing but an irreducible possibility, an 
opening that allows for every violent and non-violent act to follow and whose only defining 
feature is that its possibility cannot be completely eliminated.  One might rightly wonder why 
Derrida insists on continuing to call this contentless, openness of possibility violence.  I think it 
is because he does not want to suggest or forget that this possibility of violence always already 
implies actual violence.  There will be real harm.  Yet, if originary violence is simply the 
condition for the possibility of violence and non-violence, then how is it that this pure condition 
comes to have content?  What is the connection between the space or possibility of violence and 
any particular violent act?  This connection is, I think, constellated around yet another paradox: 
originary violence can appear only by disappearing. 
Derrida most clearly defines violence in a passage from Of Grammatology when he 
writes: 
[t]o think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of 
arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of self-
presence, in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence which 
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has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, 
incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance. (G 112/165) 
   
The character of archē or originary violence is positioned around the figure of loss, in particular 
the “loss of what has never taken place.”  Insofar as it is an expression of irreducible difference, 
originary violence is the loss of the proper, the loss of the absolute closeness of thought to words 
and the self to itself.  It is the loss of any possibility of thinking or representing the uniqueness of 
a particular object in its particularity, because it marks the limit that allows engagement with the 
signified only through a generalized set of signs, which are by necessity always different from 
the objects they wish to define.  Originary violence, thus, exposes the loss of the possibility to 
represent fully any object in its uniqueness—the loss of the power of signs to signify objects as 
they “properly” are.  Yet this loss is also a fiction, for the vision of absolute closeness it bemoans 
will have always been a mere dream, a mirage, a phantasm; all systems of signification and 
meaning require difference, and difference forecloses in advance the possibility of absolute 
presence or contiguity.  This is why originary violence paradoxically appears only in its 
disappearance; it manifests only by ceasing to be the ambiguous possibility of violence or non-
violence, by becoming a particularized manifestation either violent or not.  It is this limiting of 
possibility, this limiting of originary violence, that marks the first step toward concrete violence, 
a step Derrida characterizes as “reparatory.”       
 Directly following his description of originary violence, Derrida writes  
[o]ut of this arche-violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed by a second 
violence that is reparatory [réparatrice], protective, instituting the ‘moral,’ 
prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and obliteration of the 
so-called proper name which was already dividing the proper, a third violence can 
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possibly emerge or not (an empirical possibility) within what is commonly called 
evil, war, indiscretion, and rape. (G 112/165) 
   
Empirical violence can emerge out of originary violence, as a potentiality made possible by 
originary difference.  This passage from the structural possibility of violence to empirical 
violence is, however, mediated by a “second” form of violence that limits or forecloses the 
openness of arche-violence.  As discussed above, originary violence cannot in itself have content 
or appear, as it is nothing more than an open space of possibility.  Hence, in order for something 
to appear as “violent,” there is a need to limit the pure openness of originary difference.  
Reparatory violence answers this need.  The reparatory, as its etymology suggests,20 orders the 
openness of originary difference, allowing for the appearance of an object by differentiating or 
opposing it to other objects.21  This differentiation creates a situation in which an object is seen 
to exclude other, dissimilar objects.  This exclusion becomes the basis for the appearance of the 
object as this object and not another object.  For example, reparatory exclusion divides writing 
from speech within logocentric discourses.  Speech is defined in opposition to writing.  This 
operation excludes writing from the domain of speech, thus establishing the character of both 
speech and writing.22  The possibility of anything appearing at all, for Derrida, requires this 
                                                 
20 The word reparatory is a modified noun form of the verb “to repair.”  Repairing has two etymological sources, the 
first is from the Latin verb “reparāre” meaning to make ready, put in order, or prepare.  The second is from the late 
Latin verb “repatriāre” meaning “to return to one's country (a combing of the prefix “re” and the noun “patria,” 
fatherland).  Hence, the reparatory implies a systemizing or putting in order, but one which harkens back to a 
previous condition, a return to a former state or arrangement, and this arrangement evokes a notion of the fatherland 
or land of origin.  All etymological citations are from the OED.    
21 “Réparatrice” is just one of several terms with which Derrida marks this process of limiting through exclusion.  
For example, he frequently employs the term “economic” to describe a similar dynamic.  See “From Restricted to 
General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve” in Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978: 251-277/369-407.   
22 See G 33-34/50-51.  Speaking of the necessity of the logocentric opposition of speech and writing, Derrida writes, 
“the condition for the scientificity of linguistics is that the field of linguistics have hard and fast frontiers, that it be a 
system regulated by an internal necessity, and that in a certain way its structure be closed.  The representativist 
concept of writing facilitates things.  If writing is nothing but the ‘figuration’ [. . .] of the language, one has the right 
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structural delimiting.  This exclusive process orders the ambiguous and always uncertain 
openness of originary difference, allowing an object to appear as this particular object.  
However, in the process of allowing an object to appear, this reparatory delimiting also institutes 
a certain “morality”—that in the name of which an appearing thing is constituted as the thing it 
is. 
The delimiting originary difference not only sets up the possibility of appearance but also 
necessitates the creation of a morality.  The process that defines an object in opposition to other 
objects simultaneously demarcates the legitimacy or illegitimacy of that object.  The appearance 
of any object, for example a “Disaster Relief Organization,” requires that it be distinguished 
from other objects which are not such organizations.  This set of rules serves as the foundation of 
the “moral.”  The moral establishes the notion of a “Disaster Relief Organization” as a group of 
people who work together to assist victims of disasters.  This notion or set of rules renders a 
“Disaster Relief Organization” recognizable and confirms that this particular thing in front of me 
is a group of people that assist victims of disasters.  At the same time, these rules legitimize the 
Relief Group’s appearance, prescribing that anything that does not correspond to this notion is 
not a legitimate “Disaster Relief Organization.”  Hence, the reparatory marks a twofold 
delimiting and ordering of the undecidability of originary violence both by allowing the 
appearance of an object and establishing the rules by which the relative legitimacy of that 
appearance is discernible.  Every appearance brings with it a set of moral assertions, which 
operates to legitimate and protect that appearance.  Importantly for Derrida, this legitimation and 
protection takes place through an inherent hierarchy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
to exclude it from the interiority of the system [. . .] as the image maybe excluded without damage from the system 
of reality” (G 33/50). 
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The necessary co-arising of morality and appearance shows that a hierarchically arranged 
system of value is structurally implicit in every appearance.  The fact that every appearance 
brings with it a set of guidelines by which to judge the legitimacy of that appearance means that 
some appearances are situated, from the beginning, as superior to others.  To return to the 
example of the Disaster Relief Organization, the appearance of such an organization as having 
certain qualities that define it means that those appearances that most possess these qualities will 
be considered more “legitimately” Disaster Relief Organizations than those that do not.  The 
organization that appears to most effectively assist victims of disasters, that most conforms to the 
concept of a Disaster Relief Organization, will appear “better” than the organization that does 
not.  Thus in every appearance there is an implicit and distinct hierarchy at work that privileges 
some objects over others.  Yet this hierarchizing is not created, as my example might suggest, 
simply by historical or cultural pragmatics; rather this hierarchizing is inherent within the very 
category of appearance. 
The fact that morality arises with appearance, that there can be no appearing without 
circumscribing what is inside and outside, legitimate and illegitimate, good and evil, illustrates 
that questions of privilege and legitimacy are always already on the side of appearing.  The 
delimiting of the concept of “appearing” emerges, like all appearances, from the separating of 
appearing from its opposite, non-appearing; this separation brings with it a morality in which 
appearance is privileged and protected from what is other than appearance, namely, non-
appearance or absence.  Thus, the co-arising of appearing and morality shows that appearing, in 
its concept, is necessarily privileged over not appearing.  In fact, morality in its most basic form 
is nothing other than the defense of appearing against non-appearing, the shoring up of presence 
against absence, the sandbagging of the inside against the rising waters of the outside.  It is in 
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this context that Derrida will everywhere maintain the unavoidability not only of privileging 
presence over absence, but of binary opposition more generally, and of phonocentrism and 
logocentrism in particular.   
It is not an accident of culture or historicity that morality always privileges what appears 
against what does not appear, fortifying presence over absence:  
The privilege of the phonè does not depend upon a choice that could have been 
avoided.  It responds to a moment of economy (let us say of the ‘life’ of ‘history’ 
or of ‘being as self-relationship). The system of ‘hearing (understanding)-oneself-
speak’ through the phonic substance [. . .] has necessarily dominated the history 
of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the very idea of the 
world, the idea of the world-origin, that arises from the difference between the 
worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality, 
universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc. (G 7-8/17) 
The privileging of appearing over non-appearing emerges from the delimiting of opposites and 
the protection of that delimiting by a morality that always favors that which appears.  The system 
of hearing and understanding oneself speak, because it appears to be “present,” here and now, 
has not only dominated a certain understanding of the world, but has actually given rise to the 
very concept of the “world,” as an internally consistent system organized around a logic of 
binary opposition.  This system has, as Derrida emphasizes, arisen precisely out of the 
differentiation and exclusion of the outside from the inside, the non-worldly from the worldly, 
the non-appearing from the appearing, etc.  Hence, the privileging of a certain set of 
phonocentric binaries is structurally unavoidable.  Yet while unavoidable, this privileging 
remains paradoxical. 
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Although the privileging of presence over absence and inside over outside is necessary 
for appearance, this privileging ultimately is paradoxical, since the two sides of any binary 
opposition cannot remain completely and purely separated.  For example, recall that appearing is 
established only through separating it from its other, non-appearing.  This separation is defended 
by a set of moral assumptions that arises alongside it to protect the concept of appearing from its 
other by totally separating the two.  Yet this total separation cannot be logically maintained, as 
the emergence of “appearing” as a concept requires that it have a relationship of opposition with 
“non-appearing.”  “Appearing” can appear only in conjunction with “non-appearing.”  Thus 
appearing must always, unavoidably, bring with it the notion of non-appearing.   The 
impossibility of maintaining the absolute separation of any two binarily opposed concepts 
disrupts, fundamentally, the ability to privilege hierarchically one side of any binary over the 
other since each side is equally necessary to the other’s existence.  We have thus seen that all 
appearing requires a morally reinforced separation of it from its opposite.  However, this 
separation cannot be consistently maintained. 
Because the necessary yet paradoxical separation of any appearance from its opposite is 
not consistently sustainable, every appearance retains some relation to its opposite.  Nevertheless 
it can appear only by denying this relationship, by feigning separation.  The possibility of 
appearance is based, then, on an unjustifiable and, therefore, violent moment of exclusion in 
which what is “other” to any particular appearance is occluded and denied in order to allow for 
the emergence of that particular appearance.  Derrida presents this logic clearly in his discussion 
of speech and writing.  There he shows that the defining of writing in opposition to speech, 
although the basis for the appearance of both speech and writing, operates to exclude writing 
entirely from domain of speech.  This exclusion makes disappear those aspects of writing that do 
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not fit its characterization as speech’s illegitimate double.23  All appearing for Derrida contains a 
necessary moment of exclusion, and it is this exclusion that marks the beginning of the 
relationship between the openness of originary violence and concrete manifestations of violence.   
The exploration of originary and reparatory violence shows that the first form of 
something resembling concrete violence is an exclusion.  The move from the utterly abstract 
openness of originary violence to any form of physical or psychical violence must occur by way 
of a second violence of reparatory delimiting, an economic moment which, although allowing for 
the possibility of content, operates through a logic of exclusion.  Hence, it is the exclusionary 
violence of reparation that provides the basic passage from the structural possibility of violence 
to violence in the world.  It is evident that while exclusion defines the relationship between 
originary and concrete violence, the exclusionary violence outlined thus far is not particularly 
concrete.  It does not prescribe a particular instance of exclusion but rather shows that there will 
always be a moment of exclusion in all appearance.  In addition, this exclusionary “violence” 
must not be seen as purely negative because there can be no appearing without it.  What should 
be clear at this point, however, is that a basic exclusionary structure is integral to Derrida’s 
thinking on violence.  To provide a fuller sketch of Derrida’s understanding of exclusionary 
violence, let us turn to a textual example of the risk inherent in the relationship between the 
reparatory attempt to foreclose difference and the possibility of exclusionary violence.  This 
relationship and its consequences can be illustrated through a close reading of Derrida’s critique 
of Lévi-Strauss’s “The Writing Lesson.”  In particular, one finds in this reading that it is Lévi-
Strauss’s reparatory denial of writing to the Nambikwara that, as Derrida argues, leads to the 
ethnocentric and violent denial of subjectivity to the Nambikwara.       
 
                                                 
23 See G 27/42 ff. 
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II: Lévi-Strauss and The Violence of Ethnocentrism  
Several sections in Of Grammatology are devoted to a detailed critique of a number of 
chapters from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques, a book of observations concerning the 
Nambikwara, an indigenous people living in the Brazilian Amazon.24  In these observations, 
Lévi-Strauss makes two essential claims about Nambikwara society: first, that it does not possess 
writing and, second, that it is fundamentally peaceful and nonviolent.  These two assertions are 
logically conjoined, as Lévi-Strauss attributes the introduction of writing by Western 
anthropologists in Nambikwara society with the introduction of violence (G 117/172).  To 
maintain this argument, Lévi-Strauss is led to foreclose the possibility that Nambikwara culture 
had either writing or violence before their encounter with the West.  Implicit in this position is a 
clearly defined answer to the question of what constitutes writing.  In fact, Lévi-Strauss contends 
that the Nambikwara’s lack of writing “goes without saying,” suggesting that the nature of 
writing and the question of who does and does not possess it are self-evident (G 110/161).  
Derrida is dissatisfied with that position and goes on to show that Lévi-Strauss resolves the 
question of the Nambikwara’s goodness and innocence in an equally suspicious manner (G 
117/171-172).  The importance of these claims to the present discussion is that one catches in 
them a glimpse of something like a reparatory moment in which the defining of an object allows 
a clear demarcation of that object as either inside or outside, possessed or unpossessed, present 
or absent.  This is how Lévi-Strauss defines writing in relation to Nambikwara and Western 
society.  Derrida’s analysis explores this reparatory moment by challenging Lévi-Strauss’s 
resolution of the question of the Nambikwara and writing.     
                                                 
24 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques. Translated by John Weightman and Doreen Weightman. New York: 
Penguin Press, 1992; Tristes Tropiques. Paris: Pocket, 2001.   
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There are, for Derrida, a number of empirical reasons for contesting Lévi-Strauss’s 
claims concerning the Nambikwara’s apparent lack of writing and violence.  For example, Lévi-
Strauss himself documents the existence, albeit briefly, of “zigzags” and “dots” on the 
calabashes of the Nambikwara, prompting Derrida to wonder “up to what point it is legitimate 
not to call by the name writing these ‘few dots’ and ‘zigzags’” (G 110/162).  In addition, Lévi-
Strauss documents and yet passes over explicit acts of physical violence between members of the 
Nambikwara (for example, the striking of a child by another [G113/166]) and ignores the fact 
that the existence of a social hierarchy in the Nambikwara society already implies the exercise of 
a certain violence or threat of authority.  Yet Derrida’s most pressing disagreement with Lévi-
Strauss’s position emerges from immanent rather than empirical grounds and involves the issue 
of proper names. 
Lévi-Strauss relates an account of the way in which he manipulated some of the 
Nambikwara children into disclosing the secret and forbidden “proper names” of the various 
adult members of the tribe (G 110-111/162-163).  He offers this account to illustrate the 
corrupting force the Western anthropologists had on the Nambikwara, lending support to the 
notion that it was they who introduced the Nambikwara to violence along with writing.  
However, Derrida sees in this story not an introduction of violence but rather the expression of a 
violence that was always already present.  Analyzing the denial of writing to the Nambikwara, 
Derrida wonders “above all, how can we deny the practice of writing in general to a society 
capable of obliterating the proper, that is to say a violent society?” (G 110/162).  How can Lévi-
Strauss forbid violence and, consequently, writing to a society in which there can be, as Lévi-
Strauss himself documents, a “revealing” of the proper, as the possibility of such revealing 
suggests already the possibility of corruption and violence?       
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The fact that the Nambikwara have “secret,” “proper” names and that the 
revealing of these names contains a danger, a danger so great that it must be 
forbidden, presumably by the threat of violence to the one who reveals these 
names, shows that the Nambikwara, despite Lévi-Strauss’s contention, were 
already a society infected with violence.  Only an already violent society can have 
secrets and threat associated with disclosure of those secrets, for the possibility of 
threat necessitates the existence of violence.  Lévi-Strauss’s story attests to a 
structural violence already at work in Nambikwara society prior to the arrival of 
the Western anthropologists—this violence being the threat opened by the 
inherent inability to fully secure the “proper.” (G 107/157)   
There is a co-conditioning relationship in Lévi-Strauss’s work between writing and violence—
the one always bringing with it the other.  Therefore the notion of Nambikwara society as always 
already violent troubles fundamentally Lévi-Strauss’s entire characterization.  If Nambikwara 
society contained violence prior to the arrival of Western anthropologists, then they must have 
also had some prior form of writing.  Derrida writes: 
[V]iolence here does not unexpectedly break in all at once, starting from some 
original innocence whose nakedness is surprised at the moment that the secret of 
the so-called proper names is violated.  The structure of violence is complex and 
its possibility—writing—no less so. (G 111-112/164) 
Lévi-Strauss’s inability to maintain his claim that Nambikwara society lacks violence 
fundamentally compromises his denial of writing to them.  On this reading, writing and violence 
must have been a part of Nambikwara society long before the arrival of Lévi-Strauss or his crew.  
Having identified one difficulty in Lévi-Strauss’s analysis, Derrida raises another.  The failure of 
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Lévi-Strauss’s denial of writing to the Nambikwara throws into question his certainty about the 
nature of writing. 
 As discussed above, Lévi-Strauss’s denial of writing to the Nambikwara emerges out of 
an implicit sureness about the nature of writing: he acts as though he already knows, self-
evidently, what writing is and who does and does not posses it.  This certainty operates as a kind 
of reparatory foreclosing of originary difference.  By clearly defining the nature of writing, Lévi-
Strauss’s analysis gives the appearance of a resolution of all ambiguity concerning the 
Nambikwara’s status as an illiterate and consequently nonviolent people.  Derrida’s exposure of 
the paradox of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis undermines his certainty, since the inability to maintain 
the exclusion of writing and violence from the Nambikwara shows that writing must be 
something different from what Levi-Strauss implicitly assumes.  Derrida thus illustrates the 
logical failure of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis and by extension the failure of the reparatory to 
foreclose originary violence.  That is to say, Derrida’s critique of Lévi-Strauss illustrates how the 
limiting of originary violence by reparatory violence will always suffer from an unavoidable 
incompleteness.  There will be more to say about the inability to overcome, from a Derridean 
perspective, the logic of originary violence.  However, the stakes of Derrida’s analysis are much 
higher than simply exposing a logical inconsistency in the work of Lévi-Strauss.  Derrida is 
interested in demonstrating that the kind of paradox illustrated in Lévi-Strauss’s analysis implies 
a dangerous and ultimately ethnocentric “morality.”   
The denial of writing to the Nambikwara, the attempt to foreclose originary difference 
through a protective and reparatory certainty about the nature of writing, carries with it a certain 
morality, one in which the Nambikwara are seen as the bearers of an inherent innocence and 
goodness.  As Derrida writes, “[t]he Nambikwara, around whom the ‘Writing Lesson’ will 
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unfold its scene, among whom evil will insinuate itself with the intrusion of writing come from 
without [. . .] the Nambikwara, who do not have writing, are good, we are told” (G 116/170).  
The interconnectedness of writing and violence assures that if the Nambikwara lack writing, then 
they also lack violence and must, therefore, be good.  The certainty over the nature of writing 
paints a scene in which the Nambikwara are a good, non-violent, and innocent people, corrupted 
by the bad and violent influence of Westerners and their writing.  Now this scene proves to be 
logically problematic, as the paradoxical nature of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis undermines the denial 
of both writing and violence on which this scene rests.  However, the morality that structures this 
scene—the attempt to bestow unspoiled innocence and goodness on the Nambikwara and deny 
them writing—is instituted “in the name of” avoiding ethnocentrism.   
Derrida writes:  
One already suspects—and all of Levi-Struass’s writings would confirm it—that 
the critique of ethnocentrism, a theme so dear to the author of Tristes Tropiques, 
has most often the sole function of constituting the other as a model of original 
and natural goodness, of accusing and humiliating oneself, of exhibiting its being 
unacceptable in an anti-ethnocentric mirror. (G 114/167)25   
The making of the Nambikwara into the carriers of goodness, peace, and innocence is an attempt 
to honor their “otherness,” to avoid the cultural bias of ethnocentrism by making the “other” the 
bearer of all the positive qualities which are found lacking in one’s own culture or society.  Yet 
this construction of “the other,” for all its good intentions, produces the very kind of ethnocentric 
violence it was designed to prevent insofar as it constructs the Other only in relation to Western 
culture.  The result of Lévi-Strauss’s characterization of the Nambikwara is that they become 
                                                 
25 For a concise account of this logic in Lévi-Strauss as well as Margaret Mead and others see Rey Chow. Writing 
Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1993, 27-54. 
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nothing but “a ‘zero degree’ with reference to which one could outline the structure, the growth, 
and above all the degradation of our [Lévi-Strauss’s] society and our culture” (G 115/168).  The 
move to see the other as the locus of goodness turns the other into a mirror in which “I” am able 
to see not the “other” but only another, “better” version of “myself.”  The logic of Lévi-Strauss’s 
reading results in ethnocentric violence being done to the Nambikwara precisely in the name of 
saving them from this kind of violence.  Here then is a contextualized example of the danger 
inherent in any reparatory moment: the risk of doing exclusionary violence to the very thing that 
one most wishes to secure beyond the threat of violence.  Contextualizing the danger of the 
reparatory moment with its penchant for exclusionary violence does render this violence 
somewhat visible by giving it content.    
Returning to the Nambikwara children’s disclosure of the proper names, one can see how 
the characterization of these children as good and innocent constructs the Nambikwara as the 
hapless victims of Lévi-Strauss’s manipulation.  The giving up of the proper names of the adults 
is not, in any meaningful sense, done by the children.  Rather, the disclosure is entirely Lévi-
Strauss’s fault and his doing: 
The first little girl was trying to tell me her enemy’s name, and when the enemy 
found out what was going on she decided to tell me the other girl’s name, by way 
of reprisal.  Thenceforward it was easy enough, though not very scrupulous, to 
egg the children on, one against the other, till in time I knew all their names.  
When this was completed and we were all, in a sense, one another’s accomplices, 
I soon got them to give me the adults’ names too. (G 114/167) 
The Nambikwara children are presented in this story as having no real agency, no real 
culpability, as they can do nothing truly violent and thus nothing truly wrong. This basic lack of 
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agency extends to all the Nambikwara, as the construction of them as good and innocent robs 
them of the ability to be culpable, responsible agents.  If one is essentially and self-evidently 
innocent, nonviolent, illiterate, and good, then one cannot possibly inflict any harm nor be 
responsible for any harm inflicted.  Derrida recognizes a problem in Lévi-Strauss’s failure to 
acknowledge the hitting that goes on among the Nambikwara children as a real kind of violence 
(G 113/166).  Ironically, precisely in the name of protecting the Nambikwara from 
ethnocentrism, from the violent reduction of their culture in comparison to the West, Lévi-
Strauss does a very real ethnocentric violence to the Nambikwara by foreclosing their claim to 
agency and excluding them from the realm of agency.  This foreclosure of agency and the 
reversal of Lévi-Strauss’s attempt to avoid ethnocentrism has everything to do with the 
“suppression of contradiction and difference,” with the attempted foreclosure of the question of 
writing and the naturalization of the morality that results from it.  Lévi-Strauss’s implicit 
certainty and premature foreclosure of the question of writing allows him to present the 
Nambikwara as a people without Western agency and, thus, as a people reduced and excluded 
from the humanity of the West.  Derrida makes visible here the connection between the structural 
violence of originary difference and more concrete manifestations of violence, allowing one to 
see how the logical force of Lévi-Strauss’s assumption about the nature of writing plays itself out 
in the violent denial of agency to the Nambikwara.  However as I will show, Lévi-Strauss’s work 
is not the only venue in which Derrida connects the problem of logocentrism to the exclusionary 
violence of ethnocentrism. 
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III: Four Characteristics of Reparatory Violence  
Throughout his early work, Derrida consistently associates the problems of logocentrism 
and ethnocentrism.  The first pages of Of Grammatology concern “logocentrism: the metaphysics 
of phonetic writing (for example, of the alphabet) which was fundamentally [. . .] nothing but the 
most original and powerful ethnocentrism, in the process of imposing itself upon the world” (G 
3/11).  Later on Derrida writes, “[i]n an original and non-‘relativist’ sense, logocentrism is an 
ethnocentric metaphysics” (G 79/117).  Logocentrism is ethnocentric because it “is related to the 
history of the West” (G 79/117).  It is indebted to a specific cultural and linguistic conception of 
the world, which, as specific, inevitably excludes other possible notions and definitions.  Yet, 
this link is more than a mere historical accident, since ethnocentrism shares the same structural 
logic as logocentrism.   
Ethnocentrism (l’ethnocentrisme) derives from a modern combining form of the Greek 
words “ethnos,” meaning nation, and “kent ron,” “pertaining to the center.”26  Ethnocentrism 
describes something that applies to the center of the nation, to that which is at the center or 
concerns the center.  However, “kent ron” shares a root with the verb “kentein,” meaning “to 
prick,” “goad,” or “stab.”27  The center, etymologically, orients or commands that of which it is 
the center.  It is that element which “goads” or motivates the system.  However, it commands 
only through a certain violence, one which punctures, pricks, or stabs the very thing which the 
center commands.  Ethnocentrism thus marks the way in which the founding and structuring of a 
nation occurs only through the exercise of an organizational violence, one which gives structure 
and form to the nation but also damages it.  Derrida exposes that the element or principle that 
makes a structure or system possible will always threaten that structure or system.  This is the 
                                                 
26 OED. 
27 OED. 
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logic Derrida exposes in his critique of logocentrism, where the attempt to secure the logos 
beyond the corrupting influence of writing fundamentally undermines the purity of the logos.  
This logic also mirrors the paradoxical nature of the “center.” 
In his essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Social Sciences” Derrida 
analyzes the logic of the center, arguing that the center is that element within a structure that 
gives form and stability to the structure:  
The function of the center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the 
structure—one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but above all 
to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we 
might call the play of the structure. (WD 278/409)   
The center organizes the structure by clearly establishing that structure’s boundaries, marking 
out the form of the structure in opposition to what it is not.  In addition, the center defends this 
organization through an interdiction against play or difference.  The center is that part of any 
structure that establishes and regulates the unique form of the structure, meaning that if the 
center changes the entire nature of the structure shifts.  This is why the center functions to limit 
the “play” [jeu] or propensity for change and difference within any structure.  But as the 
organizing principle of a structure, the center has the peculiar characteristic of not actually being 
part of the structure. 
Writing of the place of the center, Derrida says “it has always been thought that the 
center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while 
governing the structure, escapes structurality” (WD 279/410).  The center, as that which makes a 
structure possible through the organization of its elements, cannot be part of the structure it 
organizes; in the same way that the founding of a system must always be anterior to and 
 36
excluded from the system it founds.28  Derrida describes this absence of the center as an “escape” 
[échappe], a being “elsewhere” [ailleurs] suggesting a lack or hole created by the necessary 
absence of the center.  The center is a puncture wound, a violent absence that disrupts the 
completeness of any system or structure.  In the case of ethnocentrism, this puncture wounds the 
ethnos.  It shows the ethnos to be always already wounded, to be always already less dominant 
than it takes itself to be.  Yet the tendency of the center to damage that which it structures is not a 
mere aspect of ethnocentrism but a facet of all structures or systems.   
 The ethnocentric violence that occurs in Lévi-Strauss account of the Nambikwara, the 
puncturing violence that occurs in the etymology of ethnocentrism, and the excluding violence 
recorded in Derrida’s writings on the center are not simply examples of violence.  Rather, in all 
these cases, violence involves an exclusion that threatens the very thing purported to be in need 
of saving.  This logic was already implied in the moral moment of reparations, the “in the name 
of” which qualifies every appearance.  In Lévi-Strauss, it is precisely in the name of avoiding 
ethnocentrism that an ethnocentric violence is done.  It is in the name of protecting the ethnos 
that the violent goading of the ethnos occurs.  It is in the name of securing structurality that the 
wounding exemption of the center takes place.  These examples gesture toward a first 
qualification of the exclusionary violence of reparations: that such exclusion always involves the 
risk of defiling the very thing that the morality of the reparatory moment purports to save.29  This 
is not to say that one can reduce all empirical violence to this logic.  For example, one being 
punched in the face may not indicate that one’s assailant really just wanted to protect one’s face 
                                                 
28 This logic will return with a vengeance in the discussion of ipseity, sovereignty, and the founding of nation-states.  
See for example, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2005; “Declarations of Independence,” Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 
1971-2001. Edited and Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002; 
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Translated by Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes. London: Routledge, 2001.  
29 This is what Derrida’s later work will call autoimmunity. 
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all along.  Rather, these examples show that the relationship of structural and empirical violence 
points necessarily in this direction.  The exclusionary move out of the merely structural involves 
the threat of defiling what is thought to be most in need of saving.  However, I would like to 
pause for a moment as I do not wish to abandon quite yet the question of the ethnos. 
 The structural link between logocentrism and ethnocentrism and Derrida’s extensive 
focus on the problem of ethnocentrism in his early work shows that the question of the ethnos, of 
race, of nationality, and of nationhood are, like those of the center, essentially connected to 
logocentric metaphysics and the exclusionary violence endemic to it.30  I take Derrida quite 
seriously when he says that logocentrism is, fundamentally, ethnocentric, that where 
logocentrism goes ethnocentric violence is sure to follow.  Hence, a second qualification can be 
added to the moment of reparatory violence, that such violence will involve or be concentrated 
around questions of the ethnos, of race, language, and nationhood.  These questions are 
privileged sites of exclusionary violence and, thus, require investigation.  Yet, having argued that 
questions of the ethnos are necessarily enmeshed with the logic of logocentrism, Derrida 
suggests that such questions are also intrinsically connected to the critique of logocentric 
metaphysics.   
 Writing of the effects the paradoxical logic of the center has on the social sciences and 
having affirmed again the privileged position of ethnos within this discussion, Derrida says in 
Writing and Difference: 
                                                 
30 Although the term ethnocentrism appears with much less frequency in Derrida’s later texts, it does reemerge in his 
final set of lectures, Séminaire La Bête et le souverain Volume II (2002-2003). Édition étable par Michel Lisse, 
Marie-Louise Mallet et Ginette Michaud. Paris: Galilée, 2010; Beast and the Sovereign: Volume Two. Edited by 
Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011.  This suggests that the concern for ethnocentrism remained a constant in Derrida’s thinking 
from first to last. 
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one can assume that ethnology could have been born as a science only at the 
moment when a decentering had come about: at the moment when European 
culture—and, in consequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts—
had been dislocated, driven from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as 
the cultural reference. (WD 282/414) 
Ethnology and questions of the relationship between nations, races, and ethnicities emerge 
simultaneously with the critique of logocentric metaphysics.  Such questions can occur only after 
there is a recognized plurality of ethnē, the point at which the absoluteness of European culture 
and European Metaphysics has already, in some sense, been challenged and rejected.  Ethnology 
enters the scientific field at the exact moment that the place, superiority, and legitimacy of 
European culture and its logocentric metaphysics become questionable.  Thus, if ethnocentrism 
is always present in the threat of reparatory violence, then questioning the ethnos would be a 
potential site of resistance to ethnocentrism.  To question the ethnos is to challenge the centrality 
of the ethnos, and, consequently, to challenge the implied superiority of one ethnos over another.  
This could equally be said of all the human sciences, since such sciences arise only at the point 
when a certain dislocation and uncertainty concerning the human is already on the scene.   
One can, thus, add a third qualifications to the exclusionary violence of the reparatory 
moment: this violence and resistance to this violence will always involve not only questions of 
the ethnos but, perhaps even more fundamentally, questions of the human and the animal, 
questions of who or what counts as human, and who or what will be included in the human 
community.  Derrida understands this questioning of the human and the animal, as necessarily a 
questioning of life.  As he says in Of Grammatology, “[w]hat writing itself, in its nonphonetic 
moment, betrays, is life” (G 25/40).  The link between the logos and ethnos assures that what is 
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at stake in writing’s challenge to the presence of speech, at stake in the irreducibility of 
exclusionary violence, is life.  The violence of writing marks a necessary limiting of presence 
and appearance, a “cutting breath short,” which is also a cutting short of life.  Reparatory 
exclusion will always involve questions of life because it is itself “a principle of death and of 
difference in the becoming of being” (G 25/40).  I shall return to the question of life 
momentarily.  However, it is also in this discussion of critique and resistance that Derrida puts 
forward what seems to be the most critical qualification concerning reparatory violence—its 
unavoidability or inevitability. 
 Ethnology and the human sciences generally offer sites of resistance to the exclusionary 
violence of logocentrism.  Yet Derrida is quick to remind us that this chance for resistance does 
not spell a moving beyond logocentric or ethnocentric violence: 
Now, ethnology—like any science—comes about within a discourse.  And it is 
primarily a European science employing traditional concepts, however much it 
may struggle against them.  Consequently, whether he wants to or not—and this 
does not depend on a decision on his part—the ethnologist [and this could equally 
be said of any and all participates in any of the human sciences] accepts into his 
discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he denounces 
them.  This necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency. (WD 
282/414) 
The exclusionary violence of the reparatory moment, an exclusion circling around a threat to the 
very thing purported to need protection, a violence of exclusion from the ethnos, the nation, the 
race, the community of the human, and life is irreducible.  Derrida’s thinking emphasizes the 
unavoidability of violence.  It reminds us constantly of our inability to overcome by some force 
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of action, will, or reason the exclusionary violence of the reparatory moment with all its 
paradoxical resonances.  This unavoidability of violence has everything to do with the way in 
which every discourse against violence, in order to appear as a discourse against, must pass by 
way of the structures of exclusion and determination from which the categories of violence and 
non-violence emerge.   
This is not to say that there is nothing to be done concerning violence, nothing to be done 
concerning those forms of violence, e.g. war, famine, abuse, rape (just to name a few), which 
destroy the lives of so many.  Derrida’s is not a nihilistic or relativistic position.  However, 
Derrida’s is not a position of overcoming violence or of getting beyond the possibility of the 
worst forms of violence and abuse.  It is precisely this commitment to acknowledging the 
unavoidability of violence, this commitment to critiquing any discourse that claims on any level 
to move beyond violence, that not only defines the deconstructive project but also puts Derrida at 
odds with other accounts of violence.  
 A deconstructive engagement is not one of reversal or overcoming—it does not attempt 
to get beyond the irreducible possibility of violence and, in particular, to get past the possibility 
of the worst violence: the possibility of absolute evil.  Yet it is concerned first and foremost with 
violence and with certain kinds of violence: the violence of exclusion and its many 
manifestations in the national, social, and living scene.  Hence when faced with the question, 
“why engage in a deconstructive critique,” part of one’s answer, even if one can never give a 
complete answer, would have to be, out of a concern for exclusionary violence.  Out of a concern 
for what is excluded from our calculations, laws, and rules concerning violence, and, perhaps 
most importantly, out of a concern that one not deny “violence,” that one attempt to keep, 
however impossibly, the question of violence alive and at the fore of one’s thinking.   
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What would it mean to keep the question of violence at the front of one’s thinking?  To 
put the question of exclusion as the first step of one’s thought?  At minimum would this not 
involve beginning from a question, advancing in an always questioning manner?  This is how 
Derrida speaks of the possibility of philosophy at the beginning of “Violence and Metaphysics” 
where, in order to found the community of “those who are still called philosophers,” it would be 
necessary to bend ourselves to the “discipline of the question.” It would mean following an 
injunction: “the question must be maintained.  As a question.  The liberty of the question (double 
genitive) must be stated and protected” (WD 79-80/118-119).31  Philosophy is a maintaining of 
the question.  It keeps open the question, providing a habitat for questioning in the double 
genitive sense of both asking questions and being put into question.32  The question of the 
question, the need and importance of the question will, thus, be a theme throughout Derrida’s 
corpus.33  In light of the discussion of violence, I believe that we can begin to see that Derrida’s 
focus on the question orients itself around a certain set of questions. 
 Derrida’s work revolves around keeping open certain questions: questions concerning 
borders, boundaries, and lines of demarcation.  In particular, Derrida purposed a questioning of 
the borders establishing the difference between the violent and the non-violent, a questioning of 
the paradoxical, self-undermining, autoimmune logic at work in every marking and maintaining 
of the violent.  Derrida is particularly concerned with the power or force at work in the 
determining or foreclosing of the question of violence.  By what means can one claim to know 
                                                 
31 The word translated as “protected” here is “abritée,” which means “to shelter, to provide a habitat for.”  Derrida is 
not talking about protecting the question in the sense of keeping it from harm but rather in the sense of giving it a 
place to be.  One must give the question a place or space to exist as a question, that is, as constantly in question. 
32 Of this community of the question Derrida writes, “[a] community of the question, therefore, within that fragile 
moment when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated 
itself beneath the mask of the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already and 
fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of the question” (WD 80/118). 
33 See in particular, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989 and Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to 
Respond. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 
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and understand the violent or non-violent well enough to say where the one ends and the other 
begins?  This was clearly illustrated in the example of Lévi-Strauss, where it was precisely by 
designating the Nambikwara as non-violent, by foreclosing the question of violence and non-
violence, that Lévi-Strauss’s analysis led to ethnocentric violence—the reductive 
characterization of the Nambikwara as a people denied Western subjectivity.  However, Derrida 
is equally interested in the way in which this marking of the violent and non-violent is always a 
marking of life.  Tied up with the question of violence is questions of life.  One thing that 
emerges from this combining of the unavoidability of violence with a certain commitment to 
keeping open the question of violence is that it frames the way in which Derrida is going to be 
critical of discourses of non-violence, insofar as such discourses attempt to overcome violence, 
to resolve or put to rest the question of violence (double genitive). 
 Given Derrida’s commitment to the unavoidability of violence and his orientation toward 
questioning, it seems obvious that he would be reticent to embrace any discourse of non-
violence.  Derrida is critical of such positions, since they imply the foreclosure of the question of 
violence, the resolving or getting beyond of such questions, the resolving of what lives count as 
morally relevant and, in fact, what counts as alive as such.  The process of deconstructing, if 
there is such a thing, is not a process or project of non-violence, and this puts Derrida’s thought 
at odds with a number of thinkers who are explicitly interested in the possibility of non-violence: 
Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, and Walter Benjamin.  In what follows, I show the ways in 
which, from a Derridean perspective, all three of these thinkers attempt an ultimately paradoxical 
move beyond violence, a move in which the figures of undecidability, purity, law, and 
sovereignty will be of central importance. 
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Chapter Two: 
Derrida and the Critique of Non-Violence 
 
Derrida argues from his earliest writings that violence is a structural and inevitable part of 
all modes of signification.  It is the unavoidable possibility of corruption and misrepresentation 
within every system of signification.  This violence is, for Derrida, operative at the empirical 
level, through what he names the “reparatory” attempt to foreclose the openness of originary 
violence resulting in the violent exclusion of certain elements of those objects being identified.  
The link between logocentrism and ethnocentrism insures that the play of exclusion is always 
already at work in every discourse both logically and empirically.  This passage from the 
structural to the empirical is, as I outlined in Chapter One, organized around a series of 
qualifications that shape but do not absolutely determine the more recognizable forms of 
physical and psychical violence.  These qualifications and the question of the relationship 
between structural and empirical violence bring us to the issue of non-violence and more 
particularly to the question of Derrida’s relationship to the discourse of non-violence.  His 
position on non-violence is more complex than that of a simple opposition, for Derrida is neither 
a pacifist nor a proponent of violence as the desire for harm.   This chapter looks at Derrida's 
position on non-violence, particularly with respect to his resistance to the discourses of non-
violence put forward by Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, and Walter Benjamin.   
Both Levinas and Arendt put forward what I call a traditional conception of non-violence, 
that is, they envision non-violence as the antithesis of violence.  On this account, something is 
non-violent only if it is free from violence, only if it is separated from or purified of all violence.  
They attempt in different contexts to maintain a notion of non-violence in opposition to violence.  
Derrida's position begins from a fundamentally different place as he resists this basic conception 
of non-violence.  In particular, he objects to the way in which these articulations of non-violence, 
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while purporting to do away with violence altogether, in fact operate only by recourse to a 
violent, reparatory force that is able to name, determine, and circumscribe the violent in 
opposition to the non-violence.  In his discussion of Levinas’s early work in “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” we will see Derrida’s resistance to the possibility of circumscribing a truly non-
violent space or discourse.34  I argue that Derrida’s concern with non-violence is linked 
particularly to the figure of the subject.  I then turn to a reading of Arendt in which I will explore 
the possibility of separating violence and power.  I argue that from a Derridean perspective 
Arendt’s position shows, contra Arendt, the need to think of violence and power together.  
Lastly, I turn to Derrida’s critique of Benjamin in “Force of Law.”  I argue that Derrida’s critique 
of Benjamin’s attempt to separate “divine” and “mythical violence” illustrates the stakes of 
Derrida’s concern for non-violence, as one there sees the link between discourses of non-
violence and the possibility of total annihilation.  Looking at Derrida's conception of non-
violence in contrast to each of these thinkers allows us to see the scope of Derrida’s concern with 
non-violence and the way in which this concern relates to his critique of sovereignty and his 
general understanding of politics.          
  
I: Philosophy at the Threshold of Death: Levinas, Violence, and Subjectivity  
 
In his most sustained engagement with the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida 
characterizes Levinas’ project as one that “seeks to liberate itself from the Greek domination of 
the Same and the One (other names for the light of Being and of the phenomenon) as if from 
                                                 
34 My reading is focused primarily around Derrida’s critique of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics,” although I 
think that there is a deep affinity between their works, one which I try to touch on a bit more in my discussion of 
Derrida’s debt to Levinas.   
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oppression itself” (Derrida, WD 83/122-123).35  The history of Western Metaphysics has, 
through its nearly unfailing commitment to a discourse of light and Being, violently reduced all 
thinking and all phenomenality to the orders of sameness and unity.  Levinas desires to combat 
or silence this violence by liberating Metaphysics from the destructive categories of the Same 
and the One.  This liberation becomes possible through the explication of “the ethical 
relationship—a nonviolent relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other [autrui]” 
(WD 83/123).  It is through rethinking ethics that Levinas hopes to disengage metaphysics from 
violence.  The first step in this liberation is a critique of the predominance of light within the 
Western philosophical tradition.  
Levinas understands Greek philosophy and the tradition that it spawns as grounded on a 
privileging of light, sight, and theory.36 This privileging has led throughout the history of 
Western thought to a violent reduction of Being to the tyranny of sameness.  This reduction 
occurs because the privileging of light and sight tends to spatialize the category of Being and in 
particular the relation of the self to others.  To think of Being spatially is coextensive with 
thinking of Being as a set of relations between the self and the world.  A spatial 
conceptualization of Being causes all categories of Being to be understood in relation to the self.  
This conceptualization creates a mode of understanding in which everything appears as either 
inside or outside of the self and, thus, as defined by its relation to the self.  As Derrida writes, 
                                                 
35 In his article, “The trace of Levinas in Derrida” Robert Bernasconi contends that Derrida’s reading of Levinas 
shifts from what he says in Writing and Difference to what he says in “Différance.”  While I find Bernasconi’s 
argument compelling on some level, I do not think that Derrida’s basic critique of Levinas changes.  That is to say, 
Derrida consistently maintains that Levinas, although presenting the Other as radically other, actually violates in 
various ways the radical otherness that he himself suggests. 
36 In the etymology of theory there is an interesting connection between sight and conceptualization.  Theory is 
derived from the Latin theōria and the Greek θεωρία meaning “a looking at, a viewing, contemplation, speculation.”  
Theory is a kind contemplation or speculation that always already involves a certain seeing, that is, a certain 
reference to light and visibility.  This connection between visibility and thought or between discourses of light and 
discourses of subjectivity is, in some sense, what Levinas’s thinking attempt to overcome.  Derrida’s critique of 
Levinas constantly returns to this connection: the idea that one cannot separate absolutely the operations of light, 
seeing, and spatialization, from the operations of conceptualization, subjectivity, discourse, and ultimately violence. 
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“[t]o see and to know, to have and to will, unfold only within the oppressive and luminous 
identity of the same [ . . .] Everything given to me within light appears as given to myself by 
myself” (WD 91-92/136).  In a philosophy of light, the self, the one who sees, becomes the 
measure of all Being, aggressively reducing other beings and relations of Being to the category 
of the “not I.”  In such thinking there can be no true otherness, Levinas argues, as one never 
moves beyond the confines of the self, beyond a measuring of Being as a variation of the self.37  
The force of Levinas’s critique is thus directed at forsaking the spatializing logic of light and the 
entire series of concepts that would reinforce the Greek privileging of this logic: sight, 
relationality, sameness, inside/outside, egoity, exteriority, etc.  Each of these concepts is, for 
Levinas, a force of light and violence leading necessarily back to the violent reduction of 
otherness to some notion of the self. 
Derrida’s critique will revolve around precisely the issue of Levinas’s seeming insistence 
on an absolute break with these Greek concepts.  In short, Derrida argues that Levinas cannot 
maintain a clear separation between the forces of light and “a certain non-light before which all 
violence is to be quieted and disarmed” (WD 85/126).  The heart of Derrida’s critique highlights 
the ways in which Levinas is unable to eschew the forces of light from his discourse, seeming 
compelled by the logic of his argument to give place to the enlightenment he desires to 
overcome.  One of the most telling moments in which the forces of light overtake Levinas’s 
argument occurs in his discussion of exteriority, a term necessarily linked to the violent, spatial 
binary of inside-outside.   
                                                 
37 This concern over the reduction of all otherness to the category of the self parallels in important respects Derrida’s 
critique of Levi-Strauss, since it is precisely Levi-Strauss’ attempt to honor the otherness of the Nambikwara that, 
Derrida contends, operates to construct them as merely the innocent and pure doubles of Western subjectivity.  This 
logic will also reemerge in my discussion of Adorno.   
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 The reductive spatializing of all relations of the self and others arises, for Levinas, from a 
privileging of the inside-outside binary.  A spatial account of Being must necessarily present all 
relations and categories of Being as concordances of what is either inside or outside of the self: 
“I” or “not I”.  The violence of this binary arises from its elimination of space for any true 
diversity.  It admits nothing that is not ultimately reducible to some version of the inside or “self” 
at the expense of the outside or “other.”  Levinas wishes to challenge this privileged binary as 
well as any kind of thinking that proceeds from it.  If successful, however, this challenge would 
have to “expel” the idea of “exteriority,” an idea that is “referred to an enlightened unity of space 
which neutraliz[es] radical alterity” (WD 112/165).  Derrida points out that Levinas clearly 
associates exteriority with the violence of spatialization, saying in Totality and Infinity that 
“exteriority is a property of space, and brings the subject back to himself through the light which 
constitutes his entire being” (WD 112/165).  Given the enlightened character of exteriority, one 
would expect Levinas to abandon the concept altogether.  However, while condemning the 
essentially spatial nature of “exteriority,” Levinas refuses to abandon the term, going so far as to 
attempt its rehabilitation. 
 One of the mainlines of argumentation in Totality and Infinity—which as Derrida points 
out is subtitled Essay on Exteriority—is the claim that exteriority is not, in itself, a necessarily 
spatial concept: “Totality and Infinity [ . . .] does not only abundantly employ the notion of 
exteriority.  Levinas intends to show that true exteriority is not spatial, for space is the Site of the 
Same” (WD 112/165).  There is a need to purify rather than reject outright the notion of 
exteriority, a desire to get back to exteriority’s “true” meaning, one that refers to a non-spatial 
relationship of alterity.38  The need for this recuperation emerges because Levinas is attempting 
                                                 
38 Derrida also points out that Levinas continues to use the term “relationship” to mark “the respect which absolves 
the other” even though such a notion seems by necessity to invoke something spatial (WD 112/165).  Hence, it 
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not only to move beyond the confines of any possible interiority or exteriority, but to articulate 
some beyond of the spatial, a beyond that must be figured as something essentially exterior to the 
dichotomy of inside-outside.  Levinas’s project, therefore, enacts a simultaneous rejection and 
recuperation of the concept of exteriority, insofar as he attempts to sever the relation between 
exteriority and spatiality, while still retaining the possibility of something outside or beyond the 
spatial.  Derrida sees this double gesture raising certain difficulties, for “if it [exteriority] has a 
meaning, if it is not an algebraic X, [it] obstinately beckons towards light and space” (WD 
112/165).  On Levinas’s own terms the exterior should be inherently inseparable from the spatial, 
inseparable from some interior, and, consequently, inseparable from violence.  It is remarkable 
that Levinas, while desiring to avoid recourse to the inside-outside distinction, precisely retains 
the language of inside-outside, interior-exterior.  Derrida suggests that this strange linguistic 
retention points not only to the impossibility of recovering exteriority as a purely non-spatial 
concept but to a more general impossibility.   
 Having questioned Levinas’s paradoxical reluctance to abandon the notion of exteriority, 
Derrida concludes: 
that it is necessary to state the other in the language of the Same; that it is 
necessary to think true exteriority as non-exteriority, that is, still by means of the 
Inside-Outside structure and by spatial metaphor; and that it is necessary still to 
inhabit the metaphor in ruins, to dress oneself in tradition’s shreds and the devil’s 
patches—all this means, perhaps, that there is no philosophical logos which must 
not first let itself be expatriated into the structure Inside-Outside.  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
seems that one could critique Levinas’ unwillingness to give up the language of “relationship” on the same grounds 
that Derrida critiques his reluctance to abandon the language of “exteriority.” 
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deportation from its own site toward the Site, towards spatial locality is the 
metaphor congenital to the philosophical logos. (WD 112/165-166)  
Levinas’ inability to give up the spatial language of exteriority at the very moment he wishes to 
forsake any reference to the spatial is not simply an inconsistency of the Levinasian system; 
rather it is a structural necessity of philosophical knowledge itself.  There is no possibility of 
moving, once and for all, beyond the logic of the inside-outside, beyond a structure of borders 
and boundaries, since in order for knowledge, language, or thought to appear at all, they must 
have a certain locality, a specific place or site that distinguishes each instance from all other 
knowledge, language, and thought.  This is not to suggest, as Levinas in fact shows us, that 
spatiality is not everywhere challenged and constituted by what is non-spatial, that light is not 
everywhere eclipsed by darkness, that the other does not everywhere make an undeniable call on 
us.  Yet, it does mean that all thought, language, and discourse are always already “expatriated” 
into the logic of inside-outside.  Thus, resistance to traditional ways of thinking, speaking, and 
acting can only emerge by precisely engaging in those traditions.  Critical thinking is “the 
necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it” (WD 
111/164).39  Hence, the Levinasian project of getting beyond a philosophy of light opens a more 
general problematic of the “beyond” of thought and language.  Because it must always already 
be spoken in the logic of inside-outside, the articulation of a beyond of thought and language 
exposes its own impossibility.  This impossibility, according to Derrida, worms its way through 
the entire chain of demarcations Levinas puts into action: the separation of language from light40 
                                                 
39 For a concise explanation of this logic in Derrida, see Michael Naas Taking on The Tradition. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2003, xvii-xxx.  
40 WD 113/167. 
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and space,41 the dividing of the infinitely other from the finite,42 and, most importantly for our 
discussion, the separation of discourse from violence. 
 Let us recall that the intention of Levinas’s analysis was to avoid the violence inherent in 
luminous discourses.  Levinas hoped to provide, through ethics and a metaphysics based on a 
truly ethical relation to the other, a discourse devoid of light and consequently devoid of violence 
(WD 111/164).  In a footnote to “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida further develops this 
commitment to non-violence.  He argues that Levinas marks a distinction between violence and 
discourse (WD 315/171-172).  Peace can be found for Levinas only in the absolute alterity of the 
Other, an alterity only announceable in discourse.  Levinas stakes the possibility of peace, the 
possibility of a truly non-violent relationship to the Other, on the separation of discourse from 
violence: on a “discourse which respects separation and rejects the horizon of ontological 
coherence” (WD 315/171-172).  In order for true peace to be articulated, it would be necessary 
that discourse be at least potentially separable from violence, for if discourse cannot be clearly 
separated from violence, then how could peace be clearly separated from war?  In Derrida's 
reading of Levinas, the possibility of separating violence from discourse takes a number of 
forms.  Derrida is particularly interested in the purification of language of all rhetoric.43  
However, such a separation appears exceedingly problematic if it is impossible to move beyond 
the spatial logic of the inside-outside. 
 Given the difficulty of moving thought, language, and knowledge beyond the inside-
outside binary, it follows that discourse suffers from the same difficulty, for it cannot be 
divorced from spatiality.  For a discourse to appear, it must be spatially demarcated from other 
discourses.  There can be no categories of “discourse” in general; no discourse having meaning 
                                                 
41 WD 113/167. 
42 WD 114/168. 
43 WD 147/218. 
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or content can appear without a distinct spatial-temporal location.  If every discourse occurs in a 
distinct space and time, then on Levinas’ own terms every discourse must be violent, the spatial 
being inseparable from violence.  As Derrida writes “[i]f, as Levinas says, only discourse [. . .] is 
righteous, and if, moreover, all discourse essentially retains within it space and the Same—does 
this not mean that discourse is originally violent?” (WD 116/171).   
 Thus we have established that the necessary spatial dimension of discourse undermines 
Levinas’s attempt to maintain an absolutely present distinction between discourse and violence.  
I say present here because, as Derrida points out, it is certainly reasonable to maintain that 
discourse aims for peace, that peace is the “telos” of discourse.  In fact, it makes perfect sense to 
say that the telos of discourse is resolution, a process of working towards peace.  However, if this 
is the case, it follows that discourse is not itself essentially non-violent.  Instead, it is in the 
silencing of discourse that peace emerges.  Peace would be “a certain silence, a certain beyond 
of speech” insofar as peace would emerge only in the resolution and, consequently, dissolution 
of discourse: the point where there is no further need to discuss and negotiate.  Hence for 
Derrida, discourse aims for peace only insofar as it aims for its own end, its own death.  What 
does it mean for the traditional discourses of non-violence and for Levinas’s in particular that 
peace is the handmaiden of death?  Can one speak of a non-violent death?  The question of 
silence and violence will reemerge in our examination of Arendt.  However, for now it is 
possible to see in this suicidal tendency of discourse, this collusion of the longing for peace with 
the longing for death, an expression of the inability for discourse to be clearly demarcated from 
the spatial, and it is this inability that undermines the possibility of a peace beyond the threat of 
war—the possibility of a true non-violence.   
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Given the impossibility of absolutely separating any discourse from the colonizing, 
reductive logic of the spatial, Derrida concludes that there can be no discourse that is not 
inhabited by violence: “There is war only after the opening of discourse, and war dies out only at 
the end of discourse” (WD 117/172).  To speak, write, and act, to engage in any discursive 
practice is to engage in violence.  “Violence appears with articulation,” because articulation is a 
locating, a positioning in time and space, and thus an unavoidable fall into the violent logic of 
inside-outside (WD 147/218).44  At the same time, articulation is the only possibility of peace, as 
it is only through continuing to articulate that one delays the death of discourse: the fall into an 
“absolute peace” that is also an “absolute violence.”45 
The recognition of the irreducible co-arising of violence and articulation returns us to the 
logic of originary and reparatory violence explored in Chapter One.  Here too it is a question of 
the way in which the possibility of appearance or articulation requires the introduction of a 
boundary and a morality that will always already privilege what is inside over what is outside, 
what appears over what does not, what is present over what is absent.  This privileging and the 
moment of circumscription that makes it possible are irreducible moments of violence, moments 
in which the resistance to a discourse of light, sight, and theory must succumb to the very 
violence it seeks to contest.  Thus Derrida concludes that Levinas's argument for the possibility 
of non-violence founders because its claim to establish a site purified of violence requires 
recourse to a logic that is always already violent.  Insofar as the establishment of such a site 
requires the ability to name, determine, and circumscribe that site, it cannot be separated from a 
violence of exclusion, a logic of the inside-outside, and a recourse to light.  Note that the concept 
                                                 
44 One can also articulate this issue in terms of time rather than space in the sense that discourse, speech acts, and 
moments of inscription are finite.  They are never total, complete, or beyond the possibility of alteration.  If every 
discourse must always be open to change or iterability, then every particular discourse contains violence.   
45 WD 146-147/218. 
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that trips up Levinas's discourse of non-violence is a certain power of identification, a reparatory 
violence which discourse cannot, despite itself, live without.  This power has much in common 
with what Derrida in other places names sovereignty. 
The word souveraineté [sovereignty] does not appear a single time in “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” nor is it a major category of Derrida’s early work.  Yet I find it hard to ignore a 
resonance between the identifying recourse to light in Levinas and Derrida’s articulation of the 
notion of sovereignty.46  In Rogues Derrida describes sovereignty as “the act” that “must and 
can, by force, put an end in a single, indivisible stroke to the endless discussion” (R/V 10/29).  
Sovereignty is the power to end discussion insofar as it is an act that proclaims the identity of a 
thing—an act that establishes that x is x, silencing the need for further debate.  Sovereignty “is a 
circularity, indeed a sphericity.  Sovereignty is round; it is a rounding off” (R/V 13/33).  A 
sovereign act establishes the line that separates what is inside from what is outside by circling 
back, recoiling around its point of departure, tracing a circle around that point, a circle that 
makes possible the recognition of that origin as something distinct from what is outside it.  This 
encircling gesture of sovereignty mirrors in principle the circumscribing of reparatory violence 
discussed in Chapter One, the conditioning of the openness of originary violence that marks the 
border between inside and outside.  It is this marking that allows for the appearance of violence 
and non-violence.  Thus, for Derrida, sovereignty names not just every “decision” on the inside 
                                                 
46 Although sovereignty is not a major term in his early work, Derrida does have one essay in Writing and 
Difference devoted to the notion of sovereignty: “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without 
Reserve.”  This essay explores Bataille’s notion of sovereignty, a discussion that graphs onto Derrida’s later concern 
with sovereignty, particularly concerning the distinction between sovereignty and lordship.  In addition, although the 
words “sovereignty” and “sovereign” only appear twelve times in Of Grammatology, all of these occurrences are 
confined to two very short sections at the very end of the book called “The Alphabet and Absolute Representation” 
and “The Theorem and the Theater” (295-313/416-441).  It is in these sections that Derrida marks the passage from 
“graphics to politics,” showing how questions of representation are necessarily political problems.  Hence, the 
question of sovereignty emerges in Derrida’s early work precisely at the site where the logical structures of writing, 
representation, and violence intersect with the empirical.  This suggests that sovereignty was always for Derrida an 
important site in the passage from structural to empirical violence.    
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and outside, every “decision” on what will be allowed to stay and what must go, but also the 
originary structure that creates the possibility for such a decision as such, the power to decide as 
such.  The relationship between the notion of reparatory violence, the question of non-violence, 
and the logic of sovereignty is further developed as Levinas everywhere links the reparatory 
power of identification to the question of subjectivity, particularly through the notion of ipseity. 
There is, as indicated earlier, a link in Levinas’s work between subjectivity and the 
notions of identity, sameness, and light.  When Levinas speaks of “exteriority” as “bring[ing] the 
subject back to himself through the light that constitutes his being” he is identifying what 
Derrida, following Heidegger and Hyppolite, calls ipseity—the power of the subject to 
understand itself as self-same.47  Michael Naas defines Derrida’s notion of ipseity as the 
“conjunction of self and sovereignty,” that is, the conjunction of the self with the power of 
identification.48 Ipseity marks the necessary collusion of the self with the sovereign power of 
identification, the notion that the category of the self along with its correlate notions of freedom, 
will, self-identity, etc, requires recourse to the sovereign power to decide what something is.   
This necessary link between subjectivity and identity is already at work when Levinas equates 
the I with the attempt to bring everything the subject encounters under its sway and is, as Derrida 
points out, “immediately practiced in the Greek concept of autos and the German concept of 
selbst” (WD 109/162).  Thus there is, for both Derrida and Levinas, a necessary link between 
identity and subjectivity, a link between sovereignty and the self.  However, while Levinas’s sees 
a necessary connection between the power of identity and the self, he works to resist this 
connection. 
                                                 
47 In a footnote of Writing and Difference, Derrida references Hyppolite’s Genèse et structure de la phénoménologie 
de l’esprit and Heidegger’s Identity and Difference “[o]n these decisive themes of identity, ipseity, and equality” 
(WD, 315/162).   
48 Michael Naas. Derrida From Now On. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 126. 
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Derrida says, “[w]ithout using these terms themselves, Levinas often warned us against 
confusing identity and ipseity, Same and Ego” (WD 109/162).  Levinas seeks the possibility of a 
subjectivity that would not operate to objectify the Other, a subjectivity not reducible to a logic 
of identity.  This is in fact what the notion of radical alterity attempts to trace, a subjectivity that 
does not determine the Other but is determined by the Other.49  Levinas postulates a subject that 
understands itself as constituted not by self-identity (ipseity) but by difference, thus exhibiting a 
subjectivity that could in principle forsake the identitarian reduction of the other to itself.  He 
dreams of a subject that could in principle, I think, renounce sovereignty.  One sees this, for 
example, in Levinas’s critique of Husserl.         
Levinas’s fundamental disagreement with Husserl has to do with the status of the other 
and whether or not the other appears to the self as an “alter ego.”  Levinas argues that, 
particularly in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl presents the other as an “alter ego,” that is, as 
“the ego’s phenomenon” and as “belonging to the ego’s own sphere” (WD 123/180-181).  For 
Husserl, the other is, as a phenomenon, related to the ego, insofar as it appears to the ego as 
something both like and unlike itself—an “alter ego.”  Levinas’s concern with this articulation is 
that it “neutralize[s] its [the other’s] absolute alterity,” for if the other is simply an ego like me, 
then it is nothing but a reflection of me (WD 123/180-181).  This concern follows from Levinas’s 
general worry over the reductive force of the inside-outside, subject-object dichotomy and his 
basic commitment to the link between subjectivity and the logic of identity.  Levinas contends 
that Husserl’s articulation fails to honor the radical alterity of the other, as it refuses to abandon 
conceptualizing the other on the model of the ego.  Returning to the question of ipseity and 
identity, Levinas seems to desire a clear separation of otherness from ipseity and identity on the 
grounds that the identifying tendencies of subjectivity (the necessary collusion of sovereignty 
                                                 
49 This is the distinction, for example, between the “I” and the “me” in Levinas. 
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and self) will undermine the possibility of honoring the alterity of the other.  In contesting 
Levinas’s critique, Derrida addresses himself to this question of what it would mean to honor the 
otherness of the other. 
Derrida contests Levinas’s reading of Husserl on the ground that honoring the otherness 
of the other requires, contra Levinas, articulating the other as in some sense an “ego” or at 
minimum as related to egoity in general: 
For it is impossible to encounter the alter ego (in the very form of encounter 
described by Levinas), impossible to respect it in experience and in language, if 
this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in general).  One could 
neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other, if there was not a 
phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally other as such.  No one 
more than Husserl has been sensitive to the singular and irreducible style of this 
evidence, and to the original non-phenomenalization indicated within it. (WD 
123/181)   
Derrida reads Husserl’s insistence on the egoity of the other as an attempt precisely to honor the 
radical otherness of the other.  What Husserl saw so clearly, for Derrida, is that the possibility of 
real otherness requires a relationship between the other and an ego, for if the other does not in 
fact encounter or appear to an ego, it is impossible to respect the otherness of the other.  Derrida 
never stopped commenting on the importance of this Husserlian insight.  In both his 1988 
interview with Jean Luc Nancy, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject” and in Gift of 
Death, Derrida returns to this language of the “alter ego” as a way to express the essential logic 
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of otherness.50  Yet, this is also an insight that Derrida takes from Levinas himself, saying for 
instance in “Adieu,” a piece read at Levinas’s funeral:  
Each time I read and reread Emmanuel Levinas, I am overwhelmed with gratitude 
and admiration, overwhelmed by this necessity, which is not a constraint but a 
very gentle force that obligates, and obligates us not to bend or curve otherwise 
the space of thought in its respect for the other, but to yield to this other, 
heteronomous curvature that relates us to the completely other [. . .] according to 
the law that thus calls us to yield to the other infinite precedence of the 
completely other. (WM/A 206-207/23)51 
It is from Husserl but also from Levinas that Derrida comes to see the vital importance of the 
relationship between self and other, the way in which the other calls for a limiting of the power 
of subjectivity, showing the “subject” to be a figure always already shaped and molded by the 
“force” of otherness.  It is precisely this debt, this call “not to bend or curve otherwise” the 
relationship between the self and other, that compels Derrida to resist that current in Levinas’s 
thought that attempts to deny the essential relationship between the ego and the other.  To 
suggest that the appearance of the other is not, as Levinas would have it, predicated on its 
relationship to an ego would be to contort this relationship beyond recognition, foreclosing the 
very possibility that otherness might appear at all.  This remains true even if one contends, as 
both Derrida and Levinas do, that one is never able to “thematize” the otherness of the other, 
since even the imperative not to thematize the other requires “a certain appearance of the other as 
                                                 
50 Points . . . Interviews, 1974-1994. Edited by Elizabeth Weber. Translated by Peggy Kamuf and Others. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, 263-264; The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995, 78. 
51 The Work of Mourning. Edited by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001.  Hereafter abbreviated WM.  Adieu: A Emmanuel Levinas. Paris: Galilée, 1997, 11-27.  Hereafter abbreviated 
A.   
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other for an ego” (WD 123/181).  Hence, on Derrida’s account, Levinas’s denial of the egoity of 
the other cannot be maintained without simultaneously compromising the notion of radical 
alterity and “depriving himself [Levinas] of the very foundation and possibility of his own 
language” (WD 125/183).   
For Derrida, what Husserl and Levinas show us is that there can be no otherness without 
identity, without an ego to identify and recognize that otherness.  The interplay of ego and other, 
of subject-object, and of internal-external must remain irreducible within all discourse, but 
perhaps most particularly in the discourse of radical alterity.  If the word other is to have any 
meaning at all, every recognition of the other is necessarily the recognition of the other in 
relationship to “myself.”  It is his commitment to this relationship of the ego and the other that 
shapes and positions Derrida’s resistance to Levinas’s claim that non-violence is possible.  
Derrida's concern is for the way in which Levinas seems unwilling to account for his ability to 
clearly identify, name, and know the violent and non-violent, for this ability that cannot, by his 
own account, appear except through violence and subjectivity.  Derrida’s reading of Levinas 
positions in important respects his general resistance towards the discourses of non-violence.   
In his reading of Levinas, Derrida articulates more emphatically than almost anywhere 
else his committed belief that there is no way to think or speak that does not, by necessity, 
involve a certain violence, as “language can only indefinitely tend toward justice by 
acknowledging and practicing the violence within it” (Derrida, WD 117/172).  Derrida sees 
Levinas’s notion of radical alterity and his limiting of the power of the Enlightenment subject as 
exposing rather than eradicating this necessity for violence.  The constitutive role of the wholly 
Other implies an unimpeachable limit to the discourses of light in their attempt to explain fully 
and expose the truth of the world through the power of reason.  It implies a limit to the power 
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and control of the Enlightenment subject, a limit to the subject’s ability to secure itself, its 
actions, or its discourses beyond the possibility of violence—beyond the possibilities of 
distortion or misrepresentation.  The constitutive role of the Other shows us that the violence 
within action, language, and discourse is not something chosen or controlled by the subject but is 
the condition for acting, speaking, and subjectivity as such.52  It does this by showing that there 
is no relationship between the self and the Other that is not always already contaminated by the 
homogenizing, reparatory power of identification, a light that attempts to reveal all and to reveal 
to all that we are all in some sense the same.  This is the truth that Levinas’s thinking exposes, 
then attempts to circumvent by trying to get beyond the discourses of light and the categories of 
the Enlightenment subject.  Furthermore in Derrida's commentary on Levinas one glimpses an 
early emergence of the problematics of sovereignty, the link between ipseity and identity, that 
will obsess a number of Derrida’s later works.  Derrida is here already arguing that it is 
impossible to separate power from violence, identification from exclusion, and ipseity from 
domination or terror.  He maintains that there is no “place” from which to identify or make such 
a separation that does not always already draw its “authority” from the very confusion of power 
and violence, ipseity and terror it would seek to settle.  Hence, Derrida’s reading of Levinas and 
his dispute with any traditional notion of non-violence puts him at odds with other projects that 
claim absolutely to separate violence and power.  One such project is that of Hannah Arendt.  
 
II: Arendt and the Tortuous Dream of Non-Violent Power 
Hannah Arendt’s work is in many respects oriented by questions concerning the 
relationship of political power to violence.  As Keith Breen says, “it is no overstatement to argue 
that the different currents of her [Hannah Arendt’s] thought are united by a sustained attempt to 
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distinguish violence from power and to resurrect an alternative concept of the ‘political’” (Breen, 
344).53  This concern for distinguishing power from violence emerges from Arendt’s belief that 
the problem of modern politics rests on the “misunderstanding” that “politics is essentially a 
matter of ruling and being ruled, of domination” (Breen, 344 and Arendt, V 43).  In fact, for her, 
modernity has been defined by this misunderstanding that takes as its grounding principle the 
idea that power and violence are two forms of the same thing, thus equating politics with 
domination.  This misunderstanding reduces politics to a play of competing violences in which 
politics becomes nothing but political realism, a thinly veiled justification for rule by the 
strongest.  A conception of politics that equates legitimate political power with violence is, for 
Arendt, already on the road to fascism.  Hence, a central tenet of her work will be the attempt to 
conceive a notion of legitimate political power that would not derive its force from a logic of 
domination, which is to say, a notion of political power that would have nothing to do with 
violence.  It is her effort to think a positive response to political realism, and most notably to 
Max Weber, that has led a number of authors, including Habermas, to embrace to varying 
degrees Arendt’s project of redefining political power in opposition to violence.54  On the other 
hand, this project has garnered a good deal of criticism from those who see Arendt as unable to 
maintain her rigid and seemingly ontological distinctions, not just between power and violence, 
but more often between the political and the social, the public and the private.55  It seems to me 
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that the argument between these two camps, although quite diverse, comes down to a basic 
questioning of Arendt’s insistence on marking a strict separation between a series of dialectically 
related terms: power and violence, public and private, etc.   
Given the critique of Levinas outlined above and particularly Derrida’s concern with 
Levinas’s attempt to separate what is violent from what is non-violent, one would imagine that 
Derrida would share with other critics a basic reservation about the general trajectory of Arendt’s 
project, insofar as she attempts to separate violence from power, the violent from the non-
violent.  This suspicion is supported by the small body of literature that directly addresses 
Derrida’s and Arendt’s work.  Although none of it looks explicitly at the separation of violence 
and power, the theme of Derrida’s resistance to Arendt’s demand for a strict set of oppositions 
occurs again and again.56  In addition, Derrida’s only article dedicated to Arendt’s work, 
“History of the Lie: Prolegomena,” implicitly raises this issue.  In this piece Derrida is critical of 
Arendt’s rendering of self-deception on the grounds that it relies on an unthought commitment to 
a relatively classical notion of the subject as unproblematically self-same, capable of more or 
less clear knowledge about itself and the world.57  Close to the end of this piece, Derrida list four 
“motifs” that seem to him to “have played an inhibiting, if not prohibiting role in the attempt to 
take such a history [Arendt’s history of the lie] seriously” (WA 67).  The first of these motifs is 
that Arendt (and also Koyre) “proceed as if they knew what ‘lying’ meant” (WA 67).  Here, as in 
several other places throughout his analysis, Derrida cites the way in which Arendt’s thinking 
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57 Jacques Derrida. “History of the Lie: Prolegomena,” in Without Alibi. Edited and Translated by Peggy  
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operates on the implicit assumption that one can more or less clearly separate truth from lying, 
an assumption that resonates with a certain logic of separation and demand for strict opposition.  
Derrida associates this implicit demand with an “indestructible optimism” in Arendt’s work, not 
in the sense that Arendt was herself an optimist, but in the sense that her account presupposes 
optimism: 
But the conceptual and problematic apparatus here put in place or accredited is 
‘optimistic.’ What is at stake is the determination of the political lie but also, 
above all the truth in general.  The truth must always win out and end up being 
revealed because, as Arendt repeats frequently, in its structure it is assured 
stability, irreversibility; it indefinitely outlives lies, fictions, and images (WA 68). 
Derrida argues that Arendt’s account of self-deception works under the sign of an implicit 
optimism, the assurance that truth must ultimately win out over lies.  This kind of optimism 
seems implicitly at odds with a certain other tone of Arendt’s work, one that would see human 
action as ultimately indeterminable, for example.  However in addition, Derrida’s claim suggests 
that Arendt’s drive to separate truth from falsity, and by extension the violent from the non-
violent or the public from the private is fundamentally not simply a political issue.  Thus, the 
tension between Arendt’s inherent “optimism” and certain other aspects of her thought strikes to 
the very heart of the question of truth, to the philosophical as well as political questions of 
violence, thought, and society.     
In what follows, I develop and explore this tension between Arendt and Derrida, 
examining in detail Arendt’s attempt to articulate a notion of political power separable from 
violence and domination.  I show the way in which this project falls prey to the kind of confusion 
highlighted in Derrida’s critique of Levinas.  This exploration of Arendt is important as it helps 
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to clarify and explore the relationship between Derrida’s and Arendt’s work, unearthing what 
might seem to be a fundamental impasse in their modes of thinking.  However, I argue that this 
impasse is somewhat negotiable based on their shared commitment to a strong notion of 
undecidability in the realm of human action.  Additionally, I believe this question of the 
relationship between violence and power helps to clarify Derrida’s resistance to a traditional 
discourse of non-violence, and begins to develop the character of Derrida’s political engagement, 
which is shaped fundamentally by his resistance to the notion of a non-violent politics.  I begin 
with Arendt’s conception of violence and power. 
In On Violence, Arendt defines violence as “acting without argument or speech and 
without counting the consequences.”58  For an act to be violent it must be done to achieve a 
specific end, and it cannot consider the effects it may have on others.  The fact that acts of 
violence exclude negotiation and speech points to the always individualistic character of 
violence.  A violent act is directed by a particular desire or end that is not discussed with the 
individuals for whom it will have consequences.  This antagonism between violence and any 
possibility of speech, discussion, or deliberation is so fundamental that Arendt will constantly 
associate violence with silence, saying in On Revolution that “violence itself is incapable of 
speech.”59  Violence is something done to a group of people who are made silent insofar as they 
cannot participate in the discussion about what is being done.  Hence violent acts are “ruled by 
the means-end category,” shunning any deliberative or group dynamic.  It is the reliance of 
violence on means-ends thinking that necessitates the relationship of violence and technology.   
The means-end thinking that characterizes violent acts requires the assistance of 
technology.  For Arendt: “violence—as distinct from power, force, or strength—always needs 
                                                 
58 Hannah Arendt. On Violence. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970, 64. 
59 Hannah Arendt. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1963, 19. 
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implements” (OV 4).  It is through the use of implements that one group or individual foists its 
ends onto others.  Arendt envisions acts of violence as structurally similar to modes of individual 
aggression, which, with the addition of technological devices, can extend their harm over a large 
number of people (OV 46).  From this perspective, the only difference between fighting with 
one’s fists and fighting with a gun is that a gun perpetrates harm on a greater number of people, 
thereby increasing an individual's ability to further his own self-interested and violent goals.  
Thus, violent acts are ones that pursue individual ends with the help of technological devices and 
which do not consider the damage they may cause those not involved in deliberations about such 
actions.  One could, I think, open an intriguing parenthesis here on the linking in Arendt’s work 
between violence, silence, and technology.  
[This link emerges at least in part from her exploration of the association of technology 
with the development of atomic weapons and emergence of the worry that humanity will, 
through the use of its technology, ultimately silence itself entirely.60  This link also raises 
questions concerning the relationship between technology and speech in Arendt’s work.  Her 
association of technology and silence coupled with her opposition of violence and speech 
suggest that Arendt has perhaps a fundamentally non-technological notion of speech.  One of the 
possible implications of such a conception would be that speech would appear in Arendt’s work 
as non-prosthetic.  For Arendt, speech would certainly shun the addition or supplementation of 
technology as a means to enhance or multiply its range or effects, but it seems that it would also 
be non-prosthetic and non-supplementary in itself.  The power of speech can be drawn in no way 
from technology.  This exploration might suggest another way to explore the impasse between 
Derrida’s and Arendt’s positions, since for Derrida language is fundamentally prosthetic.  
Furthermore, this returns us to one of the basic concerns of Derrida’s reading of Levinas, 
                                                 
60 See for example, The Human Condition, Second Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998, 4ff. 
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namely, how Levinas establishes the “right” to speak of the other as such.  Where does the power 
to speak come from?  Close parenthesis].   
Whatever Arendt’s position on technology and speech more generally, it is clear that she 
sees the notion of violence outlined above as opposed to the notion of power.  Power is “the 
human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (OV 44).  An individual never performs a 
powerful action, nor does such an action further an individual end.  Such actions are the result of 
a group of people working together.  In addition, such acts are in no way instrumental, but are 
rather ends in themselves: “Power needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of 
political communities” (OV 52).  An action is powerful when it is the undertaking of a group of 
people working together for a common goal, and it remains powerful only so long as it considers 
its potential consequences on the community at large.  Under this definition, power is inherently 
non-violent, for power is never an expression of individual interest and does not require 
technological prostheses.  In fact, Arendt goes so far as to say that “to speak of non-violent 
power is actually redundant” (OV 56).  Hence, Arendt believes that it is possible and necessary 
to carefully separate power and violence or non-violent doing from violent doing.  Failure to 
make this distinction risks confusing ethical action with unethical action.  Arendt's conception of 
power as a non-violent force, purified of any element of violence, is dependent upon her 
assumption that violence and power are absolutely separable.  This demand has a direct 
correlation to Levinas, insofar as Levinas’s hope of non-violence was also grounded on an 
absolute separation of violence from non-violence.  Like Levinas, Arendt will struggle to 
maintain this absolute separation of power and violence and, consequently, will struggle to 
articulate a non-violent notion of power. 
 66
Having argued for the clear separation of power from violence, Arendt’s text begins 
immediately to backtrack on this claim.  She argues that, although separate, violence and power 
are often confused with one another because they share certain qualities:   
Behind the apparent confusion [of violence and power] is a firm conviction in 
whose light all distinctions would be, at best, of minor importance: the conviction 
that the most crucial political issue is, and always has been, the question of Who 
rules Whom?  Power, strength, force, authority, violence—these are but words to 
indicate the means by which man rules over man; they are held to be synonyms 
because they serve the same function.  (OV 43) 
The confusion between power and violence occurs because traditionally they are seen to have the 
same function, both being ways of articulating the manner in which humans organize their 
political and social structures through domination.  Arendt returns here to her diagnosis of the 
basic guiding tenet of modern politics: the confusion of political power with domination.  Note, 
however, that this passage brings up more than one issue of interest to our analysis.  Clearly 
Arendt is questioning the notion that politics ought to be understood in terms of domination or as 
a ruling of some by others.  At the same time, this passage marks the fundamental influence that 
an assumed certainty about the true nature of the political can have on our understanding of the 
entire series of political concepts and on the notion of political action.  Arendt recognizes the 
important function that claims to certainty have in our ability to pose not only questions 
regarding politics, but questions regarding thought and human action more generally.  This 
discussion is important to my analysis insofar as I am keenly interested in the question of 
Arendt’s own certainty concerning the separability of violence and power.  The passage above 
allows us to see glimmerings of the tension in her work between her commitment to strict and 
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certain oppositions and her explicit worry about such strictness and certainty.  I shall return to 
this point shortly.  However, in a more basic sense, this paragraph makes the point that violence 
and power are often able to serve the same function, a notion that seems already to suggest that 
their separation might not be as watertight as Arendt contends. 
 Having just defined violence and power as utterly discrete, she goes on to say that despite 
their absolute distinctness, they are almost always found together.  Rarely, she acknowledges, 
does an actual distinction between power and violence exist in the “real world:” “[m]oreover, 
nothing, as we shall see, is more common than the combination of violence and power, nothing 
less frequent than to find them in their pure and therefore extreme forms” (OV 46-47).  Power 
and violence, although distinct, exist always in close proximity to one another.  In fact, “nothing 
[is] less frequent” than their appearance in isolation.  Taking Arendt at her word, one could say 
that the separation of power and violence borders on the impossible, being the thing least likely 
to occur in the entire world.  Now this might appear as an overzealous literalizing of Arendt’s 
text, and undeniably there is a certain rhetorical element to her claim.  That in this case, Arendt is 
not being hyperbolic seems corroborated by the fact that she goes on to contend that there has 
never been a single government, no matter how violent, that did not have a certain element of 
power:  
No government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed.  
Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs a 
power basis—the secret police and its net of informers.  Only the development of 
robot soldiers, which, as previously mentioned, would eliminate the human factor 
completely and, conceivably, permit one man with a push button to destroy 
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whomever he pleased, could change this fundamental ascendancy of power over 
violence.  (OV 50) 
This passage suggests that the individualist character of violence, of which Arendt makes so 
much, has in fact never been a historical or political reality, since political violence has always 
been the action of a group of people.  Arendt goes so far as to say that for violence to not be the 
work of a group of people would require the utter mechanization of society.  We, thus, return to 
the fundamental link between violence and technology and the fundamental separation in 
Arendt’s thinking of technology from power and speech.  However, the more basic point, the 
notion that historically violence has always had an element of power, seems to challenge 
Arendt’s claim that violence and power ought to be understood as distinct phenomena, and falls 
more in line with her assertion that it is almost impossible to find power and violence in isolation 
from each other.  Her claim that power has a fundamental “ascendancy” or control over violence 
suggests that the coexistence of power and violence, more than a mere historical contingency, is 
in fact a necessary collusion.  This notion is reinforced by Arendt's assertion that power opens 
the possibility of violence. 
 As stated above, violent action is conducted according to means-end logic.  However, 
Arendt adds to this that power is the condition for the possibility of means-end reasoning: 
“power, far from being the means to an end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of 
people to think and act in terms of the means-end category” (OV 51).  Power, the basic ability of 
people to join together in action, makes possible actions directed by means-end logic, since 
violence, actions directed against the many by the “one,” requires that there be a “many,” a 
group, or community to be directed against.  This is why Arendt states that “[p]ower is indeed of 
the essence of all government, but violence is not” (OV 51).  Power is the condition for the 
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possibility of political organization and, therefore, must logically precede the anti-political 
exercise of violence.  Following from Arendt’s claims concerning means-end logic is the notion 
that the relationship of power to violence is not simply one of opposition but is in fact one of 
constitutive priority—power precedes violence as its condition of political possibility.  This 
relationship of constitutive priority makes it much more difficult to see how Arendt can maintain 
her fundamental separation of power and violence. 
 The constitutive priority Arendt cedes to power in relation to means-end logic entails that 
power must have an equally constitutive relation to violence.  There can be no exercise of 
violence without the existence of means-end logic and, therefore, without the existence of power.  
Arendt paints a picture here in which power would be silently at work in every act of violence, 
opening the space in which violence is able to appear.  Power gives birth to the political 
communities against which and in whose name violent action will be directed.  Without these 
communities, without the space opened up by the binding force of power, violence could neither 
be exercised nor, in fact, exist at all.  Hence every act of violence, on Arendt’s account, is made 
possible by a more fundamental act of power and, consequently, every powerful act would seem 
to harbor the irreducible possibility of violence.  Two things seem immediately troubling about 
the claim that power is the condition for the possibility of violence.  First, this claim appears at 
odds with what Arendt says in On Revolution, where it is precisely a kind of “violence” that 
founds the political.  Second, this account is inscribed in a dialectical logic, one that Arendt 
specifically contests.  Let us begin with the second of these problems.  
 Having defined power and violence as opposites, Arendt continues by arguing against 
understanding this opposition as dialectic: 
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Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.  Hegel’s and 
Marx’s great trust in the dialectical “power of negation,” by virtue of which 
opposites do not destroy but smoothly develop into each other because 
contradictions promote and do not paralyze development, rests on a much older 
philosophical prejudice: that evil is no more than a privative modus of the good, 
that good can come out of evil; that, in short, evil is but a temporary manifestation 
of a still-hidden good.  Such time-honored opinions have become dangerous.  
They are shared by many who have never heard of Hegel or Marx, for the simple 
reason that they dispel legitimate fear.  By this, I do not mean to equate violence 
with evil; I only wish to stress that violence cannot be derived from its opposite, 
which is power.  (OV 56) 
Despite the oppositional character of power’s relationship to violence, power in no way admits 
of any violence nor can a violent act lead to or assist in the formation of any true form of power.  
This claim emerges naturally from the notion that power is the action of a group of people 
working to achieve a collective end and, thus, is not something that can emerge from an action 
directed at the achievement of some individual goal; powerful and violent doing simply begin 
from different and incommensurate locations.61  Inherent in this line of thinking is a total 
rejection of any dialectical relationship between power and violence.  In fact, Arendt presents 
dialectics as not only logically incorrect, in the sense that something cannot come from its 
opposite, but as immanently dangerous, as it promotes the idea that one could engage in immoral 
                                                 
61 This beginning from incommensurate locations is the most compelling reason, I think, for seeing Arendt’s 
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simply logically, conceptually, or regulatively opposed to violence; rather it is necessarily materially or 
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acts as a means to achieve moral results.62  This concern about dialectics is compelling in some 
sense, as there is clearly something dangerous about a logic that contends one has a right to do 
immoral things for the sake of the moral.  However, Arendt’s wholesale rejection of any 
dialectical reciprocity between power and violence appears at odds with the way in which she 
articulates their relationship. 
Arendt’s anti-dialectical position, that no pair of opposites can ever morph into one 
another, that good, for example, cannot give rise to evil, sits uneasily with the claim that violence 
emerges from the space opened by power.  The idea that power and violence are related in a 
totally non-dialectical way, which is to say, they exist utterly independently of one another, is 
difficult to square with the notion that power has constitutive “ascendancy” over violence.  For 
power to have command (dare one say dominion) over violence means that it must have some 
relation and some contact with violence, and where there is contact there is always the possibility 
of contagion, mixing, and confusion.  This issue of the relation of power and violence, of the 
possibility of their interaction, mixing, and co-contagion is developed further in On Revolution, 
where, in opposition to what she says in On Violence, it will be a moment of “violence” that 
founds the possibility of political power. 
 In the introduction to On Revolution, Arendt writes about the revolutionary founding of a 
new political organization: 
That such a beginning must be intimately connected with violence seems vouched 
for by the legendary beginning of our history as both biblical and classical 
antiquity report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the 
beginning and, by the same token, no beginning could be made without using 
                                                 
62 It is interesting that Arendt’s claim that dialectics operates on an old philosophical dogma, that evil is just a 
privative form of the good, seems itself to be based on a similarly old philosophical notion, namely that something 
cannot give what it does not have.   
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violence, without violating [. . .] whatever brotherhood human beings may be 
capable of has grown out of fratricide, whatever political organization men may 
have achieved has its origin in crime.  (OR 19-20) 
What one sees in Western religious and secular founding myths is the truth that beginnings are 
necessarily violent, since they can only emerge anterior to the establishment of the law that 
governs them.  Arendt is claiming that the beginnings of law and politics will always be extra-
legal and extra-political.  Because they are prior to the law, such beginnings are necessarily 
outside the law and as such are violations of the law.  Arendt’s argument here is very close in 
kind to ones Derrida will himself make in several place, insofar as both thinkers argue that 
political foundings are impossible to ground in the legitimacy of law.63 Yet this notion of 
political beginnings as necessarily violent seems at odds what Arendt says in On Violence, where 
it is power that not only grounds the possibility of violence but also commands violence.   
One will recall that Arendt's On Violence argues that power has a fundamental 
“ascendancy” over violence, an ascendancy that emerges from power’s constitutive relationship 
to the means-ends logic.  Yet, in On Revolution it is precisely violence that founds the political.  
This leaves us with a seeming paradox, namely, if power must come before violence, then how 
could violence found the political?  One way to at least begin answering this question is to note 
that Arendt discusses violence in On Revolution in multiple ways, the first having to do with war 
and revolution.  She frames her remarks concerning the relationship between violence and the 
political by outlining the commonalities of war and revolution.  In particular, she is interested in 
the way in which they share the “common denominator” of violence.  It is this shared 
                                                 
63 For example, Derrida writes in “On Forgiveness”, “All Nation-States are born and found themselves in violence.  I 
believe that truth to be irrecusable.  Without even exhibiting atrocious spectacles on this subject, it suffices to 
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which it founds.  It is thus outside the law, and violent by that very fact” (CF 57).  
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participation in violence that explains why wars so often lead to revolutions and vise versa (OR 
18).  In addition, the necessary relationship between wars, revolutions, and violence “set[s] them 
apart from all other political phenomena” since “[i]n so far as violence plays a predominant role 
in wars and revolutions, both occur outside the political realm, strictly speaking” (OR 18, 19).  
Arendt marks a fundamental distinction here between violence and political power, similar to the 
one she articulates in On Violence, insofar as she maintains that violence is necessarily outside 
the political realm and outside the domain of power.  However, Arendt seems to understand the 
existence of violence outside of politics and power in two different but related senses.   
On the one hand, she articulates violence as that which founds the possibility of political 
power.  This violence is outside the political realm, as it comes before the possibility of politics.  
Arendt associates this kind of “being outside” the political with the pre-political moment of “the 
state of nature,” although she is quick to say that this “state of nature” is not a historical fact, but 
rather a “theoretically purified paraphrase” standing in for the unannounceable moment of 
founding violence.  On the other hand, Arendt characterizes violence as that which can fracture 
an already existing political sphere.  This violence is outside the political realm insofar as it is an 
“anti-political” violence (OR 19).  Such violence would come after the establishment of political 
power and would, thus, find its ground in the possibility opened for it by power.  It is this second 
sense of violence that concerns Arendt primarily in On Violence.  This distinction may explain 
why in that text she writes of power as having a fundamental ascendancy over violence.  This 
articulation of violence as being outside the political in two senses makes it possible to see On 
Violence as an extension of Arendt's investigation into the phenomenon of violence in On 
Revolution, rather than as in conflict with it.  One can read On Violence as an exploration of anti-
political violence rather than of pre-political violence, a reading that lessens the tension created 
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by what first appears as a blatant contradiction where violence both founds and does not found 
the political.  Nevertheless, this reading fails to address the tension created in both essays by 
Arendt's articulation of violence and power as utterly separate yet constantly enmeshed 
phenomena. 
There is a tension in both On Violence and On Revolution concerning the relationship 
between power and violence.  Now one can read On Revolution as an attempt to grapple with this 
tension, insofar as that text presents “revolution” as having a kind of mediational relationship 
between power and violence.  In On Revolution, Arendt characterizes revolution as being both 
political and violent.  On the one hand, it is clear that revolution is understood as fundamentally 
violent, since it is excluded “strictly speaking” from the realm of political power.  On the other 
hand, Arendt writes that “we must not fail to note that the mere fact that revolutions and wars are 
not even conceivable outside the domain of violence is enough to set them apart from all other 
political phenomena” (OR 18. My italics).  The notion that revolution is different from “other 
political phenomena” suggests that, despite its differences, revolution is a political event.  
Revolution does, after all, have some political efficacy.  Revolution seems to operate on a middle 
ground between violence and power—participating in both realms simultaneously.  Arendt 
furthers this notion of revolution’s mediating character by suggesting that revolutions are never 
exclusively violent. 
Having established that the role violence plays in revolution separates revolution from 
other political events, Arendt says “not even wars, let alone revolutions, are ever completely 
determined by violence.  Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration 
camps of totalitarian regimes, not only the laws [. . .] but everything and everyone must fall 
silent” (OR 18).  Revolution is not in its totality violent for, if that were the case, it would be 
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impossible even to speak of revolution.  True violence, for Arendt, is unspeakable and always 
silent, insofar as it is by definition a doing beyond negotiation or dialogue.  It is only at the point 
that dialogue ends, the point at which one stops speaking and negotiating with others that the 
possibility of violence emerges.  It is precisely the inability of violence to negotiate, its inability 
to speak, that places it outside politics, a realm that is, for Arendt, defined by speech, constant 
negotiation, and, let us remember, a constant assessment of consequences.  Thus, Arendt sees 
revolution as fundamentally constituted by violence but at the same time functioning in the 
political realm.  It is a phenomenon that traffics both in power and violence, and therefore calls 
into question to her strict separation of power and violence.     
 While seeing revolution as a concept that mediates between power and violence, Arendt 
remains committed even in this discussion to the fundamental separation of power and violence, 
the separation of the political from that which is outside politics.  Thus, despite her statements to 
the contrary, revolution remains, “strictly speaking,” outside the political realm.  Nonetheless her 
use of the qualifier, "strictly speaking," does little to remove the impression that her work, taken 
as a whole, cannot maintain her separation of power and violence.  Whether it comes in the form 
of her contention in On Violence that not a single government, no matter how violent, has ever 
existed without some element of power or in the similar claim in On Revolution that revolutions 
are never completely violent, Arendt paints a picture of violence and power as being far less 
distinct than she constantly maintains.  However, the most striking evidence against the 
possibility of this separation comes from Arendt’s conception of human action. 
Inherent in the attempt to separate actions of power from actions of violence is the notion 
that it is possible to assure that an act will not lead to violence, possible to know that, properly 
executed and under the proper circumstances, a particular action is certain to be powerful and not 
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violent.  This certainty is derived from the defining characteristics of powerful action: its 
emergence from a group, its commitment to a communal good, its lack of any need for 
technological prostheses and its ability to count its consequences.  Thus, Arendt’s distinction 
between power and violence depends on the notion that a group of people can know with 
certainty the character of their actions and that they can through deliberation (non-prosthetic 
speech) clearly account for the consequences of their actions.  It is satisfaction of these four 
conditions that establishes true political power for Arendt and makes possible the appearance of 
a non-violent politics.  Now I believe one could show through careful analysis that all four of 
these conditions of power prove impossible to maintain in absolute opposition to their violent 
counterparts.  Take, for instance, the concept of non-prosthetic speech: it is, as I suggested 
earlier, difficult to maintain convincingly the notion that language and speech are non-prosthetic, 
for speech, the very condition of powerful action, always appears in some sense as a supplement.  
The present discussion does not allow for thorough analysis of all four of these conditions of 
power.  I will thus look in detail only at the last one, the notion that a group could calculate the 
consequences of its actions.  This requirement seems particularly odd in Arendt’s analysis given 
that her own conception of action denies the possibility of certainty concerning the outcome of 
human actions. 
All forms of human action contain within them a radical uncertainty concerning their 
outcomes.  This is why means-ends logic appears so dangerous to Arendt: “[s]ince the ends of 
human action, as distinct from the end products of fabrication, can never be reliably predicted, 
the means used to achieve political goals are more often of greater relevance to the future world 
than the intended goals” (OV 4).  Action is something that can never have an absolutely 
determined outcome, since there is no means by which unequivocally to predict the effects one’s 
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doing may have.  This is why action is so closely linked with natality and ultimately with 
freedom, for Arendt.64  It is the fact that action is fundamentally undetermined that allows 
humans to be creatures who can start new causal chains: who can be “beginners.”65  However, if 
all human action contains an irreducible uncertainty, there seems to be no way to assure that 
seemingly powerful actions will not, in some way or another, lead to violence or will not have 
been violent all along. 
The notion that every human action involves a radical uncertainty concerning its outcome 
threatens, in advance, the possibility of securing action beyond the potential of violence.  There 
should be no way, on Arendt’s own terms, to guarantee the non-violent character of action, as the 
ends of action are beyond absolute prediction.  This lack of certainty involves both the ends and 
the ground of action.  One can neither guarantee a non-violent outcome nor can one guarantee 
that an action was not, despite appearances, violent from the beginning.  One of the lessons of 
Arendt’s conception of action (and in fact its very resource) is that there is no form of action and 
no set of conditions that could exempt any act from having a radically uncertain and therefore 
potentially violent result.  Therefore, in order to honor Arendt’s insights into the character of 
human action, one seems compelled to contest her insistence on the possibility of a clearly non-
violent power. 
Arendt’s insistence on the indeterminacy of action, freedom, and politics makes it 
difficult to read her as a thinker of surety, calculation, stability, and ultimately non-violence.  In 
fact, Arendt appears to be much more a thinker of fragility and instability, which is why she is so 
committed to the “promise” and the “miracle” as essential categories of free political action.  The 
Arendtian notion of action along with its correlates, freedom and politics, stands necessarily 
                                                 
64 See The Human Condition  9. 
65 See “On Freedom.” Beyond Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Penguin Books, 
1993, 167. 
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opposed to any notion of absolute determination or calculability and, thus, opposed to the project 
of establishing a form of power or action beyond the possibility of violence.  Hence, we see an 
uneasiness in Arendt’s thinking similar to that Derrida marked in Levinas.  Both these thinkers, 
although committed in different ways to some notion of radical uncertainty concerning the 
possibility that subjects can control and master their world, remain insistent on the possibility of 
non-violence.  This uncertainty, this concern for the way in which the discourses of certainty 
house a potential for violence, is the knot that connects Arendt’s, Levinas’s, and Derrida’s work, 
for Derrida shares a worry over the fundamental limits of the possibilities of determination and 
completeness. 
There is an affinity between Derrida’s notion of undecidability and Levinas’s and 
Arendt’s notions of radical alterity and action respectively.  For Derrida, undecidability marks a 
fundamental lack of completeness: “Above all, no completeness is possible for undecidability” 
(LI 116).66  This incompleteness can be understood schematically, Derrida says, in three ways.  
First, it marks “that which resists binarity or even triplicity” (LI 116).  It marks the element 
within a system that cannot be simply reduced to either the inside or the outside of that system, 
the element that is not clearly inside, outside, or somewhere else in relationship to the system of 
which it nevertheless appears to be a part.67  Second, undecidability marks the determining of the 
limits of the calculable: “the limits of decidability, of calculability or formalizable completeness” 
(LI 116).  It marks that which, because it is neither clearly inside nor outside of a system, 
traverses and illuminates the borders that demarcate the inside from the outside.  Third, it marks 
the paradox that opens the field of decision as such: “in accordance with what is only ostensibly 
a paradox, this particular undecidable opens the field of decision or of decidability” (LI 116).  
                                                 
66 Limited INC. Edited by Samuel Weber. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988.  Hereafter 
abbreviated LI. 
67 In this sense, “undecidability” is another term or iteration of the notion of the “center” discussed earlier. 
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Undecidability names the paradoxical logic by which every particular decision, in order to be a 
decision, must contain the possibility that it could be otherwise, undermining its completeness 
and pointing to a more originary undecidability, which makes all moments of decision and 
indecision possible.  If every decision or act can be otherwise, then every decision or action 
remains in a profound sense always already undecidable.  This basic conception of 
undecidability seems to function not unlike Levinas’s notion of radical alterity or Arendt’s 
notion of action.  What all three of these figurations of undecidability have in common is that 
they are opposed to the possibilities of totalization and completeness, which is another way of 
saying that they challenge any notion of “decision” or “action” that could overcome the inherent 
indetermination, incompleteness, and passivity which makes them possible.  This is not to 
suggest that “undecidability” is somehow an example of Levinasian alterity or Arendtian action, 
for these terms relate to a complex of concepts which not only require in each case a careful 
reading but also emerge from different fields of inquiry.  Yet, there is some affinity between 
these notions, and this affinity allows one to see Derrida’s relationship to Levinas and Arendt 
less as a critique, and more as a following out of a current in their thinking, a current that stands 
opposed to the possibility of any notion of purely non-violent action, decision, or space.  
 Staying faithful to a certain insistence in the letter and logic of Levinas’s and Arendt’s 
texts leads one, from a Derridean perspective, to become unfaithful to them, unfaithful to their 
insistence on non-violence.  The current of undecidability that passes through the thinking of 
Levinas and Arendt must give one pause before their desire to establish some space, logic, or 
power devoid of the possibility of violence.  This desire, in both their cases, is belied by their 
inability to maintain the sets of oppositions that ground their claims to non-violence.  In Levinas 
this is the opposition between discourse and violence and more fundamentally between discourse 
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and spatiality.  In Arendt it is the opposition between power and violence and, ultimately, the 
separation of action from any form of indetermination.  My analysis shows that the desire for 
non-violence rests on a gesture of separation, the power of thought or will to separate the violent 
from the non-violent.  Derrida, via Levinas, associated this power of separation, this force of 
identification with the notion of subjectivity, suggesting that a traditional discourse of non-
violence falters precisely insofar as it requires recourse to a logic of identity, a logic always laced 
with exclusion and violence.  In Arendt and Levinas, this logic emerges both at the level of 
human action and at the level of their own attempts to separate violence from power.  Hence, one 
can, I think, draw a number of general conclusions concerning Derrida’s relationship to the 
discourse of non-violence:  
First, Derrida’s is suspicious of discourses of non-violence insofar as they appear as 
discourses of purity—as attempts to separate, indemnify, and secure a force, discourse, or space 
beyond the possibility of violence.  Non-violence is, on Derrida’s account, a dream of the safe 
and sound, a dream of something that would be beyond the possibility of contamination or 
corruption.  In Levinas, it is the dream of an exteriority that would create no outside, and in 
Arendt, the dream of political action that would not go astray.  Derrida’s critique of the discourse 
of non-violence thus links to his general critique of purity and properness, a critique that was 
always central to his work.68   
Second, given that the discourses of non-violence are discourses of purity, and given 
Derrida’s relentless critique of the categories, conception, and application of purity and 
properness, it follows that Derrida’s thinking would be an equally relentless critique of the 
                                                 
68 The question of the proper emerges across Derrida’s oeuvre.  See particularly Of Grammatology; “Faith and 
Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Religion. Edited by Jacques Derrida 
and Gianni Vattimo. Translated by Samuel Weber. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 1-78; The Beast 
and the Sovereign, Volume One. Edited by Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud. Translated by 
Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
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categories, concept, and uses of non-violence.  The logic that falls under the name 
“deconstruction,” because of its reliance on the unavoidability of difference and iterability, will 
never be a discourse of purity: “There is no idealization without (identificatory) iterability: but 
for the same reason, for reasons of (altering) iterability, there is no idealization that keeps itself 
pure, safe from all contamination” (LI 119).  Hence, the logic that falls under the name 
deconstruction will never be a discourse of non-violence.  In fact, the critique of non-violence 
would seem to be at the very heart of the deconstructive endeavor.   
Third, Derrida’s questioning and critique of any discourse of non-violence is connected 
to his critique of sovereignty, insofar as Derrida’s concern with non-violence revolves around the 
power of identification and its link to subjectivity.  For Derrida, sovereignty, whether in the form 
of the I, the nation-state, or God is nothing but the ability to make definitive separations, the 
ability to “put an end in a single, indivisible stroke to the endless discussion” (R 10/?).  The 
separating of the violent from the non-violent is a sovereign decision and, as we shall see, 
perhaps the sovereign decision par excellence.  Hence, the critique of non-violence links to one 
of the central concerns of Derrida’s later “political” writings.  There is much more to be said 
about this link between questions of violence and questions of sovereignty.  However, before 
pursuing those questions, I would like to dwell on Derrida’s critique of non-violence and its 
relationship to politics generally.   
One of the clear implications of what has been said above is that Derrida’s thinking does 
not advocate for non-violence, at least not as traditionally understood, nor is his thinking pacifist 
in the sense of an attempt to abstain totally from violence.  However, he is certainly not a 
proponent of violence, an apologist for the various forms of cruel, bloody, and bellicose speech 
and action that so often define, in particular, the discourses of politics.  Derrida's position of 
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neither completely condoning nor completely condemning violence emerges necessarily from the 
conclusions drawn above.  It is not a matter of being wholly for or against violence for Derrida; 
rather his critique of non-violence, of purity, and of sovereignty proceeds by relentlessly 
examining the processes, concepts, and logics that attempt to decide what is violent and what is 
non-violent.  The question of non-violence in Derrida’s work thus finds a place in the 
longstanding debate over his politics, the question of whether what is collected under the name 
“deconstruction” or “Jacques Derrida” is political or apolitical, ethical or unconcerned with 
ethics.   
 
III: Benjamin’s Violences Divine and Otherwise 
 There is a huge body of literature stretching back to at least the mid-nineteen eighties on 
the political possibilities of Derrida’s thinking.  This work can be loosely divided up into one of 
two camps: that which sees political possibilities in Derrida’s work and that which does not.69  
Thinkers critical of the “politics of deconstruction” have historically tended to dismiss Derrida as 
“reactionary,”70 “merely aesthetic”71 or, in more extreme cases, as “dangerously ecstatic or 
vitalist proto-totalitarian.”72  In opposition to this critical reaction, throughout the nineteen-
eighties and nineties a large number of works appeared that were aimed at exposing the political 
significance of deconstruction.  All of these works argue in a myriad of ways that the 
deconstructive engagement offers a means to expose and challenge traditional assumptions, 
hierarchies, and power relations.  A sampling of these writings includes the work of Geoffrey 
                                                 
69 For a brief account of the early development of these two readings see Richard Beardworth’s Derrida & the 
Political. New York: Routledge, 1996, 1-4.  
70 See for example, L. Ferry and A. Renaut Heidegger et les modernes. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1988 and Jürgan 
Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. 
71 Jürgan Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. 
72 John P. McCormick. “Derrida on Law; Or, Poststructuralism Gets Serious” Political Theory, Volume 29, Number 
3, (June 2001), 395-423.    
 83
Bennington, Drucila Cornell, Catherine Malabou, and Richard Beardsworth.73  These works and 
others like them, along with a series of explicitly political texts published by Derrida himself, 
have dramatically shifted the current terrain of the discussion regarding Derrida’s “politics.”  
Despite the fact that the days of preaching the apolitical nature of deconstruction have in many 
respects passed, the question of Derrida’s politics persists, reemerging in recent essays and books 
devoted to his work.74  It is not my purpose to rehash the arguments past or present for the 
political possibilities of Derrida’s thought.  It seems to me that it is not difficult to decide 
whether Derrida's work and deconstruction have political import.  It is fairly obvious that they 
do.  However, the question of why this debate continues is interesting.  Why is this question so 
difficult to let go or move on from?  The lesson of this nearly thirty year debate is perhaps the 
reaffirmation of the long standing notion that, for Derrida, “there can be no end to politics” 
(Bennington, L 3).  It might seem difficult to talk of explicating a politics without end, 
particularly if one takes this “without end” in the double sense of being always on going and 
having no determinable telos.  Certainly the “politics of deconstruction” are not as simple as 
applying a rule or set of laws and then calling it a day.  However, neither is it an aimless 
wondering about politics.  This question of the orientation of Derrida’s “politics” relates back to 
an issue raised only implicitly in my discussion of non-violence, namely, what is the problem 
with a desire for non-violence?  What is the importance of proceeding in the way that Derrida 
does, and what does deconstruction contribute to the body of thought regarding the problems of 
                                                 
73 Geoffrey Bennington. Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction, New York: Verso Press, 1994.  Hereafter 
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violence and also politics?  One way to approach this question would be to ask what is at stake in 
the attempt to differentiate the violent from the non-violent.  What does Derrida see as being at 
risk in the act of making claims, as Levinas and Arendt do, to have the power to clearly 
differentiate, identify, and name violence?  The advantage of posing the question in this way is 
that it respects the fact that, for Derrida, the question of politics is by no means unrelated to the 
question of violence more generally.  The slippage between political violence and all other forms 
of violence is a result of the fact that the demarcation of violence is already a question of 
political violence.  There is no political violence that does not draw its resources from more 
structural forms of violence.  In what follows, I explore this question of the stakes of Derrida’s 
concern for discourses of non-violence through a reading of his critique of Walter Benjamin in 
“Force of Law.”   
As suggested at the end of the last section, Derrida’s concern with discourses of non-
violence has everything to do with the connections between such discourses and a logic of purity.  
Implicit in these discourses is a desire to eliminate the violent elements of a system, space, or 
discourse, a desire to cleanse the system of violence.  Derrida's concern with projects of purity 
and cleansing is that they appear necessarily connected to the possibility of absolute violence—
to the possibility of total annihilation.  Thus, I argue that what Derrida finds so worrisome about 
the discourses of non-violence is not that they risk violence (all discourses do that) but that they 
risk committing and justifying the worst kind of violence.  To see the link between non-violence, 
purity, and annihilation reveals the high stakes of determination of violence.  In fact, Derrida's 
awareness of this link explains in significant ways the orientation of his own work.  Hence in the 
final part of this chapter, I suggest that questions of violence comprise a fundamental category of 
Derrida’s thought.  I argue that exploring Derrida’s work with an eye to violence allows one 
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clarify the character of Derrida’s project, to recast the logic of sovereignty as a question about 
identifying the violent and the non-violent, and to ultimately expose the inherently ecological 
orientation of “deconstruction.”  I begin with Derrida’s critique of Benjamin.  
 “Force of Law: The ‘Mythical Foundations of Authority” is a reading of Benjamin’s “Zur 
Kritik Der Gewalt.”  I introduce Benjamin’s essay by its German title in order both to highlight 
and to delay, if only for a moment, an impossible decision around which Derrida’s entire reading 
of Benjamin revolves.  This decision concerns the translation of Gewalt, a word that, like the 
pharmakon of “Plato’s Pharmacy,” houses in a single articulation two antithetical meanings.  
One may render Gewalt as either illegitimate “violence” or legitimate “force.”  Derrida’s reading 
demonstrates the way in which the polysemic character of Gewalt complicates Benjamin’s 
attempt to articulate a notion of non-violent force, what Benjamin comes to call “divine 
violence” (göttliche Gewalt).  Derrida’s reading of Benjamin and particularly the notion of 
“divine violence” illustrates more emphatically than in Levinas or Arendt how the discourse of 
non-violence, as a discourse of purity, comes to resemble and, thus, justify a discourse of 
absolute annihilation.  Derrida writes at the end of his essay:   
What I find, in conclusion, the most redoubtable, indeed perhaps almost 
unbearable in this text, even beyond the affinities it maintains with the worst [. . .] 
is a temptation that it would leave open, and leave open notably to the survivors 
or victims of the ‘final solution,’ to its past, present, or potential victims.  Which 
temptation? The temptation to think the holocaust as an uninterpretable 
manifestation of divine violence insofar as this divine violence would be at the 
same time annihilating, expiatory and bloodless, says Benjamin, a divine violence 
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that would destroy current law, here I re-cite Benjamin, ‘through a bloodless 
process that strikes and causes to expiate.’ (FoL 298/145)75       
Derrida’s concern with Benjamin’s critique of violence is that, in its attempt to articulate a notion 
of non-violent, bloodless, expiating force, it reveals that such a force is essentially 
indistinguishable from absolute annihilation, indistinguishable from what could be gathered 
under the name of the “final solution.”  There is, for Derrida, a fundamental and concerning 
collusion in Benjamin’s text between “divine violence” and absolute violence, which emerges 
unavoidably from the polysemic character of Gewalt.  Derrida’s reading shows that the 
articulation of a certifiably non-violent force ultimately is indistinguishable from an absolutely 
violent force, a force of total annihilation.  However, in order to see this one must first follow 
Benjamin’s argument for non-violent force, which begins with the relation between violence and 
law. 
 Violence appears, according to Benjamin, only in relationship to some form of moral 
law: “For a cause, however effective, becomes violent [Gewalt], in the precise sense of the word, 
only when it bears on moral issues” (R/GSII 277/179).76  The notion of Gewalt, whether 
understood as legitimate force or illegitimate violence, requires reference to some system of law.  
For something to appear justified or unjustified presupposes a set of rules against which its 
justification may be considered.  In the same way that Gewalt presupposes law, the existence of 
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law is dependent upon Gewalt, for there can be no law without the possibility of a force capable 
of either founding a new law or enforcing an existing law (in the face of its violation).77   
Of particular interest to Derrida is the way in which Benjamin’s “philosophy of law” 
organizes itself around a series of distinctions concerning the relationship of violence to law.  
The first of these distinctions is the one described above between “founding violence, the one 
that institutes and posits law (die rechtsetzende Gewalt) and the violence that preserves, the one 
that maintains, confirms, insures the permanence and enforceability of law (die rechtserhaltende 
Gewalt)” (FoL 264/79).  For Benjamin, “[a]ll violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-
preserving” (R/GSII 287/190).78  Through a discussion of state violence, Benjamin concludes 
that these are the two basic relations of violence to law.  This discussion also illuminates his 
further distinction between “mythic violence” and “divine violence.”   
The division between founding and preserving violence emerges from Benjamin’s 
discussion of the way in which states attempt to “monopolize” violence.79  Benjamin argues that 
modern European states preserve themselves by attempting to convert all claims to founding 
violence into the language of preserving violence or by converting “natural ends” into “legal 
ends.”80  States protect their legitimacy—the legitimacy of their own founding violence—by 
trying to remove the right of other entities to engage in alternative acts of founding.  By limiting 
the ability of people to challenge the law except through the avenues of the legal system (legal 
ends), the state eliminates peoples’ recourse to a founding violence (natural ends) that could 
                                                 
77 This is also what is at stake in Benjamin’s notion of natural and legal ends.  Natural ends having to do with the 
establishing of law and legal ends with the preserving of law.   
78 All violence for Benjamin is a question of means rather than ends. 
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while legal ends can always appeal to the history of the law or the constitution to justify them.   
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challenge and, consequently, endanger the state.  Thus, states attempt to replace a violence that 
disrupts their legitimacy with a violence that necessarily reinforces it.  This logic interests 
Benjamin because it shows that violence cannot only found and preserve law but can also 
destroy it.  This operation makes the question of “strikes” interesting to him as well because 
strikes are instances in which the state sanctions the recourse of entities other than itself to 
violence.81  That states attempt to control the use of founding violence indicates that “violence 
when not in the hands of the law, threatens it [law] not by the ends that it may pursue but by its 
very existence outside the law” (R/GSII 281/183).  What is intolerable to the state about allowing 
individuals recourse to founding violence is that such violence challenges the very existence of 
the law as such.  The possibility of establishing a totally new law does more than contest a 
particular law, it also shows that law itself is contestable.  This inherent contestability of law 
allows the notion of violence to be further distinguished into “mythic violence” (mythische 
Gewalt) and “divine violence” (göttliche Gewalt).   
The fact that violence can found as well as destroy law means that the division between 
founding and preserving violence is inadequate to encompass the character of violence in its 
entirety.  In order to address this inadequacy, Benjamin introduces what Derrida calls the second 
of his key distinctions, namely that between a “mythic violence” that founds the law and a 
“divine violence” that destroys all law.82  Writing about these two forms of violence, Benjamin 
says: 
Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence [mythischen Gewalt] 
is confronted by the divine.  And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects.  
If mythical violence [mythische Gewalt] is lawmaking, divine violence is law-
                                                 
81 R/GSII 281-282/183-185. 
82 FoL 265/80. 
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destroying [so die göttliche rechtsvernichtend]; if the former sets boundaries, the 
latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and 
retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if 
the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood. (R/GSII 297/199) 
Mythic violence concerns questions of law and the protection of law through the threat of guilt 
and bloody punishment.  In this sense, mythic violence combines, in a single expression, 
founding and preserving violence.  Benjamin presents this notion of violence in opposition to 
divine violence, which is never concerned with order or rules, and which simply strikes without 
warning, justification, or blood.  It is important to note here that Benjamin does not say, as in the 
English translation, that “divine violence is law-destroying” but rather that “the divine is law-
destroying [so die göttliche rechtsvernichtend].”  This difference of translation is important as it 
saves Benjamin from saying something that on its face would appear radically contradictory, 
namely that divine violence is non-violent.  However, the bloodlessness of this divinity will be 
one of the important factors that leads Benjamin ultimately to speak of the force of divinity as 
non-violent.   
Divinity’s force appears bloodless, for Benjamin, in two senses.  On the one hand, the 
“bloodiness” of violence, its brutality, is understood through its link to the law, to some notion of 
morality, and thus to the evaluative matrix of the mythical.  It is only within the framework of 
the mythical that one can attempt to calculate the cost of violence.  With divine force all such 
calculation is impossible, because divine force denies all law, all rules, and consequently all 
means of calculation.  For that reason, Benjamin asserts that the only human option in relation to 
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divine force is acceptance.83  On the other hand, divine violence appears bloodless insofar as it is 
connected to atonement, expiation, and purity:  
But in annihilating it [divine violence] also expiates [entsühnend], and a deep 
connection between the lack of bloodshed and the expiating [entsühnenden] 
character of this violence [Gewalt] is unmistakable.  The dissolution of legal 
violence [Rechtsgewalt] stems [. . .] from the guilt of more natural life, which 
consigns the living , innocent and unhappy, to retribution that “expiates” [shünt] 
the guilt of mere life—and doubtless also purifies [entsühnt] the guilty, not of 
guilt, however, but of law. (R/GSII 297/199)  
The Gewalt of the divine is “bloodless” insofar as it is inseparable from a purifying expiation of 
“life” from law.  Divine violence purifies that upon which it is wrought by annihilating not just 
some living being or set of beings but the law that circumscribes life as such.  Hence, it purifies 
“life” by freeing it from the constraints of law, meaning, and value, allowing it simply to be.  
This is why Benjamin says, “divine violence [is] pure power [reine Gewalt] over all life for the 
sake of the living” (R/GSII 297/200).84  It is in connection with this notion of divine violence, as 
a pure and expiating power beyond the possibility of any law, that Benjamin puts forward the 
possibility of a non-violent labor strike. 
 Just before his discussion of mythical and divine violence Benjamin outlines, following 
Sorel, two forms of worker strikes: “political strikes” and “proletarian strikes.”85  Benjamin 
argues that these two forms of strike have necessary but opposing relationships to violence.  On 
the one hand, a general political strike attempts to win certain concessions from those in power.  
This form of strike uses violence as a means to gain some determinable ends.  Yet, this form of 
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strike does nothing, on Benjamin’s account, to contest the structure of power, as it attempts not 
to change those structures, but to force the wielders of power to act in a certain way.  On the 
other hand, the proletarian strike has no set goals and desires no set of concessions; it is an 
“anarchistic” (anarchistisch) endeavor that in its goalless upheaval challenges the power 
structure as such.  Benjamin writes of these two forms of strike:  
[w]hile the first form of interruption of work is violent [Gewalt] since it causes 
only an external modification of labor conditions, the second as a pure means, is 
non-violent [gewaltlos].  For it takes place not in readiness to resume work 
following external concessions and this or that modification to working 
conditions, but in the determination to resume only a wholly transformed work, 
no longer enforced by the state. (R/GSII 291-292/194) 
Political and proletarian strikes are opposed in their relationship to violence insofar as the 
political strike is violent and the proletarian strike is not, for the appearance of violence requires 
some reference to law and the proletarian strike is precisely the contestation of all laws.  For 
Benjamin, in order for an action to be classified as non-violent, it must be unconstrained by law, 
outside the grips of any law.   
 Given that the appearance of violence has this necessary relationship to law, it is clear 
that there is a basic affinity between the notion of divine violence and the proletarian strike 
insofar as each functions fundamentally to contest the law and as such are necessarily non-
violent, gewaltlos.  As Benjamin says concerning the proletarian strike, “[a]gainst this deep, 
moral, and genuinely revolutionary conception, no objection can stand that seeks, on grounds of 
its possibly catastrophic consequences, to brand such a general strike as violent [Gewalt]” 
(R/GSII 292/194).  At the end of this essay he writes concerning the notion of divine violence:    
 92
But if the existence of violence [Gewalt] outside the law, as pure immediate 
violence [reine unmittelbare], is assured, this furnishes the proof that 
revolutionary violence [revolutionäre Gewalt], the highest manifestation of 
unalloyed violence [reiner Gewalt] by man, is possible, and by what means. 
(R/GSII 300/202-203) 
Parenthetically anticipating the coming discussion of Derrida's writings on Benjamin, it is 
possible to point to these passages as raising the questions that shape Derrida’s critique of  
Benjamin’s notion of non-violent power:  For what does it means to speak of an act that in the 
face of the most “catastrophic” of consequences resists the label of violence, an act whose effects 
are inconsequential to its character?  And why in order to show Benjamin’s argument for non-
violent force is one led to quote a passage so thoroughly saturated with the word violence?  In 
short, why is it necessary to name violence in order to erase it?  We shall return to these 
questions momentarily.  For the moment, it is salient to see that Benjamin postulates in the 
proletarian strike the possibility for an act of “revolutionäre Gewalt,” in which human beings 
might wield a pure force (reiner Gewalt) akin to divine force.  In challenging all structures of 
law, this human act would transcend the categorization of “violence,” which is understood in 
relation to a system of law and therefore is seen as morally questionable and thus potentially 
reprehensible.  This correlation between the proletarian strike and the concept of divine force 
would provide human access to a force that is at least in principle non-violent, non-coercive, and 
purifying.   
Benjamin's further discussion, however, muddies the clarity of his argument, for he says 
that “only mythical violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such with certainty, unless it be 
in incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is not visible to men” (R/GSII 
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300/203).  Mortals are unable to see with certainty the purifying nature of divine violence, 
presumably because they are unable to free their understanding from the mythical confines of 
law.  This would seem to deny them access to intentional use of divine force.  Yet Benjamin 
suggests that such a Gewalt still offers some kind of alternative to the always tyrannical violence 
of the mythical.  Allow me now to quote the above passage in its entirety:  
But if the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is 
assured, this furnishes the proof that revolutionary violence, the highest 
manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and by what means.  
Less possible and also less urgent for humankind, however, is to decide when 
unalloyed violence has been realized in particular cases.  For only mythical 
violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such with certainty, unless it be in 
incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is not visible to 
men. Once again all the eternal forms are open to pure divine violence, which 
myth bastardized with law.  It may manifest itself in a true war exactly as in the 
divine judgment of the multitudes on a criminal.  But all mythical, lawmaking 
violence, which we may call executive, is pernicious.  Pernicious, too, is the law-
preserving, administrative violence that serves it. (R/GSII 300/203)    
Mythical violence, whatever else it may be, is deeply and inexorably tyrannical, for it reduces the 
openness of divine force and limits the possibilities of “life.”  Hence, while mortals certainly 
have a less than transparent relationship to divine violence, Benjamin seems to see such 
purifying, non-violent force as giving humans some “possibility” and some “means” to resist the 
pernicious and tyrannical violence of the mythical.  Thus, like Levinas and Arendt, Benjamin 
puts forward a discourse of non-violence, the possibility of a “force” purified of all “violence,” 
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and, like Levinas and Arendt, this possibility of non-violent force rests on the strictness and 
purity of an entire set of more or less absolute distinctions: between divine force and mythical 
violence, non-violent force and violent force, proletarian strike and political strike, purity and 
impurity.  Not surprisingly, Derrida’s critique of Benjamin proceeds by showing that Benjamin’s 
discourse cannot maintain the purity of the distinction on which it rests.   
 The second half of Derrida’s “Force of Law” essay is an analysis of the way in which all 
the distinctions Benjamin puts into play regarding violence by his own logic merge necessarily 
into their opposites.  In relation to the separation of founding and preserving violence Derrida 
writes:  
What I am saying here is anything but conservative or antirevolutionary.  For 
beyond Benjamin’s explicit purpose, I shall propose the interpretation according 
to which the very violence of the foundation or positing of law (Rechtsetzende 
Gewalt) must envelop the violence of the preservation of law (Rechtserhaltende 
Gewalt) and cannot break with it. (FoL 272/93-94) 
The distinction between founding and preserving violence cannot be strictly maintained because 
every founding necessarily inscribes the possibility of its own preservation, for “[p]ositing is 
already iterability, a call for self-preserving repetition” (FoL 272/94).  Every founding of the law 
must constantly be reaffirmed in order to be preserved.  In fact preservation is nothing other than 
a reaffirmation of the force and legitimacy of founding.  Thus Derrida points to a fundamental 
moment of identity in the differential relationship of founding and preserving violence, insofar as 
every preserving violence, although necessarily different from the founding it preserves, appears 
as a repetition of that founding.  The force of this logic of iterability is that it compromises the 
supposed purity of these two forms of violence. 
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If every founding violence appears as simultaneously a preserving violence and every 
preserving violence appears as simultaneously a founding violence, then these concepts are not 
completely distinct, pure, or self-contained: “What threatens the rigor of the distinction between 
these two types of violence [. . .] is, at bottom, the paradox of iterability.  Iterability makes it so 
that the origin must repeat itself originarily, must alter itself to count as origin, that is to say, to 
preserve itself” (FoL 277-278/104).  Iterability undermines a conception of the relationship of 
founding and preserving violence that allows these concepts to be maintained in pure opposition 
to one another.  The iterability of the “origin” shows that the “origin” is never purely present, 
never purely original, since to be an “origin” requires the possibility of repetition.  Derrida will 
go on to dissect in a similar manner the entire set of distinctions put into play by Benjamin's 
argument, showing in each case that the purity of the distinction cannot be maintained in the face 
of iterability.  But the most definitive instance of this iterability, the most compelling argument 
against the possibility of clearly differentiating violent and non-violent force in Benjamin’s 
work, emerges from Derrida’s reading of the polysemic character of Gewalt. 
As I briefly outlined at the beginning of this section, what interests Derrida about Gewalt 
is the word itself.  It is a single term that houses the impossibility of clearly distinguishing 
legitimate force from violence, for it signifies “both violence and legitimate power, justified 
authority” (FoL 234/18).  The polysemic character of Gewalt makes questionable and 
undecidable any absolute separation of force from violence, since one could always translate 
Gewalt as either.  There is no means to determine absolutely what kind of “force” one is 
invoking by using the term Gewalt, and, therefore, no way to assure that one's invocation of 
force is not an invocation of violence.  This indeterminacy, this limit of control, was evident in 
my attempt to rearticulate Benjamin’s assertion of the possibility of pure, divine, non-violent 
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force, an effort that led me to cite a passage which, in English translation, contains the word 
“violence” no less than four times.  Furthermore, I justified my claims that, for Benjamin,  
göttliche Gewalt is fundamentally non-violent, with a passage that throughout its English 
translation uses the term “divine violence.”  I appeared, thus, to be espousing a blatant 
contradiction, saying that divine violence is non-violent, that göttliche Gewalt ist gewaltlos, that 
A is not A.  The apparent oddity in this can be explained in some degree by recognizing that it 
rests on the decision of the English translator, Edmund Jephcott, who renders almost every 
occurrence of “Gewalt” or “Gewalten” as the English “violence.”86 
In pursuing the present argument, there is something to be gained from delving a bit 
further into this translation conundrum.  Jephcott’s decision makes good sense, as it saves both 
himself and the reader from the problem of deciding when the author meant “violence” and when 
he meant “force."  It has the added advantage of appeasing academics, like myself, who 
appreciate terminological consistency.  However, the price paid for the decision is that it renders 
as nonsense the push in Benjamin’s argument to articulate divine Gewalt as non-violent, since it 
leads to the paradoxical claim that “divine violence” is no “violence” at all.  There are of course 
alternatives to Jephcott’s translation.  For example, in order to capture the tendency toward non-
violence in Benjamin’s text one could retranslate the above passage to read “[b]ut if the 
existence of force outside the law, as pure immediate force, is assured, this furnishes the proof 
that revolutionary force, the highest manifestation of pure force by man, is possible, and by what 
means.”  This translation would certainly be justifiable insofar as Benjamin clearly understands 
                                                 
86 The few exceptions to this fall into two categories.  First, there are five instances in which Jephcott translates 
Gewalt or Gewalten as “force” (278/180, 282/184, 284/187, 288/190, 300/202), these are generally moments in 
which “force” is being used in a general sense.  Second, there are seven instances in which Jephcott opts to translate 
Gewalt or Gewalten as “power” (287/189-190 twice, 289/192, 295/198, 297/200, 298/200 twice).  In almost all of 
these cases “power” is used in moments when Benjamin is pairing Gewalt with the divine.  Hence, Jephcott seems in 
these instances to be following out the current in Benjamin’s text that would attempt to disassociate the divine from 
“violence.” 
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divine Gewalt as non-violent, but it introduces a new problem.  For one could hardly generalize 
this rendering because the word “force” does not capture the “violence” of mythical Gewalt or 
founding Gewalt.  A third possibility would be simply to leave every instance of “Gewalt” or 
“Gewalten” in German, and provide a footnote that explains the ambiguity, allowing readers to 
decide for themselves what Benjamin is up to.  However, this suggestion does nothing to address 
the irresolvable ambiguity of Gewalt, opting instead simply to pass it on for others to struggle 
with.  In fact, and this will be Derrida’s contention, there is no translation of Gewalt that does not 
run into this ambiguity, and hence no way to be faithful to Benjamin’s intentions or text without 
simultaneously being unfaithful.   
The beauty and elegance of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin is that it shows that even if 
one grants all of Benjamin’s historical and empirical analysis, grants that states, strikes, the 
police, myth, and divinity function in the way that he suggests (and there are many reasons to 
think this), it still seems impossible to affirm the existence of a purely non-violent or 
revolutionary force, a force that would be beyond violence.  The argument is betrayed by the 
very language that attempts to outline, demarcate, and define such a “force."  The very language 
in which one would attempt to be faithful to Benjamin’s intentions carries within it 
undecidability and unfaithfulness, always already carries the possibility of a force become 
violence.  Any attempt to resolve the undecidability through an interpretive decision concerning 
the meaning of Gewalt performs an unjustifiable reduction of the polyvalent and contradictory 
meaning of the word.  This is why Derrida describes his reading of Benjamin as tracing “a kind 
of self-destruction, if not a suicide of the text, that lets no other legacy appear than the violence 
of its signature—as divine signature” (FoL 262/75).  Derrida thus reveals Benjamin’s position as 
self-destructive, justifying its separation of force and violence only through the interpretive 
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violence of a “divine signature,” a singular and God-like decision on the part of Walter Benjamin 
to determine the character of Gewalt, circumscribing it as either “violence” or “authorized 
force.”  Here we find ourselves returning to a familiar logic exposed in the critique of Levinas 
and Arendt, namely, that to posit some form of non-violence requires a power of identification, a 
reparatory and sovereign decision inseparable from violent exclusion.  Such discourses of non-
violence remain always already violent because, like all discourses of purity, they require an 
unacknowledged appeal to this sovereign power of identification, this “divine signature” that can 
clarify only by distorting, compel by violating, and purify by annihilating.  This connection to 
sovereignty is also what makes discourses of non-violence inseparable from the risk of absolute 
annihilation.  
The attempt to move beyond violence, to establish a space of non-violence, and, thus, to 
overcome the inherent potential for violence lodged at the heart of all language, thought, and 
action is, from a Derridean perspective, problematic not simply because it proves to be logically 
impossible, but rather because such an approach appears to justify the worst violence.  As 
Derrida writes at the end of his reading of Benjamin:  
When one thinks of gas chambers and the cremation ovens, this allusion to an 
extermination that would be expiatory because bloodless must cause one to 
shudder.  One is terrified at the idea of an interpretation that would make of the 
holocaust an expiation and an indecipherable signature of the just and violent 
anger of God. (FoL 298/145)        
One does not “shudder” at Benjamin’s argument because of the contradictory notion of “divine 
violence” nor the difficulty of imagining the human uses for such “power” as Benjamin 
describes.  It is, rather, the way in which this kind of “force” existing outside of any law, striking 
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without justification, and destroying utterly those it strikes, appears as a mirror image of absolute 
violence, a justification for what has come to be collected under the name “the final solution.”  
For Derrida, an absolutely non-violent “force,” a “force” beyond all qualification by law, is, 
because of its extra-legal position, indistinguishable from an absolute violence.  Hence, Derrida 
resists the discourses of non-violence not because they contradict themselves but because, by 
denying their inherent contradiction, such discourses come to resemble and, more terrifyingly, to 
justify the possibility of the worst violence.87   
 In Derrida’s critiques of Levinas, Arendt, and Benjamin we see his resistance to 
articulating a discourse of non-violence, whether understood as non-violent power or the creation 
of a space of non-violence.  This resistance emerges from his worry over the way in which such 
discourses attempt to foreclose the question of violence through an unjustifiable, sovereign 
decision concerning the character of the violent and the non-violent.  This decision operates to 
create the possibility of more or greater violence, insofar as such sovereign decisions attempt to 
cover over their inherent illegitimacy, purporting to settle, once for all, the question of violence 
and, thus, purporting to silence any debate concerning the violent and non-violent.  It is this 
silencing of debate, the putting an end to questioning through a sovereign decision over what will 
and will not count as violence, that Derrida constantly associates with the worst.  Hence, this link 
between Derrida’s concern over violence and its connection to the ability to decide the violent 
and the non-violent situates his general concerns over violence and sovereignty and allows us to 
begin to see the contours of a deconstructive ecology. 
      
 
 
                                                 
87 See also A Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy. 
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IV: Defining Sovereignty in Light of Violence and Life 
Exploring Derrida’s work from the perspective of violence reveals a number of things:  
First, it clarifies Derrida’s relationship to the question of non-violence by showing his resistance 
to such discourses and to any discourse that attempts to deny its own moment of force.  Hence, 
the question of violence positions Derrida’s project away from pacifism, understood as the 
attempt to act without violence.  For Derrida, thinking, critique, and certainly political action is 
not a non-violent activity.   
Second, it shows that fundamental to the deconstructive process is a concern for violence, 
and in particular a concern for the border separating the violent and the non-violent.  Whether in 
the form of the reparatory violence outlined in Of Grammatology, the concern over discourses of 
non-violence, or the question of sovereignty one sees that deconstruction is always already a 
critique of the separating of the violent from the non-violent.  This concern motivates Derrida’s 
critique of the discourses of non-violence, showing that the way in which one takes on the 
question of violence, the way one orients one’s thinking in relationship to violence, radically 
affects the nature of one’s critical project.  
In a thinking like that of Levinas, Arendt, or Benjamin, a thinking that attempts to 
overcome violence through the clear differentiation of the violent from non-violent, there is a 
focus on establishing and maintaining a non-violent discourse or set of practices by removing or 
excluding the violent elements.  These projects attempt in different ways to develop their critical 
agenda out of the separation of violence from non-violence, an attempt that establishes their 
agenda as one of purity, security, surveillance, etc.  These kinds of project are worrisome insofar 
as they operates on the basis of an unthought moment of sovereignty, an authoritarian settling of 
the question of what will count as violence.  This settling increases the potential for violence, 
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according to Derrida, insofar as the attempt to identify and exclude violence requires an 
uncritical recourse to the sovereign power of exclusion.  Hence, the question of violence is what 
separates Derrida’s critical project from those of Levinas, Arendt, Benjamin, and a certain 
tradition of Western philosophy.  Whatever else Derrida’s project may be, it is, first and 
foremost, an attempt to explore, contest, and acknowledge the irreducibility of violence in all 
practices of thought.  It takes violence as a fundamental category of thought and action.  Hence 
the question of violence is at the very heart of the deconstructive project, marking out both the 
orientation and stakes of that project.     
Third, the question of violence clarifies the nature and logic of sovereignty.  As outlined 
earlier, sovereignty is one of the names Derrida gives to the power of identity, the ability to mark 
the character of a thing by circumscribing its borders: it is a “kurios or kuros, having the power 
to decide, to be decisive, to prevail, to have reason over or win out over [avoir raison de] and to 
give the force of law, kuroō” (R/V 13/33).  Sovereignty is a decisional force that distinguishes 
the inside in opposition to the outside, and as such it is a decision on what will count as violent 
and non-violent.  In fact, sovereignty is in many ways nothing but a deciding of the boundary 
separating the violent and the non-violent, insofar as the separating of any inside from its outside 
is always simultaneously the establishing of a morality, a defending of the inside against the 
outside, a violent marking of inclusion and exclusion.  Hence, the question of violence clarifies 
the logic of sovereignty, showing it to be a necessary but also concrete circumscribing, marking, 
and deciding on the violent.   
Fourth, the question of violence also helps one clarify Derrida’s questioning of 
sovereignty.  If the danger of sovereignty is that it attempts to foreclose the question of violence, 
to proclaim once and for all what will count as violence and what will count as force, then the 
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contestation of sovereignty will take the form of fighting against sovereign violence with 
sovereign violence.  This is because any claim to contest sovereignty, any claim that would hope 
to challenge the sovereign demarcation, can only enact such a contestation through recourse to 
its own moment of sovereignty.  This was already implied in the structural necessity of originary 
and reparatory violence, in the logic of autoimmunity, and in the emphasis on questioning.  It is 
only through violently keeping open the question of violence, of keeping open the possibility of 
debate and discussion, that one can hope to avoid the passage from violence into absolute night.  
Yet such a keeping open requires a sovereign operation, a divine signature that would demand 
that the question of violence remain unresolved.  Hence, Derrida suggests that although one 
cannot do away with violence, one can resist violence only by violently exposing the 
questionableness of every sovereign decision.  There is a need when the logic of sovereignty to 
renounce always already its appeal to unconditionality, to renounce the uncontestability of any 
claim.  The character of such a renunciation is particularly well articulated in a passage from The 
Gift of Death. 
In The Gift of Death, Derrida takes up again the paradoxical logic of decision making, the 
paradox that is inscribed in every sovereign act and in the very logic of sovereignty.  Speaking of 
the way in which duty, responsibility, and decision are “condemned a priori to paradox, scandal, 
and aporia” (Derrida, GD 68).88  Derrida writes:  
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, 
command, or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing 
ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same 
way, in the same instant, to all the others.  I offer a gift of death, I betray, I don’t 
need to raise my knife over my son on Mount Moriah for that.  Day and night, at 
                                                 
88 The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
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every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, I am doing that, raising my 
knife over what I love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity, 
incommensurably. (GD 68)  
Entering into a relationship with the other, which is the very condition of subjectivity and ipseity, 
requires recourse to a logic of decision.  This “decision” will involved demarcating who or what 
one will honor, who or what one will give moral consideration, and, conversely, who or what 
will be excluded from such consideration.  This is why response and decision must “sacrifice 
ethics,” the logic of decision, which is to say the logic of sovereignty, demands that one can give 
consideration to some only by excluding others.  Every decision is at every instance as much a 
securing as a sacrificing, a pre-ontological decision on the border that will separate the 
considered from the unconsidered.  The pre-ontological nature of this “decision” means that it 
cannot be reduced to a mere logic of choice, a thing that might be avoided; one sacrifices 
whether one wants to or not.  One must always already betray, being unfaithful in the very act of 
fidelity, this is the truth of originary and reparatory violence explored in Chapter One, it is the 
truth with which Derrida critiques the discourses of non-violence and the logic of sovereignty in 
Chapter Two.  Let me be clear, the decisionary structure that Derrida is exploring is passive as 
much as active—one sacrifices whether one decides to or not.  However, this hardly means that 
one is left with nothing to do nor does it mean that all decisions are equally violent.  In fact, 
every cut is unique in the profoundest sense.   
In the case of Abraham, the decision to honor God’s command at the expense of his duty 
to Isaac is certainly an example of the irreducibility of violence—the fact that the honoring of 
one relation demands the betrayal of another.  Likewise, Abraham’s ultimate recourse to the 
sacrificing of a ram in the place of his son is also a moment of this logic of betrayal.  However, 
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these moments hardly have the same material consequences.  Disobeying God, killing your son, 
and killing a ram are not materially equivalent, even if they are all moments of decision, 
moments of exclusion, and moments of violence.  It makes a difference what Abraham does and 
how one understands his actions, even if his action cannot be secured beyond violence.  For 
Derrida, it always matters what one does, on every Mount Moriah, and this is precisely because 
every decision is a decision on violence, a decision of who or what can be sacrificed.  Hence, the 
question of violence helps to situate the stakes of Derrida’s project by showing the way in which 
Derrida is challenging us to take seriously the question of violence.  
What if, as Derrida’s thinking suggests, one thinks of every decision, every marking of a 
border, as an unavoidable decision on violence, a deciding on who or what can and must be 
excluded, degraded, and sacrificed?  One of the results of this thinking would be a 
reinterpretation of Derrida’s project and the concept of sovereignty.  Such thinking reveals 
deconstruction to be oriented by the concern for violence.  The act of “deconstructing” is an 
exploring and resisting of violence; it is an attempt to resist the worst violence with lesser 
violence.  Derrida’s thinking is from this perspective a relentless critique of the logic of 
sovereignty, a critique of the power to demarcate borders and boundaries, a critique of the force 
that establishes what will be included and excluded.  Reading Derrida’ work with an eye to 
violence shows that the sovereign cut is more than a logical demarcating of borders and more 
than a mere logic of decision.  It is always already a marking of who or what deserves to be 
included, a marking of who or what’s death counts as an ethical issue, a marking of which life 
can be sacrificed with impunity.  This reading orients us necessarily towards the question of life 
and to other forms or possible forms of life—toward other animals and toward the otheness of 
animality as such.  Hence, the advantages of reading the deconstructive project in this way is that 
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it allows one to brings out a more concrete side of the deconstructive project, a more concrete 
way to understand what it might mean to attempt a renunciation of the unconditionality of 
sovereignty.  However, it also points to the way in which Derrida’s thinking, insofar as it was 
always already concerned with violence, is also always already concerned with a certain 
ecology—a “revolution in our dwelling together with these living things we can animals” (F 
180/54).      
To take up Derrida’s call concerning decision and violence returns us to the question of 
“the animal” and to the possibility of a critical or deconstructive ecology outlined in the 
introduction to this project.  There is a way in which the deconstructive project calls always 
already for a challenging of the categories of “the animal” as a means to challenge the category 
of “the human.”  However, this call also returns us to the relationship between the thinking of 
Derrida and Adorno, the relationship between negative dialectics and the deconstructive project.  
In the following two chapters, I explore this connection by tracing the centrality of violence to 
Adorno’s work, highlighting the numerous similarities between his and Derrida’s project.   
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Chapter Three: 
Violence in the Work of T.W. Adorno 
 
 I hope it is not too late.  Maybe I should have said this earlier.  Derrida hears voices.  
These voices speak to him in his “dreams.”  They ask him to confess.  "Announce," they 
demand, “clearly and publicly, once and for all, the affinity between your work and Adorno’s.”  
They insist, “[a]ren’t you an heir of the Frankfurt school?” (F 176/43).  On the urgings of these 
voices, Derrida concedes, in his Adorno prize address, his inheritance from the Frankfurt School: 
“I can and must say ‘yes’ to my debt to Adorno” (F 176/43).  However, Derrida gives only 
schematic indications of the character and scope of this debt.  To understand Derrida's 
inheritance from Adorno, perhaps it is wise to listen to some of the voices that one can imagine 
urging Derrida to own this debt.  Perhaps one is the voice of Lyotard, saying “No” to this 
inheritance (from Adorno to Derrida) insisting that postmodern theory avoid Adorno like the 
devil.89  One can imagine the voice of Fredric Jameson echoing Lyotard’s “No” but from the 
other side, precisely in order to save from postmodern confusion what is modern and most 
importantly Marxist in Adorno.90  Certainly one can imagine Habermas’s voice.  Against 
Lyotard and Jameson, he would, like Derrida, mouth a resounding “Yes” to this inheritance, but 
only to dismiss both progenitor and heir as fundamentally “irrational.”91  In this cacophony, for 
and against, one would hear the murmur of other voices whispering along with Derrida of the 
affinity between his work and Adorno's.92  Rising out of this chorus, the voice of Drucilla 
Cornell will have spoken most definitively on this inheritance.93   
                                                 
89 Jean-Francois Lyotard. “Adorno as the Devil” in Telos 19 (1974), 127-137. 
90 Fredric Jameson. Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic. London: Verso, 1990. 
91 Jürgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985.  Also, 
for a very concise account of the scholarly debate concerning Adorno’s relationship to poststructuralist thought see 
The Actuality of Adorno: Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern. Edited by Max Pensky. Albany, New 
York: SUNY Press, 1997, 1-19.  
92 Rainer Nägele. “The scene of the other: Theodor W. Adorno’s negative dialectic in the context of 
poststructuralism.” Theodor W. Adorno: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory Volume III. Edited by Simon 
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Cornell’s The Philosophy of the Limit is to date the single most sustained exploration of 
the kinship between Adorno’s critical theory and Derrida’s deconstructive project.  For Cornell, 
the intersection between their thinking is apparent in the logical and ethical resonances between 
Adorno’s insights into non-identity and Derrida’s critique of alterity and law.  In particular, 
Cornell examines their shared critique of community and the logocentrism of Geist.  She shows 
that their mutual suspicions of community, totality, and identity are not simple rejections of these 
notions in the name of alterity or non-identity.  What separates Cornell’s work from others who 
have taken up the relationship between Derrida and Adorno is that Cornell’s analysis takes 
seriously the intricacies of both thinkers.  She refuses to reduce or caricature either position.94  
This is not to suggest that Cornell thinks that they are doing the same thing or that ultimately she 
finds their accounts equally compelling.  She, in fact, concludes that Adorno’s insistence on 
“redemption” [Erlösung] and “negativity” separates him fundamentally from Derrida.   
Although Adorno’s thinking opens the question of non-identity in a fashion quite similar 
to Derrida’s, Cornell finds that Adorno’s critique remains solely negative.  At the end of her 
book, Cornell writes, “[w]e come now to the ethical, legal, and political significance of 
[Derrida’s] difference from Adorno […] For Adorno, the ‘end of philosophy,’ which must come 
with the full acknowledgment of the horror of the Holocaust, left him only with ‘negative 
dialectics’” (POL 181).  Adorno’s insistence on negativity and the need to acknowledge the 
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absolute violence of the Holocaust leads him into a position from which he cannot, on Cornell’s 
account, formulate a positive position on ethics, law, or justice.  His resistance to any claim that 
would appear to justify the violence of the twentieth century means that any “possibility of 
redemption can only be shown negatively” (POL 181).  For Cornell, Adorno can tell us only 
what redemption is not, foreclosing the possibility of a positive critical project.  This critique 
resonates with her concern for redemption in Adorno more generally.  She argues, via Derrida, 
that Adorno is overly committed to an “apocalyptic” notion of redemption by which she seems to 
mean that Adorno remains too uncritical of the sovereign messianic tone of the redemptive (POL 
57-61).  In contrast, Cornell’s suggests that Derrida offers a way to honor in a positive fashion 
the ethical possibilities disclosed by the critique of radical alterity without succumbing to this 
“apocalyptic tone.”  It will be part of my project to contest her characterization of Adorno as one 
that overplays the “purely” negative side of his endeavor.  However, it is important to point out 
that Cornell’s claims are in many ways consistent with the Habermasian critique of Adorno.   
The longstanding notion that Adorno’s thought breaks down precisely at the point where 
the critique of identity would touch on positive material or concrete political and ethical issues is 
widely accepted particularly by his successors in critical theory.  As Lambert Zuidervaart puts it, 
“[i]n the polite language of critical theory after the communicative turn, they [his successors] 
find Adorno’s philosophy inappropriately ‘metaphysical’ or ‘theological’ or ‘utopian’” 
(Zuidervaart 133).95  Following the work of Jürgen Habermas, there emerges a general concern 
that Adorno’s thinking lacks material specificity.  In particular, his emphasis on aesthetics is read 
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as occluding, confusing, or at worst mystifying the ethical and political force of critical theory.96  
Although Cornell is herself critical of Habermas’s position, she seems to share his basic concern.  
The claim that Adorno’s purely negative position precludes the possibility of a positive critique 
seems to concede that there is something problematic about the relationship between 
metaphysics and the empirical in Adorno.  Cornell is not alone here.  J.M. Bernstein and 
Christoph Menke, thinkers also quite critical of the Habermasian reading of Adorno, readily 
admit that there is something unclear or baffling in the way Adorno positions his philosophical 
and ethical project.97  However, given that Adorno constantly points to a direct link between 
negative dialectics and the possibility of addressing suffering and violence, I am less quick to 
concede this lack of clarity.  It is certainly the case that Adorno’s work is complex and yes, 
difficult to follow at times.  However, it is not clear to me that this difficulty emerges at the 
junction of Adorno’s “metaphysical” and “practical” positions.  In fact, he is remarkably clear on 
how these two realms are interconnected, insofar as he argues that the purpose of philosophy is 
to alleviate suffering and violence.   
Adorno’s thinking constantly revolves around a worry over violence and in particular the 
extreme forms of violence indicated by the name “Auschwitz.”  In his lectures on Metaphysics, 
Adorno writes “there can be no one, whose organ of experience has not entirely atrophied, for 
whom the world after Auschwitz, that is, the world in which Auschwitz was possible, is the same 
world as it was before” (M 104/162).98  The world and our understanding of it are necessarily 
altered in light of the violences of the twentieth century.  To live in a world in which 
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“Auschwitz” is possible is to live in a world fundamentally at odds with any traditional 
metaphysics that sees the story of the world or humanity as one of inherent progress:  
In the face of the experiences we have had, not only through Auschwitz but 
through the introduction of torture as a permanent institution and through the 
atomic bomb—all these things form a kind of coherence, a hellish unity—in the 
face of these experiences the assertion that what is has meaning, and the 
affirmative character which has been attributed to metaphysics almost without 
exception, becomes a mockery; and in the face of the victims it becomes 
downright immoral.  (M 104/162) 
The traditional story of metaphysics, that humanity is progressing, becoming “better” whether 
technologically, scientifically, or morally is, in the face of a world after Auschwitz, simply an 
untenable and immoral fable.  One can no longer maintain that “in a secret world of being” or in 
some metaphysical way “all of this [violence] will have had some kind of purpose” (M 104/162).  
Yet, Adorno’s concern for violence is not merely historical or pragmatic.  He sees the possibility 
of violence as constitutive of thinking and metaphysics generally. 
 There are many passages where Adorno links the problem of violence to the structure of 
thought and metaphysics.  At the opening of Negative Dialectics, for example, he argues that 
thought is dialectical in nature precisely because it is driven by “guilt” for the violence it has 
perpetrated on its objects (ND 5/17).  A bit further on, he writes, “[t]he need to lend a voice to 
suffering is a condition of all truth” (ND 18/29).  There is a constitutive relationship between 
suffering and thought such that any possibility of truth, and by extension any knowledge about 
the world, brings with it a certain suffering.  Because of the inherent insufficiency of thought to 
capture or represent objects fully, one cannot think without involving oneself in suffering and 
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violence.  It is precisely in this sense that Adorno designates “pain” and “negativity” as “the 
moving forces of dialectical thinking,” which is to say, the moving forces of thought in general 
(ND 202/202).  For Adorno, the question and figure of violence is what connects metaphysics to 
the empirical world.  Hence one of the goals of the next chapter will be to follow the question of 
violence in Adorno’s work as a guide to exploring the link between his metaphysical and 
empirical projects.  I will argue that, for Adorno, violence in the form of exclusion and the 
domination of life marks the shared space of the metaphysical, empirical, and ethical.  Given the 
importance of violence in Derrida’s thinking, this exploration will allow one to see more clearly 
the similarities between their projects.  By clarifying the notion of violence in Adorno’s work, I 
hope both to contest the Habermas-inspired critique of Adorno and to explore further the link 
between Adorno’s and Derrida’s thinking.  I begin with the question of violence in relationship 
to dialectics.  
 
I: Guilty Dialectics  
 Negative Dialectics begins with a definition: “The name of dialectics says no more, to 
begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they 
come to contradict the traditional norms of adequacy” (ND 5/17).  In its most elementary form, 
dialectics names the non-identity between objects and their concepts.  It articulates the structural 
fact that concepts cannot fully capture their objects.  It represents a fundamental challenge to the 
traditional construction of truth and knowledge on the model of the adequatio intellectus et rei. 
The first breath of dialectics whispers of a fundamental and necessary distance or difference 
between objects and their concepts—the impossibility of an identity without difference.  The 
result of this accompaniment of non-identity with identity is that the relation of thought to 
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objects necessarily takes the form of contradiction: “[c]ontradiction is nonidentity under the 
aspect of identity; the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of 
unity the measure of heterogeneity” (ND 5/17).  Dialectics marks the same paradox as writing in 
Derrida, namely that all forms of representation, whether conceptual or textual, require that 
something always already escapes representation, undermining the ability of concepts to capture 
their objects fully and without remainder.  Here one sees a relation between Adorno’s thinking 
and Saussurian linguistics, so influential on Derrida’s thought, namely that the unity represented 
by the sign requires difference.  Saussure, Adorno, and Derrida all tell us that unity is inseparable 
from difference.  However, Adorno and Derrida go further than Saussure by emphasizing the 
contradictory character of the demand for difference within similarity.99  The contradictory 
character of dialectics, like the paradoxical character of writing, necessarily creates the link 
between dialectics and violence.   
Having established the contradictory character of dialectics, Adorno writes, “[d]ialectics 
is the consistent sense of nonidentity.  It does not begin by taking a standpoint.  My thought is 
driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt [Schuld] of what I am thinking” (ND 
5/17).  Dialectics follows out the inherent logic of the relation between objects and concepts.100  
In following out this contradictory relation, dialectics exposes the necessary insufficiency of 
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concepts to capture their objects without leaving a remainder.  The driving force of dialectics is 
this insufficiency—the failure of thought to represent objects in their totality.  Adorno 
characterizes this necessary and motivating insufficiency as “guilt” (Schuld), implying an 
“offence” or “fault” as well as a “debt,” “owing,” or “obligation.”101  The relationship of thought 
to any object inevitably involves a moment of wrong-doing in that, by failing to capture the 
object fully, the process of conceptualization necessitates some misrepresentation.  Dialectics 
names the violent fact that “no object is wholly known” (ND 14/26).  Yet, guilt cannot exist 
without the acknowledgement that something wrong has been done.   
In the context of the relation between concepts and objects, the notion of debt (Schuld) 
indicates that thought not only misrepresents objects but also registers, in some sense, its own 
violent misrepresentation.  The self-reflexive character of thinking necessitates that both 
thought’s attempt to cognize objects and its inevitable failure to do so must be visible to thought: 
“[w]hile doing violence [Gewalt] to the object of its syntheses, our thinking heeds a potential that 
waits in the object, and it unconsciously [bewußtlos] obeys the idea of making amends to the 
pieces for what it has done” (ND 19/30-31).  Thought, on an unconscious (bewußtlos) level, 
acknowledges the violence it does to objects.  It desires to “make amends” precisely to those 
“pieces” it excludes.  However, this amending remains unconscious.  Thought cannot recognize 
its reparatory endeavor because the pieces of objects that are excluded in the process of 
conceptualization, the pieces to which thought is driven to make amends, are precisely the non-
identical elements that thought cannot identify, and, consequently, cannot account for or 
recognize.  The importance of this notion of “unconscious” amending is that it indicates once 
again the unavoidability of violence within the process of conceptualization.  For Adorno, as for 
Derrida, thinking, signification, and representation involve an irreducible violence, insofar as 
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thought and signification are structurally unable to represent their objects in fullness.  Hence, the 
first lesson of dialectics is that something of objects is always left out in the process of 
conceptualization.  However, it is important to note that this unavoidable exclusion is not purely 
negative.  
Thought is necessarily violent, for Adorno, insofar as the process of conceptualization 
operates only through a certain failure.  Adorno acknowledges, however, that this failure, this 
violence, is necessary in order for anything to appear to us at all, as the appearance of objects 
requires the mediation of thought.  As Adorno puts it in Negative Dialectics, “[i]n principle, 
philosophy can always go astray, which is the sole reason why it can go forward” (ND 14/26).  
The possibility of thought comes only at the cost of violence.  This inevitability renders the 
violence of dialectics productive as well as destructive.  Dialectics map the way in which objects 
appear only by simultaneously being misrepresented or distorted.  Here one can see already the 
outline of my resistance to Cornell’s characterization of Adorno as a purely negative thinker.  
Cornell underestimates Adorno’s commitment to the foundational as well as problematic 
character of violence.  Both Derrida and Adorno recognize this paradoxical relationship between 
thought and objects and share the notion that without this risk of violence one is left with a 
thinking that cannot go forward and is doomed simply to accept the world as it appears.  We 
shall have more to say about this question of inertia in Adorno's work after a look at his precise 
characterization of the violent exclusion inherent in thought. 
In his course on metaphysics, Adorno writes explicitly of the kind of violence entailed in 
the failure of objects to go completely into their concepts without remainder.  He first 
characterizes this violence as a movement of abstraction, a distancing of thought from the unique 
time and space of its object.  In order to render the similarities between objects visible, in order 
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to produce, for example, the concept “1” it is necessary, Adorno says, to abstract: “For in 
referring to the items which I have just called ‘1’ as the concept [. . . ] I generally disregard the 
special spatial and temporal position of the elements subsumed under the concept” (M 70/110).  
The formation of concepts is, first and foremost, a grouping by similarity, an amalgamation of 
shared attributes.  In order to form a concept, therefore, it is necessary that one exclude or mute 
the differences between the elements grouped under that concept.  In particular, one must 
exclude the unique spatial and temporal specificity of those objects: those elements that are in no 
way sharable.  For Adorno, the process of conceptualization does not randomly exclude some 
aspect or part of objects; rather, it necessarily excludes the singular spatial and temporal 
specificity of those objects.  Here one can already see marked similarities between the 
abstracting violence outlined by Adorno and Derrida’s notion of reparatory violence, which, one 
will recall, he figures as a violence of exclusion.  Adorno then goes on to identify a second form 
of violence perpetrated on objects by the process of conceptualization that again resonates with 
Derrida’s reparatory violence.   
It then follows from Adorno’s understanding of the abstracting process of 
conceptualization that concepts appear timeless: “The concept as such, once established, is not 
temporal” (M 70/110).  Concepts certainly refer to something temporal and themselves have 
unique histories; yet they appear, through the abstracting process of their construction, to 
transcend any particular time and space.  This apparent independence from time emerges from 
the fact that concepts are the result of a process of detemporalization—concepts are the 
detemporalized similarities of a set of objects.  In this sense, timelessness marks both the great 
utility and the great failure of conceptualization.  It usefully allows concepts to be applied to 
objects irrespective of their differences in time and space.  At the same time it marks 
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unmistakably the inability of concepts to represent objects as they exist in their own unique time 
and space.  The unifying and universalizing tendency of conceptualization allows the appearance 
and ordering of the world, but falls short of capturing the essence of that world.102  Further, in a 
distorting move that Adorno describes as “the crucial fallacy in traditional philosophy as a 
whole,” the apparent timelessness of concepts comes to be ascribed to the objects they subsume. 
(M 71/111).   
The ability of concepts to subsume particular objects under a set of common elements 
leads to a conceptual sleight of hand in which the elements grouped together in the formation of 
concepts come to be counted as the very essence of the objects they subsume.  As Adorno says,  
And what could be described as the greatest paralogism of all in metaphysics [. . .] 
is nothing other than this de-temporalization of the meaning of concepts, which is 
produced by the way in which concepts are formed, but is attributed as an 
inherent property to that which they subsume. (M 71/112) 
The logic of conceptualization not only gathers objects together through a set of abstract 
elements; it comes fallaciously to attribute those elements to objects as their very essence.  The 
falsehood in this tendency is that it forgets the abstract nature of conceptualization, operating as 
though the particularities of each object were merely accidental, inessential attributes.  
Conceptualization thus perpetrates against its objects two interrelated acts of violence.  The first 
is the theft of the objects' spatio-temporal specificity.  The second is the substitution of a set of 
abstract attributes that come to be understood as the essence of each object.  This second act of 
violence works to justify and naturalize the first abstracting violence of conceptualization.  It 
covers over the original moment of exclusionary violence insofar as it reinscribes the exclusion 
of the unique spatio-temporal specificity of objects as a clarification of the essence of those 
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objects.  These two moments of violence are the necessary extension of the “guilty,” 
“unconscious” logic of thought outlined in Negative Dialectics.  They reveal the inability of 
thought either to capture its object in completeness or to admit its inability to do so.  
Furthermore, they mirror substantially the two moments Derrida figures as reparatory violence.   
Recall from Chapter One that Derrida’s notion of reparatory violence marked a twofold 
violence.  On the one hand, it described a basic ordering of appearance, the exclusionary logic by 
which an object comes to appear by opposing and excluding other, dissimilar objects or 
elements.  On the other hand, it marked a moral violence, the establishment of the rules that 
circumscribe the relative legitimacy of any appearance.  These two moments seem to be 
remarkably similar to the two forms of violence Adorno details in his lectures on metaphysics.  
Both Adorno and Derrida understand the logic of thought, representation, and signification to 
involve, first and foremost, a moment of exclusion.  In this violent moment, some unique aspects 
of objects are excluded from their concept in order to allow those objects to appear.  Adorno 
details more clearly than Derrida the exact nature of this violence, showing that it involves 
exclusion of the spatio-temporal specificities of objects.  However, this conclusion is in no way 
at odds with Derrida’s thinking.  In fact, Derrida reaches a similar conclusion insofar as he 
argues that what is always excluded from the logic of signification are those very things that 
logic claims to attend to most.  In the case of conceptualization, thinking aims to capture the 
essence of objects and yet it is precisely some part of the particularity of what it is to be this 
object here and now, some part of the object's essence, that thought must necessarily exclude.  In 
addition, both thinkers argue that this exclusionary violence is accompanied by a second violence 
that justifies and naturalizes the moment of exclusionary violence.   
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In Adorno, this naturalization occurs when the elements of the concept are attributed to 
objects as their essence.  For Derrida, this justification emerges as the rules defining objects 
come to be understood as determining the object's legitimacy.  Despite the difference between 
the language of naturalization and that legitimation, Adorno and Derrida are remarkably close to 
one another here, for the set of rules that Derrida describes is nothing other than the elements of 
the concept—those attributes that define an object in opposition to other objects.  Thus, an 
examination of the logic at work in Adorno’s discussion of the process of conceptualization and 
Derrida’s notion of reparatory violence shows fundamental similarities not just in the logic of 
their arguments but also in their conclusions.  For both Adorno and Derrida, the logic of 
conceptualization and signification operates violently to exclude the singularity of objects and 
simultaneously to justify this exclusion.  This justifying moment will have important 
implications for Adorno’s thinking on violence, particularly as it shows thought’s inherent 
tendency toward ideology. 
For Adorno, thought necessarily tends towards ideology.  This tendency emerges around 
the question of primacy: “ideology lies in the substruction of something primary [. . .] it lies in 
the implicit identity of concepts and things, an identity justified by the world even when a 
doctrine summarily teaches that consciousness depends on being” (ND 40/50).  Ideology 
emerges out of the perceived identity between concepts and their objects, an identity that places 
thought in a primary position relative to objects.  This claim to primacy is necessarily built into 
the logic of conceptualization because thought is structurally unable to recognize those elements 
of objects that cannot be reduced to its general categories.  Hence, even though the primacy of 
thought is denied by the dialectical relationship between concepts and objects, thought, 
nevertheless, cannot help but take itself as primary.  Thought’s tendency to justify its exclusion 
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of objects is fundamentally ideological: a setting up of thought as something primary in 
relationship to an always secondary objectivity.  One will recall that Derrida too argues that there 
is an inherent moment of primacy built into the logic of thinking, insofar as such logic is 
structured hierarchically.  It is on the basis of this inherent hierarchical ordering that Derrida 
contends that phonologocentrism is unavoidable, a notion that seems to echo Adorno’s claim that 
the identity between concepts and objects is, despite its dialectical disruption, “justified by the 
world.”  The logic of hearing and understanding oneself speak, the phonic appearance of 
“presence,” here and now, cannot be avoided or completely done away with.  In the same way 
neither can the ideological tendency of thought be dismissed, justified as it is by the appearance 
of identity in the world.  There is a fundamental kinship between Derrida’s critique of 
logocentrism and Adorno’s critique of ideology insofar as both fundamentally are attempts to 
identify and challenge a certain irreducible claim to origin within the logic of thought and 
appearance.  However, the importance of this question of primacy and ideology goes beyond the 
connection between Adorno and Derrida as it also exposes the way in which Adorno understands 
the violence of exclusion as a precursor to the violence of domination.    
 The very notion of origin or of ontological or conceptual primacy is, according to 
Adorno, a corollary of domination: 
The category of the root, the origin, is a category of domination.  It confirms that 
a man ranks first because he was the first there; it confirms the autochthon against 
the newcomer, the settler against the migrant.  The origin [. . .] is itself an 
ideological principle. (ND 155/158) 
The notion of origin functions to support the unjustifiable claim that whoever or whatever came 
first has some kind of moral authority denied to those that come after.  This moral authority 
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derives from the inherently anti-dialectical or ideological nature of origin claims.  Such claims 
suggest that, since the origin is that which emerged first, it must necessarily be independent from 
that which comes after.  This independence becomes the basis of the origin’s supposed 
superiority.  For Adorno, the violence of ideology leads to the violence of domination, insofar as 
ideology’s claim to primacy constructs ideology’s opposite as inferior, less worthy, subordinate: 
“Wherever a doctrine of some absolute ‘first’ is taught there will be talk of something inferior to 
it, of something absolutely heterogeneous to it, as its logical correlate.  Prima philosophia and 
dualism go together” (ND 138/142).  This connection further develops Adorno’s understanding 
of the violence inherent in conceptualization.  No longer is it simply an issue of the exclusion of 
some pieces of objects; rather the ideological bent of thought leads to the claim that thought has 
dominion over objects.  This claim has particularly profound consequences not just for the logic 
of conceptualization and signification, but for the relationship between subject and object or 
those that think and what they think about.  
In the section of his 1969 essay, “Dialectical Epilegomena,”  entitled "On Subject and 
Object," Adorno outlines the way in which the concept’s claim to primacy fundamentally alters 
the relationship between subjects and objects.  Having assumed its primacy over objects  
Mind then arrogates to itself the status of being absolutely independent—which it 
is not: mind’s claim to independence announces its claim to domination.  Once 
radically separated from the object, subject reduces the object to itself; subject 
swallows object, forgetting (vergißt) how much it is object itself. (CM 246/742)103   
In the relationship of the subject and object, the ideological relationship of concept and object 
expresses itself as the subject’s claim to total independence from its object.  The thinking 
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individual is led to see itself as independent from that which it thinks about because it sees its 
thought as an objective expression of the world.  This claim to independence provides the 
grounds for thought’s dominion over objects, as it establishes thought’s claim, outlined above, 
that whatever cannot be captured by thought, whatever resists or disrupts conceptualization, is 
fundamentally inessential to the object and thus inferior and accidental to it.  Adorno 
characterizes this domination as a reduction of objects to the subject: everything that is not 
reducible to the subject’s conceptual categories becomes utterly superfluous.  This operation of 
reduction and incorporation follows from the logic of justifying violence discussed above and 
remakes the object in the image of the concept.  It is no longer simply an issue of thought 
excluding some aspects of objects but of thought dominating and excluding objectivity as such, 
including the objectivity of the subject. 
The logical result of thought’s claim to dominance and superiority over objects is the 
push to violently reduce objectivity to subjectivity.  Thought is driven to dominate and exclude 
everything that cannot be reduced to its categories of origin, universality, totality, unity, and 
identity.  Thought’s structural intolerance of anything that is other than thought has particularly 
profound consequences not just for objects but, Adorno argues, for the objectivity of subjects.  
As he says,  
The ideological side of thinking shows its permanent failure to make good on the 
claim that the non-I is finally the I: the more the I thinks, the more perfectly will it 
find itself debased into an object.  Identity becomes the authority for a doctrine of 
adjustment, in which the object—which the subject is supposed to go by—repay 
the subject for what the subject has done to it. (ND 148/151) 
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The ideological push to identity necessarily fails to capture the non-identical, objectness of 
objects including the objectness that is the material subject.  In the process of conceptualization, 
the subject, this living breathing human being here and now, must be devalued in order to allow 
it to fit into the abstract, universal schema of the “subject.”  All the differences that separate one 
thinking subject from another, all the things that make one human being unlike the rest of its 
species, must be excluded and devalued, insofar as such differences cannot be the basis of any 
universal category.  The ironic result of this exclusion is that the more the subject “thinks” about 
itself, the more it attempts to identify itself, the more surely it turns itself into a mere object of 
thought, and the more it eliminates the importance of its material existence.  Hence, “[t]he spell 
cast by the subject becomes equally a spell cast over the subject” (ND 139/142).  The process of 
conceptualization leads a thinker in the act of thought into a contradictory, self-destructive 
relation, in which the thinking subject is driven to dispossess itself of the very relationship to 
materiality that gives the thinking subject reality.  For Adorno, the subject’s relationship to itself 
is what Derrida will three decades later refer to as autoimmune.   
In the essay, “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida outlines, “a sort of general logic of 
autoimmunity” (Derrida, FK fn 27/67-68).104  Autoimmunity describes a process by which an 
entity or system attacks its own principle of protection, tearing down the very thing that ensures 
its purity or indemnity.  In the case of Adorno’s discussion of the subject, this assertion of purity 
is expressed in the claim that the subject is completely separate from the objects that it confronts.  
The identity principle ensures the purity of the subject by excluding from the subject all that is 
not identical to it.  This exclusion, likewise, establishes and insures the indemnity and unity of 
the subject.  The subject knows clearly what it is by knowing what it is not.  This exclusion 
                                                 
104 “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Religion. Edited by 
Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo. Translated by Samuel Weber. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 
1-78.  Foi et Savoir suivi de Le Siècle et le Pardon. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999.  Hereafter abbreviated FK. 
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ensures the whole ideological mechanism that subordinates objectivity to subjectivity.  However, 
this separation of the subject from objects cannot be maintained.  While establishing a unified 
subject, the separation of subject and object undermines the unity of the subject by leading the 
subject to exclude and deny its own objective moment.  In being opposed to objectivity, the 
subject comes to be opposed to its own objectivity.  It opposes its material self.  The irony of the 
logic of subject, for Adorno, is that in being a subject, one is led to deny one’s own material or 
objective moment.  This denial leaves the subject with the appearance of unity at the cost of any 
real unity or objective existence.  As Adorno describes this autoimmune process in Negative 
Dialectics, 
[i]t is precisely the insatiable identity principle that perpetuates antagonism by 
suppressing contradiction.  What tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the 
reconcilement for which it mistakes itself.  The violence of equality-mongering 
reproduces the contradiction it eliminates. (ND 143/146)     
The principle of identity, with its insistence on the suppression of difference, can reconcile the 
difference between subject and object only by attacking and eliminating objectivity.  Yet this 
solution reproduces the difference between subject and object on the level of the subject as such, 
eliminating the very materiality which thinking itself is.  Hence, the relationship of the subject 
with itself is not merely contradictory but self-annihilating, that is, autoimmune.  In addition to 
noting its affinity with Derrida, there are a number of things to be said about this current of 
autoimmunity in Adorno’s thinking.  Particularly important is the way in which Adorno's notion 
of the subject appears both structural and material. 
Adorno’s discussion of the way the thinking subject's drive to divest itself of its objective 
moment is, on the one hand, a structural claim.  Adorno is keenly aware that neither subjectivity 
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nor the subject is identical to a living, breathing human being: “‘subject’ can refer to the 
particular individual as well as to universal attributes of ‘consciousness in general’” (CM 
245/741).  However, he remains committed to the notion that “[n]o concept of the subject can 
have the element of individual humanity […] separated from it in thought; without any reference 
to it, subject would lose all significance” (CM 245/741).  Subject and subjectivity refer 
simultaneously to the logical, abstract, universal notion of a person and to the particular human 
individual.  Thus, Adorno’s claims concerning subjects always have concrete resonance.  The 
domination of the objective by the subjective is not, for Adorno, a mere problem of logic.  The 
devaluing of the objective elements of the subject is the concrete devaluing of peoples’s bodies 
and the material world in which they live and breathe.  My intention now is to develop as clearly 
as possible the way in which Adorno sees the relationship between the structural, autoimmune 
violence of exclusion and domination to manifest itself as social and empirical domination.  This 
connection is developed specifically in his concept of the “Tauschprinzip” or exchange principle.  
 
II: A Society of Exchange is a Society of Violence  
Before delving into Adorno’s concept of Tauschprinzip, a note on translation is 
imperative.  In the standard, English translation of Negative Dialectics, Tauschprinzip is almost 
universally rendered as “barter principle.”  This is of course a reasonable translation, as Tausch 
means “exchange” or “barter.”  However, there are several philosophical reasons to prefer 
“exchange” over “barter.”  First off, Tausch has important Marxist connotations, being the word 
Marx uses for “exchange” in his notion of “exchange value” [Tauschwert], for example.  The 
translation “exchange” thus clarifies the link between negative dialectics and Marxism that is 
camouflaged by the use of the word “barter.”  One never speaks in English of Marx’s concept of 
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“barter value.”  Secondly, the notion of “exchange” better captures the relationship, crucial for 
Adorno, between das Tauschprinzip and das Identifikationsprinzip, the principle of exchange 
and the principle of identification.   
In English, “barter” has the connotation of a kind of pre-capitalist economic arrangement 
that existed before capitalism reduced value to the equivalency of currency exchange.  This 
reduction to general equivalency is precisely where Adorno sees the significant correlation 
between exchange and identity.  This correlation forms the basis for Adorno's understanding of 
exchange as the social form of the identity principle.  Thus I translate every use of Tausch as 
exchange. 
The principle of identity, with all of its implications of violence and autoimmunity, is not, 
for Adorno, a mere theoretical entity.  It is expressed socially in the concept of the exchange 
principle: 
The exchange principle [Tauschprinzip], the reduction of human labor to the 
abstract universal concept of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the 
principle of identification [Identifikationsprinzip].  Exchange [Tausch] is the 
social model of the principle [. . .] it is through exchange [Tausch] that non-
identical individuals and performances become commensurable and identical. 
(ND 146/149.  Translation modified.)  
The exchange principle reduces all labor to the abstract category of “working hours” and 
ultimately to the notion of the hourly wage.  Through the exchange system all individuals and 
their labor are made commensurable via the common denominator of wages.  This reduction of 
individuals and their labor is, for Adorno, the social expression of the conceptual notion of 
identification.  The systematic reduction of the value of work to wages comprises the practical 
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expression of the reduction of all individuals to the concept of the subject and all that is non-
conceptual to the categories of the conceptual.  Identity and exchange are two expressions of the 
same logic, both of which operate to reduce a diverse field of objects to a common, conceptual 
denominator.  The reduction of work to wages, like the reduction of objects to the conceptual, 
violently excludes the unique spatio-temporal aspects of both workers and their labor.   
The principle of exchange, like every identity principle, amounts to a reduction of 
diversity to a singular set of categories or single system of value.105  The exchange principle 
reduces all forms of labor to the abstract category of wages.  This operation makes diverse forms 
of work comparable by excluding those aspects of them that are not identical, which is to say, by 
excluding the unique spatio-temporal aspects of their occurrence.  For example, in the system of 
exchange one meatpacker becomes identical to any other insofar as their work is reducible to a 
similar wage.  What the categories of wages identifies is not the essence of any particular worker 
or the essence of their work, but rather the abstract role or site they and their work occupy within 
the system of exchange.  This exchangeability of work and workers applies to all forms of labor 
because, within a system of wage labor, every form of work and every worker is comparable.  
This does not preclude some workers making a higher wage than others.  This difference is 
certainly possible, but it does nothing to disrupt the basic identitarian exchangeability of the 
wage system.  To take an example, a veterinarian may be paid more for her labor than a 
meatpacker, but this difference only reinforces the exchangeability of these workers and their 
labor by suggesting that the difference between a veterinarian and a meatpacker is quantifiable as 
a mere difference in wage.  In the same way that the difference between a larger and smaller 
                                                 
105 Concerning the question of exchange in Derrida see “On the ‘Priceless,’ or the ‘Going Rate’ of the Transaction” 
in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001. Edited and Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2002, 315-328. 
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triangle does nothing to challenge the conceptual category triangle nor to inhibit the reducibility 
of every triangle to this category, a difference in wages does nothing to contest exchangeability 
within a logic of exchange.  Hence the principle of exchange has the same empirical effects as 
identity.  The conceptual exercises domination over the objective by excluding all objective 
differences that cannot be rendered as differences of wage. 
The notion of wage labor functions, like the categories of the concept, violently to 
exclude and reduce to differences of wage all the material differences separating workers and 
their labor.  Exchange renders all qualitative differences as quantitative differences, which in 
effect reduces all difference.  Speaking of the dominating system of exchange, Adorno writes:    
The universal domination of mankind by the exchange value [Tauschwerts]—a 
domination which a priori keeps the subjects from being subjects and degrades 
subjectivity itself to a mere object—makes an untruth of the general principle that 
claims to establish the subject’s predominance.  The surplus of the transcendental 
subject is the deficit of the utterly reduced empirical subject. (ND 178/180) 
In a world reduced to a system of exchange, the individual human being has value only insofar as 
it conforms to the standard of wage labor and is rendered identical to all other workers.  This 
reduction undermines the subject’s claim to any unique subjective specificity, effectively 
reducing the living, breathing subject to the “worker.”  The push to conform to the 
transcendental category of the wage-earning subject makes any claim to empirical subjectivity 
false.  In a system of exchange, one can express one’s individuality and subjectivity, “the surplus 
of the transcendental subject,” only by earning a larger wage.  One can be an individual only by 
conforming ever more fully to the concept of the wage earning subject, that is, by reducing one’s 
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empirical specificity.  This system reduces the subject to a mere object, a node in the system of 
social value, a means rather than an end.  Here one sees the extent of Adorno’s Marxism.   
Adorno’s critique of the system of exchange maps directly onto Marx’s critique of wage 
labor.  Marx showed that the system of wage labor under capitalism leads the working class to 
sell their labor at ever lower wages, leading ever more fully to the domination of workers by the 
system of exchange. 106  Adorno argues in parallel that the more the individual conforms to the 
notion of the wage earning subject, the more surely is the subject reduced to a mere object by the 
system of exchange.  If what defines one as a subject is one’s labor, and if one is constantly 
forced to devalue that labor, then effectively one is forced to devalue one’s subjectivity.  Adorno 
says that this reduction is “a priori.”  It is not simply a matter of choice or decision.  The subject 
cannot choose not to devalue its material self.  This is because we are talking about a structural 
logic of the class system and of the economy of subjectivity.  Some subjects or wage workers 
could theoretically not have their material existence reduced much at all.  However, this does 
nothing to change the fact that, as a class and on the whole, subjects and wage workers have their 
material existence devalued.  This devaluing is always already built into the logic of exchange.  
For Adorno, like Marx, the system of exchange dominates empirical subjects under the guise of 
elevating the subject through wage labor irrespective of their choices within that system.  As 
evidence of this domination of the empirical subject, Adorno points out that in the system of 
exchange every subject, every wage worker, becomes radically fungible.     
 Adorno’s concern with the domination inherent in the exchange system is not merely that 
it limits the potentialities of living and breathing human beings but, more dramatically, that it 
makes the individual human being superfluous: 
                                                 
106 See for instances, “Wage, Labor, Capital.”  The Marx-Engels Reader (Second Edition). Edited by Robert Tucker. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 203-217.    
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A situation has been reached today, in the present form of the organization of 
work in conjunction with the maintenance of the existing relations of production, 
in which every person is absolutely fungible or replaceable, even under the 
conditions of formal freedom. (M 109/170-171)   
By reducing every subject to the mere category of its earning potential, the system of exchange 
creates a situation in which every subject, insofar as she is a “worker,” becomes replaceable by 
any other subject.  This is true even under formal conditions of freedom.  Any formally free 
subject is still exchangeable with other wage earning subjects.  Returning to his emphasis on the 
“a priori” nature of the exchange system's dominating violence, Adorno argues that formal 
freedom does little to protect the subject from radical fungibility.  In a system in which the 
objective substance of subjects is excluded and degraded, so too will the subject’s objective 
freedom be excluded and degraded.  This explains, for Adorno, why workers can be subject to 
this “experience” of fungibility even in highly developed, affluent, and politically progressive 
societies.107  Within the system of exchange, a formally free meatpacker is still exchangeable, 
despite his freedom, with any other meatpacker, since they do the same work for a similar wage.  
Like all systems of identity, the system of exchange operates to insure the exchangeability of the 
elements subsumed under that system by relegating to absolute unimportance the particularly of 
any of its elements.  Fungibility reigns within a system of exchange.  Hence, the very abstracting 
identifying force attributed to the subject contradictorily becomes  the force that liquidates the 
subject.  Furthermore, in a move that Adorno again describes as contradictory, the subject is led 
to embrace its own liquidation.  
                                                 
107 “In my view, these experiences [of fungibility] have such deep objective reasons that they are actually untouched 
even by political forms of rule, that is, by the difference between formal democracy on the one hand and totalitarian 
control on the other” (M 109/171). 
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An antinomy emerges from Adorno’s discussion of the question of exchange and its 
fundamental relationship to subjectivity.  The first contradictory move is that the “truth” moment 
of subjectivity, its ability to abstract, comes to be used against the subject for the purpose of the 
subject’s liquidation.  The principle of exchange, the social corollary of the subject’s power of 
conceptual abstraction, must ultimately be turned against the objective elements of the subject 
itself, leading to its liquidation.  Adorno sees the subject's disappearance expressed abstractly in 
the reduction of all subjects into objects, and concretely in the reduction of the subject to the 
wage laborer.  In a second contradictory move, the subject is led to embrace its liquidated form 
as its very essence.  As Adorno puts it, 
Yet what he [the subject] knows to be meaningless is forced on him as the 
meaning of his life; indeed, a life which is really no more than the means to the 
end of his self-preservation is, by that very fact, bewitched and fetishized as an 
end.  And in this antinomy—on the one hand the debasement of the individual, of 
the self, to something insignificant, his liquidation, and on the other, his being 
thrown back on the fact that he no longer has anything but this atomized self 
which lives our life—in this contradiction lies the horror of the development 
which I regard it as my duty to present to you today. (M 110/171-172)  
The subject, reduced to an exchangeable unit of labor power, is compelled to identify this wisp, 
this "atomized self" as self, for without participation in the wage labor system, the subject cannot 
preserve itself.  The need to survive makes the system of exchange seem, if not natural, at least 
necessary.  Adorno's description shows not only how the system of exchange comes to dominate 
the subject externally, but how the subject, unwittingly, internalizes this domination and its logic 
of subjectivity along with the principle of exchange.  In identifying itself, its life, the subject 
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recognizes itself as a wage laborer, at least insofar as it participates necessarily in this role.   To 
complete the reduction, the universalizing tendency of the identification process brings the 
subject to understand this role as encompassing its totality.  The identification is then reflected in 
and reinforced by the social processes of exchange.  The paradox is complete as the logic of 
identity and exchange touts the liquidation of the subject as the highest form of “subjectivity.”  
The individuals can live only by giving up their claim to a life beyond the narrow confines of 
fungible wage labor.  Here Adorno moves from the dialectical relationship between concepts and 
their objects to concrete concern for the living human beings via the figures of identity, 
exclusion, domination, exchange, fungibility, and life.  Contra his Habermas inspired critics, he 
explicitly relates his philosophical concerns to his concrete social concerns.  
The question of violence in Adorno’s work contests fundamentally the Habermasian 
claim that Adorno is unclear about the connection between his philosophical project and his 
social-political concerns.  Adorno traces a direct pathway between the philosophical logic of 
identity and the violent reduction of the living individual in modern society.  It is crucial to 
understand that, for him, identity and exchange are not merely analogous but are concretely 
related in an intimate interchange whereby each continuously emerges out of real social 
processes that serve to maintain the other.  The domination of the individual within the system of 
exchange co-arises with and is essentially the same operation as the identitarian process of 
conceptualization.  Under its domination, the wage worker must devalue and exclude any notion 
of its life that is not ultimately reducible to the categories of exchange.  Adorno expresses this 
moment both in terms of the radical fungibility of all workers and the dissolution of all forms of 
subjectivity and life that cannot be reduced to the categories of wage labor.  As the interchange 
plays out between domination in the system of exchange and the logic of identity, Adorno argues 
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that subjects necessarily internalize their own fungibility and accept their identification as mere 
wage workers.  In this way the logic of identity and exchange circumscribe and reduce life, 
violently curtailing the potentiality of what it means to live.  Whether or not one is convinced by 
Adorno’s account of dialectics, identity, or the evacuation of life under the capitalist system of 
exchange, Adorno gives a remarkably clear and specific account of the relationship he sees 
between the identitarian logic of thought and the social processes and conditions of concern to 
him. 
In addition to contesting the Habermasian reading of Adorno, an examination of Adorno's 
treatment of violence demonstrates the profound similarities between his work and that of 
Derrida.  The two thinkers share a number of sympathies both in their general conceptions of 
violence and their understanding of its role in the logic of thought and signification.  First, they 
both conceive violence in the form of exclusion as built into the very logic of conceptualization 
and signification.  This violence is a necessary and unavoidable function of the relationship 
between concepts and their objects.  Second, both see this structural violence inherent to the 
logic of conceptualization as related to empirical violence. 
In Derrida this relationship is seen in the always ethnocentric character of logocentric 
discourse.  The localized character of every form of conceptualization necessitates that thinking 
involve the exclusion of other cultural, linguistic, and conceptual understandings of the world.  
For Derrida, these exclusions occur most profoundly around the borders of the ethnos and most 
particularly around the border separating the human and the animal: around the question of life.  
 Adorno is more explicit than Derrida concerning the way in which the structural violence 
of thought relates to violence in the world.  He traces the distinctly Marxist notion that this 
violence occurs as the exclusion and reduction of the individual human being to the liquidated 
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subject of wage labor.  Yet, Adorno insists that this reduction is fundamentally a reduction of life 
in general, which circumscribes and restricts the ways of living and kinds of being that are 
afforded value.  Hence, despite their differences concerning Marx, both Derrida and Adorno 
insist on a tendency of violent exclusion that is structural and unavoidable and they agree that 
ultimately the expression of this violence occurs around the question of life.  In fact, Adorno 
argues even more explicitly than Derrida that the violent character of the conceptual develops 
alongside the question of life. 
 Adorno directly connects metaphysical issues with the concrete question of life: “the 
question of whether it is still possible to live is the form in which metaphysics impinges on us 
urgently today” (M 112/175-176).  The violent logic of dialectics is interwoven with the lives of 
subjects: “Guilt [Schuld] reproduces itself in each of us—and what I am saying addresses us as 
subjects—since we cannot possibly remain fully conscious of this connection at every moment 
of our waking lives” (M 113/176).  To be a subject, to be a creature functioning in a dialectical 
relation to the world, is to be a creature enmeshed in the guilt of exclusionary violence.  Adorno 
is very careful here to say that he is speaking to us as “subjects,” speaking of the structures 
implied in our lived existence.  He does not tell us what is excluded through our living but only 
that something or someone will be violently excluded.  He is clear that these structures are direct 
and concrete in their effects.  Subjectivity is a living at the expense of life:  
It should be said, at any rate, that the guilt [Schuld] in which one is enmeshed 
almost by the mere fact of continuing to live can hardly be reconciled any longer 
with life itself.  Unless one makes oneself wholly insensitive one can hardly 
escape the feeling—and by feeling I mean experience which is not confined to the 
emotional sphere—that just by continuing to live one is taking away that 
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possibility from someone else, to whom life has been denied; that one is stealing 
that person’s life […] If we—each of us sitting here—knew at every moment 
what has happened and to what concatenations we owe our existence, and how 
our own existence is interwoven with calamity, even if we have done nothing 
wrong […] if one were fully aware of all these things at every moment, one would 
really be unable to live.  (M 113/176) 
The exclusionary violence of dialectics, outlined in the first section of this chapter, is 
rearticulated here in terms of lived experience and survival.  Living cannot be separated from the 
violent denial of life.  It cannot be separated from “calamity” and violent exclusion.  One does 
violence whether one wants to or not simply by continuing to live.  Hence, my existing requires 
the “predetermined” denial and exclusion of life from others, in the same way that the 
paradoxical logic of identity makes the appearance of objects possible at the cost of excluding 
the spatio-temporal specificity of those objects.  That this denial is predetermined indicates yet 
again that the violent exclusion of life is unavoidable.  However, simultaneous with the violence 
committed through our very act of living, is the constraint to “forget” the violence. 
Directly following the passage quoted above, Adorno continues:  
If we—each of us sitting here—knew at every moment what has happened and to 
what concatenations we owe our existence, and how our own existence is 
interwoven with calamity, even if we have done nothing wrong […] if one were 
fully aware of all these things at every moment, one would really be unable to 
live.  One is pushed as it were into forgetfulness, which is already a form of guilt 
[Schuld].  By failing to be aware at every moment of what threatens and what has 
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happened, one also contributes to it; one resists it too little; and it can be repeated 
and reinstated at any moment. (M 113/176-177) 
If subjects were, at every moment, aware of the violences associated with their continued 
existence, the guilt that survival entails would make life unlivable.  Living requires that one 
forget the exclusionary violence that enables one to exist.  This forgetting perpetuates guilt but at 
a distance, allowing one a space of livability.  The rent for this borrowed space, the fee extracted 
for survival, is that one always does too little to alleviate the violence one’s living perpetuates.  
To live is to “resist too little,” repeating a violence of exclusion at every moment, even this one, 
right now. 
 This logic of guilt and forgetting rearticulates the abstracting and justifying violence 
outlined in Adorno’s discussion of Aristotle.  One is required precisely to abstract away from the 
material consequences of one’s existence, and to naturalize this abstraction by forgetting the 
violence done by one's survival.  Guilt and forgetting, the violence of living and the justification 
of that violence, are both dialectical through and through.  One hears the echoes of this claim in 
Derrida’s invocation of Mount Moriah: “I offer a gift of death, I betray […] Day and night, at 
every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, I am doing that, raising my knife over 
what I love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity, incommensurably” (GD 
68).  Do Adorno and Derrida not agree fundamentally in this moment?  Living is inexorably tied 
to the betrayal of life.  The paradoxical logic of identity, writing, exchange, reparations, 
ethnocentrism, and wage labor all point in this direction.  Hence, the most convincing but also 
interesting affinity in Adorno’s and Derrida’s thinking is that they arrive, despite their 
differences, at the same spot: the question of life.  There is much to say here.  However, what 
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emerges immediately from this affinity is that, for both Adorno and Derrida, life is always 
entangled with death.   
 One will recall that despite thought’s and exchange’s tendency toward violence, Adorno 
finds himself unable to do without them altogether.  He must maintain them for two reasons.  
First because appearance requires identity, and second because without some principle of 
equivalence there would be no way other than brute force for people to exchange anything at all: 
“If comparability as a category of measure were simply annulled, the rationality which is 
inherent in the exchange principle [Tauschprinzip] [. . .] would give way to direct appropriation, 
to violence [Gewalt]” (ND 146-147/150. Translation modified).  Without a system of exchange, 
without some system of comparability there can be no exchange at all.  The practical result of 
this lack is that every transfer of goods amounts to a violence of pure seizure.  Hence, there can 
be no thinking without the violence of identity, no community without the violence of exchange, 
and given the link between the logic of identity/exchange and questions of life, no living without 
the violent denial of life—death. 
 J.M Bernstein, interpreting Adorno’s claim that “wrong life cannot be lived rightly,” 
says, in a remarkably Derridian formulation, “wrong life is life enmeshed in death, which we 
survive in and as” (Bernstein, A 398).  There can be no “right life” because every form of life 
obeys the autoimmune logic of identity—every life is a life/death.  It follows that any form of 
life, by definition, excludes the possibility of being completely non-violent.  Adorno, like 
Derrida, resists simplistically doing away with violence, whether understood logically, 
practically, or politically.  Nonetheless, Adorno stops short of giving up altogether the language 
of non-violence.  In the next chapter I will explore Adorno’s seemingly contradictory insistence 
on the unavoidability of violence and his retention of the notion of non-violence.  Further, I will 
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connect these concepts to his critique of Husserl, Bergson, and Heidegger, thinkers who, as 
Adorno has it, attempt to escape, breakout, or move beyond the autoimmune logic of dialectics 
and, consequently, beyond the necessity of violence.  This connection and particularly Adorno’s 
critique of Heidegger helps to flesh out the character of Adorno’s concern over life, his 
relationship to Derrida, and the ultimately ecological orientation of his critical theory.  However, 
I begin with Adorno's strange relationship with violence and nonviolence. 
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Chapter Four: 
Adorno and Critiques of Non-Violence  
 
 Adorno has a nuanced relationship with the possibilities of non-violence.  For example, 
in Minima Moralia he writes:    
The pure unreflective act is violation projected on to the starry sky above.  But in 
the long, contemplative look that fully discloses people and things, the urge 
towards the object is always deflected, reflected.  Contemplation without violence 
[Gewaltlose Betrachtung], the source of all the joy of truth, presupposes that he 
who contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: a distanced nearness 
[Nähe an Distanz].  (MM 89-90/98)108 
Adorno here reaffirms the violence of the dialectical relationship between thought and objects.  
Contemplation is always thwarted in its “urge” to “fully disclose” objects.  It fails to capture the 
object, a failure that, as I argued in the previous chapter, necessitates an unavoidable violence of 
exclusion in the relationship of thought to objects.  To suppose that this is not the case is to 
“project” violently onto objects.  Yet, having affirmed this unavoidable violence, Adorno 
immediately speaks of a “contemplation without violence.”  He describes this contemplation as a 
way of thinking that would conceptualize the object without incorporating [einverleiben] it, 
respecting, in thought, the difference or distance between the concept and its object.  This notion 
might initially seem contradictory, given Adorno’s commitment to the unavoidability of 
violence.  How can thought be unavoidably violent and yet hold the potential for non-violence?  
To understand the logic of this claim, one must read the two parts of the quote together.   
                                                 
108 Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. New York: Verso, 2005; 
Gesammelte Schriften Band 4: Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003. 
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Given Adorno’s commitment to the idea that violence is unavoidable, his claim 
concerning non-violent contemplation ought not to be taken as a straightforward endorsement of 
what I called in chapter two a traditional notion of non-violence.  Adorno is not arguing that it is 
possible to move completely beyond or to break out of the violent, identitarian character of 
thought.  Rather, the notion of non-violence put forward here is one that would attempt to avoid 
or resist violence by acknowledging the violence.  The possibility of following out the promise 
of thought, the hope of thought to deal justly with its object, would involve identifying clearly in 
thought the relationship between concepts and objects.  As outlined in the previous chapter, a 
clear articulation of this relation reveals that the logic of thought, as a logic of identity, implies 
exclusion, hierarchization, and domination.  Hence, for thought faithfully to represent objects 
means that thought must acknowledge the truth of its relationship to objects.  It requires thought 
to own up to its violent distortion of its object.  Adorno’s interest in the possibility of non-
violence is a very peculiar one.  He is unwilling to abandon the idea that it is possible to avoid 
violence in the process of conceptualization, for to concede that possibility would deny the truth 
moment of this process: that there is some identity between thought and objects.  Yet 
simultaneously he resists the notion that non-violence is something radically and non-
dialectically opposed to violence.  This issue of the suppression of dialectics links Adorno’s 
paradoxical conception of non-violence with his critique of “modern” philosophy.    
 
I: Non-Violence in Bergson and Husserl  
As far as I know, Adorno never took up explicitly the issue of pacifism nor did he put 
forward an explicit critique of political or social discourses of non-violence.  However, he is very 
concerned with an attempt on the part of “modern philosophy” to “break out” of the categories of 
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the conceptual, an attempt to provide access to that which is other than thought.  It is, in fact, 
precisely this attempt that defines “modern” philosophy:  
[t]he interest of philosophy in the non-conceptual [. . .] is not new; we can say that 
in the last generation of philosophers [. . .] interest in this question was very much 
alive.  And whatever products of that generation have any claim to be modern are 
defined by this need. (LND 70/106)109   
Modern philosophy is an exploration of the non-conceptual and its relationship to the conceptual.  
Adorno positions this interest as a response to logical positivism: “the universal dominance of 
causal, mechanical thinking […] the unsatisfactory implication of cause-and-effect thinking for 
the desire to comprehend” (LND 70/106).  Modern philosophy attempts to address the failure of 
logical positivism to provide a satisfactory account of what is other than thought.  The question 
of violence involves itself here insofar as modern philosophy addresses the way in which 
positivism excludes what cannot be reduced to the mechanistic categories of cause and effect.  
Adorno’s critique of modern philosophy coincides here with his hope that conceptualization may 
avoid doing violence to its object.  He singles out Husserl and Bergson as “two of the most 
important representatives of this trend,” as they both attempt to articulate the means by which 
one could access the essence of the world without reducing that world to one's thinking of it 
(LND 70/106).  But Adorno finds that neither Bergson nor Husserl achieved their aim of 
providing access to the non-conceptual, as the non-conceptual remains in their thinking 
“something mental, subjective” (LND 71/108).   
                                                 
109 Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a lecture course 1965/1966. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. 
Translated by Rodney Livingston. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008; Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik. Edited by 
Rolf Tiedamann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003.  Hereafter abbreviated LND. 
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Bergson fails to formulate a viable alternative to logical positivism because he 
“dogmatically assumes, willfully, it would seem, a duality of knowledge” (LND 71/108).110  
Bergson divides knowledge into two realms: a conscious realm of classificatory knowledge and a 
more essential and unconscious realm of pre-conceptual objectivity.  He considers the second 
realm to be the “higher truth” of objects, accessible through a kind of intuition of the affective 
and temporal experience of the life of objects.  Adorno argues that Bergson cannot justify this 
separation of knowledge into these two spheres, insofar as “the so-called intuitions or those 
images that are supposed to possess a pre-conceptual objectivity in the subject cannot be 
expressed except through the medium of concepts” (LND 71-72/108).  Bergson cannot separate 
the realm of conscious thinking from the realm of intuition because “intuition” can only be 
articulated in terms of the thinking subject.  His thinking fails, for example, to recognize that the 
very prioritizing of one realm of knowledge over the other is the seminal gesture of conceptual 
subjectivity and not a pre-conceptual fact of temporal life.  Adorno is equally critical of 
Bergson's notion of “duration," arguing that the absolute and non-conceptual character of 
“duration” cannot be justified expect through an act of positing, which is no different in kind 
from an act of first philosophy.111  He thus falters in his failure to recognize the dialectical 
relationship between his two realms of knowledge.  Bergson does not see that the expression of 
pre-conceptual objectivity occurs via the medium of conceptuality.  This critique is quite similar 
in spirit to Derrida’s somewhat obscure critique of Bergson in “Faith and Knowledge: the Two 
Sources of ‘Religion’ at the limits of Reason Alone.”  There Derrida is at pains to show that one 
cannot absolutely separate religion from technology, faith from reason, except through a gesture 
                                                 
110 For a concise account of Adorno’s critique of Bergson see Alastair Morgan Adorno’s Concept of Life. New York: 
Continuum, 2007, 40-44. 
111 See Against Epistemology: A Metacritique—Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies. 
Translated by Willis Domingo. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 142
of sovereign violence.  One cannot, as Bergson would have it, maintain a duality of knowledge 
without using the force of subjectivity and thus risking the very confusion and violence from 
which duality was intended to protect one.112  Adorno and Derrida are both concerned with a 
certain anti-dialectical dualism in Bergson that attempts to overcome any reference to the 
violence of the conceptual sphere, while relying on the categories, distinctions, and most 
importantly the force of that sphere. 
Adorno’s concern with Husserl emerges in a similar vein, but his critique of Husserlian 
phenomenology is much more thorough and detailed than his work on Bergson.113  In particular, 
he takes issue with Husserl’s notion of intentionality.  Adorno reads Husserl as attempting to 
reveal the non-conceptual, objectivity of entities by omitting “everything that is merely 
individuated, in other words, tied to time and space” (LND 71/107).  Through this omission of an 
entity’s accidental elements—the phenomenological bracketing of the world—Husserl hoped to 
show that the “logical unity of kinds or species” was an objective fact of entities themselves and 
“not produced by the abstract mental operations of the subject” (LND 71/107).  Hence, 
intentionality reveals the objectivity of objects, those aspects of objects which call thinking 
rather than being themselves products of thinking.  Adorno takes issue essentially with this 
phenomenological bracketing of the world, not because he thinks that thought is not inherently 
called by objects, but rather because he does not think that this relationship is in any sense “non-
conceptual.”  His evidence for this claim is that “what gazes out at us when I extract the pure 
entities from the individuation or the individual phenomena [. . .] is at bottom nothing but the 
good old concepts of classificatory logic” (LND 72/109).  Husserl’s project of intuiting the 
essential characteristics of objects through the relationship of intentionality ends by simply 
                                                 
112 FK. It is important to note that in this text Derrida first speaks of a “general logic of autoimmunity.” 
113 I am here indebted to Alastair Morgan’s profoundly clear account of Adorno’s critique of Husserl in Adorno’s 
Concept of Life, 44-47.   
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finding in objects the traditional categories of the mind.  This result is not in itself a problem for 
Adorno, provided that Husserl is willing to give up the notion that these categories are the pre-
conceptual essence of objects.  But he is not.  The result is that Husserl does no more than give 
“an ontological vindication of the concepts,” showing the essential attributes of the objects to be 
the universal categories of the concepts.  As with his critique of Bergson, Adorno finds here a 
certain anti-dialectical moment.  On the one hand, Husserl argues that there is an intentional and 
necessary relationship between thought and objects and, on the other, he suggests that this 
relationship allows a kind of unmediated access to objects. 
There is again a kinship between Adorno and Derrida.  Derrida addresses Husserl in 
Speech and Phenomenon and “La Phénoménologie et la clôture de la métaphysique.”  What he 
finds fundamentally at stake is Husserl’s attempt to isolate or protect the “living present” from 
any metaphysical abstraction.  Husserl wishes to present a “theory of knowledge” freed from 
metaphysical presupposition.  This project is thwarted, however, as 
phenomenology seems to us tormented [tourmrntée], if not contested from within, 
by its own description of the movement of temporalization and of the constitution 
of intersubjectivity.  At the heart of what ties together these two decisive moments 
of description we recognize an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting 
value, and with it a nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living 
present, an ineradicable nonprimordiality. (SP 6/5) 
The effort to unearth phenomenologically a theory of knowledge free from metaphysical 
abstraction is challenged from the beginning, as “phenomenology” is always already a form of 
conceptual abstraction.  Phenomenology cannot provide access to a pure, unscathed, fully-
present phenomenality, because it is constituted by an irreducible non-phenomenological, non-
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present, non-living moment that undermines the purity of the phenomenological project.  This 
fundamental non-present is contained in phenomenology’s very articulation of the development 
of time and subjectivity.   
Derrida will play out his challenge to the Husserlian project around the issue of the 
“sign” (Zeichen).  His dialectically inspired discussion will show that Husserl cannot maintain 
with any consistency his distinction between indication (Anzeichen) and expression (Ausdruck).  
These terms, brought together in the concept of the “sign” (Zeichen), tend toward confusion.  Yet 
if Husserl cannot maintain a clear distinction between indication and expression, if, as Derrida 
says, “the Verflechtung which couples the indicative sign to the expression were absolutely 
irreducible,” then the whole Husserlian project falters.  In such a case, there would no way to 
determine clearly whether those things intuited from objects are indeed expressions of the objects 
or impositions of the mind—the living present of the object or lifeless conceptual abstractions.  
On Derrida’s reading, the distinction between indication and expression falters as Husserl has no 
means by which to adjudicate between indication and expression except through recourse to 
these terms themselves.  What in the end guarantees the connection between life and expression 
is nothing but the lifeless tautology that expression is not indication because it is expression.  
This tautology destabilizes the entire Husserlian project.114  It is interesting that what is at stake 
in these earliest works of Derrida is the question of “the living present,” of the non-life in life.  
This resonates with my claim in chapter three that the deconstructive project was shaped from 
the start by a concern for life. 
Both Bergson and Husserl fail for Adorno insofar as each remains “idealistic,” drawing, 
albeit in different ways, on some notion of “immanent consciousness” to explain what is other 
than consciousness (LND 73/107).  Their difficulty is that they remain indebted to an implicit 
                                                 
114 See in particular chapter two, “The Reduction of Indication.” (SP 27-47/28-33). 
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notion of consciousness—and the fact that it is implicit is the problem.  As a result, both these 
positions reinstate that which they wish to contest: the basic privileging of subject over object 
and the reduction of non-conceptuality.  Adorno directs the reader to “draw a lesson from this 
[Bergson’s and Husserl’s failure],” a lesson that is entirely amenable to Derrida, that “[e]very 
attempt at a breakout [of conceptuality] that is initiated by the subject, out of subjective whim—
we might also say: out of subjective freedom of choice—is doomed to futility” (NDL 73/107).  
Every mode of inquiry that begins from subjectivity, which is to say every mode of human 
inquiry, will forever be indebted to the sphere of conceptualization.  This debt is as inevitable as 
the proverbial death and taxes, and to deny it in the name of arriving at some form of unmediated 
non-conceptuality or intuited essence is conceptual self-deception.  However for Adorno, 
Bergson and Husserl go beyond simple self-deception in their failure to acknowledge that their 
articulations of the non-conceptual are inherently dialectical and based in the conceptual.  He 
finds in them something ideological and ultimately dangerous in that they operates both to 
reduce the objective world to the categories of the subject and to naturalize this reduction.  His 
critique of Heidegger most emphatically develops this concern for reduction and naturalization. 
 
II: Heidegger and the Naturalization of History    
As with Bergson and Husserl, Adorno understands Heidegger’s thinking as emerging 
from a concern with idealism and the question of the non-conceptual.  In Negative Dialectics, 
Adorno positions the project of fundamental ontology as a response to an “emphatic need, the 
sign of something missed, the longing that Kant’s verdict on knowledge of the Absolute should 
not be the end of the matter” (ND 61/69).  This “ontological need” results from Kant’s having 
shut off access to non-conceptuality and having limited cognition.  Heidegger worries, according 
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to Adorno, that by limiting cognition and denying individuals access to things-in-themselves, 
Kant’s system denies humans access to their essence, creating an empty, evacuated notion of 
humanity.  Adorno shares this worry over an evacuation of content from the subject.  
Furthermore, this concern provides one way of framing Adorno’s general worry with 
phenomenology: “a universal feeling, a universal fear, that our progress in controlling nature 
may increasingly help to weave the very calamity it is supposed to protect us from” (ND 
67/75).115  Adorno shares the suspicion that by circumscribing the world, instrumental reason has 
worked to deny individuals their substantive life and to encourage society's control over 
individuals.  However, he finds Heidegger’s approach to this shared concern radically opposed to 
his own.      
 Adorno's critique of Heidegger's ontology spans nearly four decades during which he 
consistently maintains that the key problem with Heidegger’s thinking is its attempt to overcome, 
suppress, and immobilize the dialectical logic immanent to it.  This guiding principle of 
Adorno’s critique was formulated as early as 1931-32.  In “The Idea of Natural History,” Adorno 
argues that Heidegger fails in his attempt to solve the antithesis of “nature” and “history.”  He 
maintains that “[e]ven though history is acknowledged to be a fundamental phenomenon, its 
ontological determination or ontological interpretation is in vain because it is transfigured 
directly into ontology” (NH 115/350-351).116  In positing historicity as ontology, Heidegger is 
able to resolve the antithesis of nature and history showing “historicity” to be, as Susan Buck-
                                                 
115 Adorno states explicitly the kinship between the project of phenomenology and his own work when he writes 
“[w]e want to adhere as closely to the heterogeneous as the programs of phenomenology and of Simmel tried in vain 
to do; our aim is total self-relinquishment.  Philosophical contents can only be grasped where philosophy does not 
impose them.  The illusion that it might confine the essence in its finite definitions will have to be given up” (ND 
13/18).  The illusory reign of the subject, the belief that the always finite articulation of subjective could give one 
access to universal or infinite truth concerning objects must be abandoned in order to precisely proceed toward some 
grasping of the non-conceptual. 
116 “The Idea of Natural History” Translated by Bob Hullet-Kentor. Telos (60), 1984, 111-124; “Die Idee der 
Naturgeschichte.” Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996, 345-365. 
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Morss puts it, “the ontological essence of existence” (Buck-Morss, OND 54).117  However, this 
solution is wholly unsatisfying because it remains necessarily abstract or, as Adorno puts it, 
“[t]he problem of historical contingency can not be mastered by the category of historicity” (NH 
114/350).  Heidegger’s “solution” falls short as the “extreme factual being” of the world is 
irreducible to the categories of “historicity.”  The historical structures of “life” remains always 
already irreducible to material life, despite the fact that one can find in any particular example, 
(Adorno chooses the French Revolution) “every possible element of this structure of life” (NH 
114/350).  Heidegger conflates the structural elements of an object with the object itself, a move 
that entraps his thought in the same basic paradox that trips up Bergson and Husserl: namely, 
that despite his attempt to break ties with the subjective, metaphysical standpoint, he remains 
implicitly committed to the abstracting force of conceptualization.  In more dialectical terms, 
Heidegger attempts to suppress the dialectical relationship between the subjective and objective, 
ontology and history, but relies implicitly on the abstracting power of the ontological (NH 
112/348).  The charge that Heidegger suppresses dialectics is more clearly articulated in “The 
Actuality of Philosophy,” where Adorno argues that Heidegger breaks with idealism only 
through recourse to “an essentially undialectical and historically pre-dialectical ‘ready to hand’ 
(zurhanden) reality” (Adorno, AP 123/328).118  However, Adorno’s most extended critique of 
Heidegger comes in his last text, Negative Dialectics. 
 Fully a third of Negative Dialectics is devoted to a critical examination of Heidegger.  
Adorno proposes an immanent critique of Heideggerian ontology, since “[w]e have no power 
over the philosophy of Being if we reject it generally, from the outside, instead of taking it on in 
                                                 
117 Susan Buck-Morss. The Origins of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt 
Institute. New York: The Free Press, 1977.  I am indebted to Buck-Morss’s beautifully clear and concise account of 
Adorno’s early critique of Heidegger over the issue of nature and history 52-57. 
118 “The Actuality of Philosophy.” Telos (31). New York: Telos Press, 1977, 120-133; “Die Aktualität der 
Philosophie.” Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996, 325-344. 
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its own structures—turning its own force against it” (ND 97/104).  Adorno aims to show that 
articulating the relationship between Being and entities in terms of the ontological difference 
undermines the promise of fundamental ontology to break with a metaphysical, abstract notion of 
Being.  Key to Adorno’s argument is the claim that Heidegger’s insistence on the ontological 
difference evacuates any content from his notion of Being.  Being, then, becomes a mere abstract 
and ultimately transcendental notion:  
If we try to accomplish Heidegger’s distinction of Being from the concept that 
circumscribes it logically, we are left—after deducting entities as well as the 
categories of abstraction—with an unknown quantity which nothing but the 
pathos of its invocation lifts above the Kantian concept of the transcendent thing-
in-itself. (ND 98/105)   
The notion of the ontological difference attempts to sequester Being from entities and the 
categories of the concept; but, Adorno contends, in separating it from any materially existing 
entity, this operation circumscribes Being and leaves it utterly abstract and void of content.  
Following his earlier texts, Adorno’s critique concerns itself with the denial and suppression of 
the dialectical relationship between Being and entities that he finds immanent to Heidegger’s 
position.   
Despite his insistence on the ontological difference, in order for the project of 
fundamental ontology to have anything to say concerning the existence of human beings, 
Heidegger must remain committed to the dialectical relationship between Being and entities.  He 
must suppose that the exploration of the meaning of Being is related to our existence.  If this 
were not the case, his thinking would from the beginning be nothing but empty idealism, 
describing some notion of Being that bears no relationship to existence at all.  If he wishes to 
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preserve the power of Being to show us something essential about our existence, Heidegger 
cannot insist on Being as utterly separate from entities as he does with his notion of the 
ontological difference.  The fundamental tension that drives Adorno's critique is that Heidegger’s 
commitment to the ontological difference renders Being devoid of all determination. 
For Adorno, “[t]alk of the ‘ontological difference’ comes down to the tautology that 
Being is not entity because it is being” (ND 115-116/121).  The notion of the ontological 
difference leads Heidegger, quite logically, to argue that one cannot define Being nor make it 
into a concept, as this would violate the radical difference between Being and any particular form 
of existing.  In fact any qualification of Being must on this model betray Being, insofar as Being 
is not reducible to any particular moment of existing.  Hence one can define Being only 
negatively as that which is not an entity or a concept.  This failure to articulate Being is the very 
tautology for which Heidegger castigates Western metaphysics, namely, “that it always left 
unsaid what is meant by Being as distinct from entity” (ND 116/121).  Heidegger’s absolute 
insistence on the dialectically arresting notion of the ontological difference leads him to reenact 
the logic he claims to overcome.  Yet, the price paid for insistence on the ontological difference 
is not merely that it evacuates all content from the notion of Being but, more profoundly, that it 
devoids the human subject of content.   
 By insisting that Being and entities are related fundamentally and that at the same time 
they are radically different, Heideggerian logic works to reduce all entities to Being.  While 
Being must bear directly on what is most fundamental to the human Dasein, it cannot have any 
material or conceptual content.  The resulting logic holds that what is most fundamental to 
humans is not their material existence but their relationship to the abstract notion of being.  To 
make specific material existence the most fundamental aspect of Dasein would amount to giving 
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particular content to the notion of Being.  This Heidegger will not do.  For Adorno, then, 
Heidegger’s insistence on the essential character of Being must devalue the material lives of 
subjects:   
The whole construction of the ontological difference is a fake, a ‘Potemkin’s 
village.’  It is erected solely to permit a more sovereign rejection of doubts about 
Being, by means of the thesis of entity as a mode of Being to be.  As each 
individual entity is reduced to its concept [. . .] that which makes it an entity as 
opposed to the concept will disappear. (ND 116-117/122)  
If entities require Being as an expression of what is most essential to them, and if Being can have 
no relationship to the particularities of an entity's material existence, then it follows that all those 
aspects of the individual entity that are not part of their relationship to Being, all their material 
content, becomes accidental and disappears in the face of the forceful call of Being.  The abstract 
notion of Being operates to render entities equally abstract.  The same reduction was already at 
work in Heidegger’s attempt to resolve the problem of nature and history, for there too he shows 
the essence of entities as nothing other than Being.  The danger of this suppression of dialectics 
is that it not only reduces entities to the concept of Being, excluding their material existence, but, 
worse, it ontologizes this exclusion.   
 Adorno’s critique of fundamental ontology presents a system in which every individual 
entity is identified with the “pure” concept.  In such a system history itself appears ontological. 
“The ambivalence of the doctrine of Being, the fact that it deals with entity and at the same time 
ontologizes it—in other words, deprives it of all its nonconceptuality by resorting to its 
characteristica formalis—this ambivalence also determines the doctrine’s relation to history” 
(ND 129/134).  Heidegger’s logic leads to the conclusion that what is essential to humans is their 
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common grounding in Being.  This ground, while necessarily independent from their lived 
existence, is shown ultimately to be identical to it.  By this logic, it makes no difference what 
kind of state or social system one inhabits.  The only matter of import is one’s relation to Being.  
Yet Being has no determinable content: “That history can be ignored or deified, depending on 
the circumstances, is a practicable political conclusion from the philosophy of Being” (ND 
130/135).  For Adorno, the repression of dialectics subjugates individuals to the historical and 
social situations they inhabit, ontologizing those situations as the very essence of Being. 
 Adorno had identified the same problem in his reading of Bergson and Husserl, insofar as 
both these thinkers tend toward an anti-dialectical moment.  Any attempt to “break out” of the 
conceptual circumscription of the non-conceptual comes at the risk of reaffirming the very 
conceptual categories and logic that one set out to overcome.  These supposed escapes from the 
conceptual work by a sleight of thought that obscures rather than severs the dialectical 
connection between the conceptual and non-conceptual.  In all three of the cases explored above, 
the categories of the conceptual reemerge as aspects of the non-conceptual.  Thus these 
attempted escapes from the conceptual in fact operate to naturalize its domination.  This 
domination is spelled out most clearly in Adorno’s reading of Heidegger, whose anti-dialectical 
position ontologizes our history as the history of Being as such and thus ontologizes and 
naturalizes our historical violence as reflections of Being.  Adorno’s reading has grave 
implications for any project that tries to substantiate itself beyond violence or that claims for 
itself privileged access to unmediated existence, for he reveals such a project to be a disguised 
and consequently pernicious reenactment of the conceptual violence from which it claims to 
escape.  In this sense, Adorno’s critique of phenomenology and ontology returns us to the set of 
issues and questions with which we ended the previous chapter: violence, exclusion, ideology, 
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domination, mediation, exchange, fungibility, and life.  Adorno is critical of phenomenology and 
ontology because he reads them as implicit reinstatements of the dominance and violence of the 
conceptual at the expense the concrete lives of subjects.  Here, though, there is cause at least to 
wonder about the validity of Adorno’s critique, particularly of Heidegger.  
Only a surprisingly small body of literature has explored the quality of Adorno’s reading 
of Heidegger. 119  In their introduction to the only book length investigation of this dispute 
currently available in English, Iian Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek argue that this paucity can 
be explained in large part by the fact that dialectics and ontology historically have been 
understood to be in radical opposition.  In addition, the vehemence of Adorno’s critique and 
Heidegger’s utter silence has made it is all too easy to dismiss this dispute as a fundamental 
difference of project or as an essential misunderstanding.  Macdonald’s and Ziarek’s collection 
challenges this traditional reading.  It also highlights the opinion, held even by those generally  
sympathetic to Adorno, that his reading of Heidegger may not be particularly accurate. 
To cite an example of this opinion, Alastair Morgan in his book, Adorno’s Concept of 
Life, argues that “the central problem with Adorno’s critique [of Heidegger] is that he 
fundamentally misunderstands the radicalization of ontology that Heidegger proposes” (Morgan, 
ACL 48).  This misunderstanding results from Adorno's misrepresentation of Heidegger’s 
concept of Being as a kind of absolute immediacy, “something primary and immediate beyond 
subject-object relations” (ACL 48).  On this account, the problem with Adorno’s critique is that 
it ignores fundamentally the fact that “Being is precisely that within Heidegger’s philosophy that 
                                                 
119 The most comprehensive discussions of this debate have yet to be translated into English.  See Hermann 
Mörchen, Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1981, and Macht und Herrschaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980.  
Dieter Thomä, “Verhältnis zur Ontologie: Adornos Denken des Unbegrifflichen,” in Theodor W. Adorno: Negative 
Dialektik, ed. Axel Honneth and Christoph Menke. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006.  Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof 
Ziarek, eds., Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008 is, I 
believe, the only book length encounter with this dispute in English. 
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is never totally present or immediate” (ACL 48).  Adorno makes Heidegger into too much of an 
ontological dogmatist.  Morgan’s reading fits into the camp that sees Adorno’s differences with 
Heidegger, in large part, as the result of a basic misunderstanding.  While I am in some ways 
sympathetic to this claim that Adorno misunderstands certain aspects of Heidegger’s thought, I 
am unsatisfied with this explanation. 
I would argue that Morgan’s defense of Heidegger comes to show him as, in fact, more 
dialectical than Adorno paints him.  Directly following his statements concerning Adorno’s 
misunderstanding of Heidegger’s notion of Being, Morgan writes:  
This [Adorno’s misunderstanding] is not to negate Adorno’s critique of the 
ultimate dissolution of every particularity into an ideal concept of Being, which is 
itself contentless and has no relation to history.  Nor does it get around Adorno’s 
general critique of prima philosophia, of an ultimately ahistorical grounding in 
everyday life. (ACL 49)   
Morgan concludes that while Adorno misunderstands Heidegger’s notion of Being as being too 
anti-dialectical, his ultimate conclusions about Heidegger are more or less correct.  One will 
recall that Adorno's conclusions are based on his claim that Heidegger suppresses the dialectic 
inherent in his notion of Being.  Here lies a tension in Morgan’s readings, for how can Adorno 
fundamentally misunderstand this particular aspect of Heidegger while remaining more or less 
right in his claim that Heidegger suppresses the oscillating, dialectic character of Being?  
Morgan seems to be defending Heidegger by arguing that his notion of Being is actually far more 
dialectical than Adorno maintains.  If true, then, on Adorno’s own terms, Being is not an empty, 
ahistorical notion.  Paradoxically, Morgan's assertion that Adorno misunderstands Heidegger 
works only to vindicate more surely Adorno’s general approach.  Clearly acceptance of this 
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claim leads to all kinds of other problems given that Heidegger is so often explicitly anti-
dialectic.  Yet, is not Morgan’s position indicative of a desire to stop short of completely 
dismissing Heidegger, a desire to maintain what Adorno might call the truth moment in 
fundamental ontology?  It seems to me that Adorno marks this desire as well. 
 Despite what one might think about Adorno’s reading of Heidegger, one can hardly claim 
that it is dismissive.  Adorno was from the beginning of his career interested in following out the 
project of fundamental ontology.  In doing so, he constantly puts two particular questions to 
Heidegger.  The first concerns the possibility that, despite Heidegger’s intentions, subjectivity 
and conceptuality may continue to play an undisclosed role in his thinking.  The second concerns 
a kind of clandestine violence that seems to permeate Heidegger’s thinking, particularly in his 
justifying of certain historical, social, and political consequences as expressions of Being.  It is 
interesting that these questions are not particularly unique to Adorno.  They sit at the heart of the 
debate over Heidegger’s relationship personally, politically, and philosophically to National 
Socialism.  Adorno is hardly alone in worrying that phenomenological and ontological thought 
might contain a certain, undisclosed or disavowed debt to transcendental subjectivity, or that it 
might, through this debt, come to justify certain historical or social formations.  Hence what to 
my mind is most convincing about Adorno’s critique of Heidegger is the way it aligns with other 
more phenomenologically inspired critiques.  In particular, it seems extremely close to Derrida’s 
critique of Heidegger in Of Spirit.  This collusion further illuminates not just the connection 
between Adorno's and Derrida’s thought but the character of Adorno’s concern over the 
domination of life.  
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II: Of Spirit, Of Thought, Of World.      
 In Of Spirit, Derrida traces a tension in Heidegger’s thinking regarding the notions of 
Geist in its broad implications as “spirit” and “mind,” as well as in the adjectival modifiers 
spiritual, intellectual, religious, and sacred.  Heidegger will from Sein und Zeit (1927) to 
“Language in The Poem: A Placement of Georg Trakl’s Poem” (1953) warn of a need “to avoid” 
(vermeiden) terms such a Geist, geistig, and geistlich (Derrida, OS 1/11).120  One must resist, 
Heidegger claims, referring to Geist in the sacred or religious context of geistlich but also in the 
more “intellectual” or “mental” connotations of geistig.  Therefore, on the one hand, he cautions 
resistance to any reliance on the whole brood of terms that would relate to “spirit,” to the living 
presence of the voice, and to the intellectual gathering together of the conceptual.  On the other 
hand, though, he makes extensive use of the notion of “spirit” throughout his work: “he often 
spoke not only of the word ‘spirit’ but, sometime yielding to the emphatic mode, in the name of 
spirit” (OS 1-2/12).  Derrida’s analysis traces Heidegger’s move from rejection and the 
provisional use of Geist in Sein und Zeit (1927) to his eventual recuperation of the term in the 
Rectorship Address (1933).  Derrida shows Heidegger’s seeming attempt, over a twenty five year 
period, to reclaim the notion of Geist, geistlich, and geistig, as though his thinking could not do 
without its invocation and “force.” (OS 5/18).  I cannot here do justice to the whole of Derrida’s 
analysis.  However, it seems that he exposes a tension in Heidegger's work that parallels 
remarkably a similar tension in Adorno’s.  Both Derrida and Adorno trace Heidegger’s attempt 
to avoid the subjective realm and its ontologizing of Being as he circles around a clandestine 
recourse to the categories and force of that realm.  The degree of this similarity is brought out 
with particular clarity in Chapter Six of Derrida’s analysis. 
                                                 
120 Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989; De l’esprit. Paris: Galilée, 1987.  Hereafter abbreviated OS. 
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 Having worked carefully through Heidegger’s varied uses and denials of the notion of 
spirit from Sein und Zeit (1927) to An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), Derrida argues that 
Heidegger comes to two seemingly contradictory conclusions concerning spirit, particularly in its 
relationship to “world” and to “animals.”121  Heidegger will hold in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics that “the world is already a spiritual (geistig) world.  The animal has no world or 
any environment (Umwelt)” and is thus devoid of any relationship to spirit (OS 47/75-76). 
Animality is not part of spirit and does not touch spiritual matters, nor is spirit directed toward 
animality.  In short, spirit has nothing to say about the animal.  This absolute separation of 
animality and spirit remains “remarkably constant” throughout Heidegger’s corpus (OS 54/85).   
Juxtaposed to this absolute separation, though, Heidegger puts forward in answer to the question 
“what is the world,” the following three theses: “1. The stone is without world (weltlos).  2. The 
animal is poor in world (weltarm). 3. Man is world-forming (weltbildend)” (OS 48/?).  Here “the 
animal” stands as a kind of median point between that which has and that which lacks world.  
Derrida points this out as a paradox, insofar as the claim from the Introduction “appears 
expressly to contradict the three theses” (OS 47/75-76).  How can it be that animals have no 
world and no relation to spirit and yet are weltarm?  Given that, for Heidegger, the “world” is 
always a spiritual world, if animals are poor in world are they not also at least potentially poor in 
spirit and, therefore, perhaps within reach of a world after all?  How can it be that “the animal 
does and does not have a world”? (OS 50/80).   
 Heidegger is strident in maintaining that he does not mean weltarm in the sense of a 
“difference of degree.”  He is not arguing that animals take part in or have access to the human 
world or that the difference between the world of humans and whatever world animals may have 
                                                 
121 An Introductions to Metaphysics did not appear in published form until 1953.  However, this material was the 
subject of a course of university lectures given in 1935.   
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is a matter of quantity or degree.  Heidegger rather insists on a qualitative distinction between the 
human and animal world.  Animals have and inhabit an altogether different world than that of the 
human Dasein.  His insistence here rearticulates the ontological difference.  Being is other than 
entities, in the same way that the world of the human Dasein is other than the animal world.  Yet, 
Derrida wonders “what justifies this concept of privation once the animal is no longer a species 
of the human world” (OS 49/78)?  If the animal world is utterly distinct from the human, there 
seems no reason to describe the animal’s relationship to its world as one of privation.  The notion 
of “privation” is a comparison that necessarily introduces relationality, hierarchy, and ultimately 
anthropocentrism into the world and between humans and animals.  In what sense are animals 
deprived of their world unless it is not entirely or actually theirs but in fact belongs to others to 
whom animals are not, as “privation” suggests, equals? 
 Hoping to clarify Heidegger’s use of the word poor in this context, Derrida turns to the 
discussion of “poverty” and “privation” in Sein und Zeit.  This text, he finds, does little to 
address the problem, since Heidegger makes a distinction there between the privation (Privation) 
of Dasein and the privation (Entbehrung) under discussion here.  The privation (Privation) of 
Dasein is already of a different order than the privation (Entbehrung) of animals.  The distinction 
between these two privations will not help to clarify the relational call of Entbehrung, as that 
very relationality is already put out of bounds by the alterity between Privation and Entbehrung.  
In fact, Heidegger seems in no hurry to resolve this paradox at all, saying that “‘metaphysics and 
essentiality have a logic different from that of the sound understanding of men’” (OS 50/80).  
Derrida attributes this lack of urgency to Heidegger’s “wariness of Hegelian Reason.”  He resists 
resolving this paradox out of a concern for the way in which the call to resolution tends toward 
the “dialectical power of absolute reason.”  He does not want to stray into metaphysical 
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abstraction or into dialectics.  Yet Derrida cautions that “[i]t would be necessary, precisely 
around the problem of animality, to reelaborate the question of Heidegger’s relationship to 
Hegel,” because “[o]nce the differences had been recognized [. . .] troubling affinities might 
again show through” (OS 50-51/80).  This same concern for the way in which Heidegger seems 
to reestablish the very speculative absolutism that he wants to resist is at the heart of Adorno’s 
critique.  In a fashion not alien to Adorno, Derrida’s analysis begins to show that Heidegger’s 
unwillingness or inability to address the paradox of the animal has everything to do with the way 
in which his system remains committed, often obliquely, to the priority of the conceptual over 
the material.  However, Derrida first reframes the paradox of the animal as a question of alterity.  
Derrida calls up Heidegger's animal, both poor in world and without world, and reframes 
its paradoxical condition as a struggle between “two values incompatible in their ‘logic’: that of 
lack and that of alterity” (OS 49/78).  Heidegger, unwilling to abandon either the absolute 
alterity of the animal and human worlds or the privation of animals in relationship to their world, 
attempts to maintain simultaneously these two incompatible values.  His position then mirrors 
precisely his unwillingness, cited by Adorno, to abandon either the ontological difference or the 
essential relationship between Being and entities.  Like Adorno's critique, Derrida's argues that 
while unwilling to abandon either the logic of alterity or privation, Heidegger will insist on 
hierarchizing these logics.   
Although positing both a logic of alterity and a logic of privation, everything in his 
analysis dictates that “privation” remain subservient to the moment of alterity.  In fact, Derrida 
will goes so far as to argue that all of Heidegger’s thinking concerning “world” and “spirit” rests 
on this moment of hierarchy, the supposed superiority of the alterical over the privative.  
Heidegger remains committed in every way to the absolute alterity of the human and animal 
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worlds: “It is always a matter [for Heidegger] of marking an absolute limit between the living 
creature and the human Dasein” (OS 54/85).  For Heidegger, the ontological difference always 
wins out over the mediation of the privative.  This privileging of alterity reveals itself in a series 
of supposedly alterical oppositions that, for Heidegger, define the relationship between the 
human Dasein and the animal.  For example, in a gesture that is remarkably classical in its logic, 
Heidegger will deny animals access to language,122 techné,123 and, perhaps most importantly, “to 
entities as such and in their Being” (OS 54/85).  The animal, in utter opposition to the human 
Dasein, will be that which has no language, art, or access to Being.  In identifying this moment 
where Heidegger, in support of his thinking on the world and spirit, attempts to maintain these 
absolute and anti-dialectical oppositions, Derrida could not be closer to Adorno.  Heidegger’s 
thinking subsists on the force of its anti-dialectical insistence, its denial and suppression of 
dialectics.  Hence, in a move that is Adornian in spirit, Derrida contends that it is precisely this 
suppression of the relational logic of the privative in favor of alterity that compromises 
Heidegger’s thinking.     
Derrida would be the first to argue that there is something compelling even necessary in 
Heidegger’s emphatic call for alterity.  In particular, the attempt to break with an 
anthropocentric, scientific, and political notion of existence requires positing that the “as such” 
of entities is something different than previously thought.124  Being is not reducible to the history 
of metaphysics, anthropology, biology, or social science.  Being is not identical to ontology.  
Nevertheless this insistence on alterity “founders on essential difficulties.”  It is still impossible 
to maintain a notion of poverty dictated wholly by a logic of alterity:  
                                                 
122 OS 53/83. 
123 OS 57/89-90. 
124 OS 55/86. 
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if privative poverty indeed marks the caesura or the heterogeneity between non-
living and living on the one hand, between the animal and human Dasein on the 
other, the fact remains that the very negativity, the residue of which can be read in 
this discourse on privation, cannot avoid a certain anthropocentrism or even 
humanist teleology.  This is a schema which the determination of the humanity of 
man on the basis of Dasein can no doubt modify, displace, shift—but not destroy. 
(OS 55/86) 
Heidegger’s insistence that privation mark the animal’s relationship to world necessarily and 
irreducibly introduces relationality into his notions of world.  One cannot have privation without 
mediation, without the “negativity” that would connect what is poor to that which is other than 
poor.  Recalling the most essential collusion between his critique and Adorno’s, Derrida 
ultimately will name this negativity “dialectics.”125  One cannot, as Heidegger would have it, 
claim the privilege of the human over the animal or Being over entities without an implicit claim 
to relationality, insofar as privilege, superiority, privation, and poverty always “imply 
hierarchization and evaluation” (OS 56/87).  Hierarchy itself is always already a relation, a 
bringing together, and a gathering by force.  Heidegger cannot announce the ontological 
difference or the difference between the human and animal without appealing to mediation, 
relationality, negativity, and dialectics.  His insistence that the difference between the human and 
the animal remain absolute, unaffected by relationality draws its force from precisely the 
relational force that it denies.  Hence, Derrida comes to the very conclusion put forward by 
Adorno some two decades earlier: that Heidegger’s thinking founders on a denial of the dialectic 
inherent to it.  This undoing strikes to the very heart of Heidegger's project, weighing “upon the 
possibility of the onto-logical as such, upon the ontological difference, the access to the Being of 
                                                 
125 OS 57/89-90. 
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the entity […] and first of all to the world of man as weltbildend” (OS 56/87).  The logic of 
privation and relationality speaks already to the impossibility of dividing absolutely the 
materiality of the onto and the conceptuality of the logical.  It haunts the ontological difference.  
It orients what it could mean to be a unique member of a species.  It traces the almost 
imperceptible pause between the world and the force that shapes that world.  Hence, Derrida’s 
claims return us to the central issues of the relationship between conceptualization and the 
material world, subjects and objects.  In fact, Derrida argues that Heidegger’s suppression of 
dialectics orients a privileging of the subjective at the expense of the objective, a claim that 
brings us back round to Derrida’s discussion of spirit.     
Having explored Heidegger’s inability to address the paradox introduced by the figure of 
the animal and the logic of privation, we can look to Derrida’s reading of spirit in its relationship 
to world and the “symptoms that this situation now lets us read in Heidegger’s text” (OS 56/88).  
The most striking of these symptoms is that, for Heidegger, “[t]here can be no animal Dasein, 
since Dasein is characterized by access to the ‘as such’ of the entity” (OS 56-57/88).  
Heidegger’s absolute separation of the human Dasein requires the notion that Dasein, its world, 
and its relationship to spirit is something utterly foreign to animality.  Heidegger is emphatic: the 
animal does not have access to the human world, and the world is fundamentally spiritual, 
therefore, the animal does not have access to spirit.  This claim follows naturally enough from 
Heidegger’s commitment to a logic of alterity.  Animals and Dasein live and die in totally 
separate worlds.  Yet, if there is no animal Dasein, then conversely Dasein is and must be devoid 
of all animality, devoid of all that is not spirit or reducible to spirit.  If we turn this impossibility 
of an animal Dasein on its head, we see that the human Dasein cannot, on Heidegger’s account, 
have access to the animal world, the world that is fundamentally not of spirit.  Humans cannot 
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have access to animality, for such access would compromise the utter alterity of the human and 
animal worlds.  It would make Dasein at least in part animal, a possibility to which Heidegger is 
utterly allergic.  Hence, everything in Derrida’s analysis suggests that the human Dasein must be 
confined to the world of spirit; it is, in fact, nothing but spirit all the way down.  Add to this the 
notion that the “Geist” at stake here is necessarily a Geist and geistig, that relates always in some 
sense to the mind, intellectualization, conceptualization, and psyché.  One is then treading in the 
footsteps of Adorno’s claim that Heidegger’s thinking remains fundamentally committed to the 
dominance of the subjective.  For Heidegger, the human Dasein excludes all that cannot be 
reduced to the categories of the subject and mind.  Here we have moved beyond the scope of 
Derrida’s argument, insofar as Derrida makes no mention of a Dasein that appears to be only on 
the side of the mind.  However, this conclusion is in no way alien to Derrida’s analysis. 
 Early in his reading of Heidegger, Derrida remarks that, “manifest” in the three theses 
from Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, one can find “intact, sheltered in obscurity, the 
axioms of the profoundest metaphysical humanism” and, he emphasizes, “I do mean the 
profoundest” (OS 12/28).  This contention that Heidegger remains consistently committed to the 
tenets of humanist metaphysics is one of the key elements of Derrida’s reading in Of Spirit and 
in his entire engagement with Heidegger.  Heidegger continues stalwartly to privilege the 
“human” subject, with its powers of reason and conceptualization.  More technically, he 
advances a logic of “gathering” (Versammlung) and thus a logic of unity and oneness.  One of 
the sites of this gathering will be “Geist” (OS 9, 106-107/24, 174-176).126  In addition, Derrida 
indicates in several places throughout Of Spirit the resonance between Geist and the categories of 
subjectivity and conceptualization (OS 1, 41/12, 67).  This brings us back to the “troubling 
                                                 
126 “Geist cannot fail to gather this interlacing insofar as, for Heidegger, as we shall verify, it is another name for the 
One and the Versammlung, one of the names of collecting and gathering” (OS 9/24). 
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affinities” between Heidegger and Hegel, the way in which Heidegger’s thinking comes to 
incorporate the very privileging of reason, spirit, and human conceptuality that he claims to be 
avoiding.  Derrida sees everywhere in Heidegger’s thought the mobilization of the forces and 
categories of conceptualization for which Adorno chastises Heidegger.  This metaphysical 
humanism is nowhere more pronounced than at those moments where Heidegger addresses the 
questions of the “world,” “life,” “humans,” and “animals.”  Hence, the stakes of Derrida’s 
argument bear a striking resemblance to those of Adorno, for whom “life” was always the issue.  
In fact, Derrida's critique draws explicit lines between Heidegger's thinking and a certain 
naturalizing of the historical world in the shadow of National Socialism, and he sketches a 
relationship between Heidegger’s articulation of spirit and Nazism.           
 Derrida links Heidegger’s recuperation of spirit and his clandestine commitments to 
humanism to the naturalization of the historical and political world and a possible 
“spiritualization of nazism.”  He concludes among other things that: “in a sense which would, to 
be sure, like to think itself not Hegelian, historicity is immediately and essentially determined as 
spiritual [for Heidegger].  And what is true of history is true of the world” (OS 37/61).  Both in 
his Rectorship Address and two years later in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger posits 
that there is a fundamental link between history and spirit: “Heidegger associates, with a hyphen, 
the adjectives geistig and geschichtlich: geistig-geschichtlich [spiritual-historicity] is Dasein [. . 
.] geistig-geschichtlich is the world” (OS 37/61).  There is a fundamental connection between 
spirit, historicity, the human Dasein, and the world.  In fact, the world and Dasein are nothing 
but spiritual-historicity.  The notion that the “world” of the human Dasein is always already a 
“spiritual” world is here expanded to include history—historicity is spirit.  There is a chain of 
equivocation in Heidegger’s thinking, one that fundamentally links spirit-world-history-Dasein 
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into a kind of relay of identity and equivalence.  All of these terms come to appear as reflections 
of one another.  Hence, what will be true of spirit will be true of the world, of Dasein, and of 
history.  Derrida’s analysis discloses an implicit moment of reduction in Heidegger’s thinking of 
spirit, one in which the historical specificity of “earth and blood,” the historical specificity of a 
certain “Germanness,” comes to be equated fundamentally with the spiritual essence of the world 
and Dasein.  This seeming naturalization of a distinctly German history and its connection to the 
“metaphysics of subjectivity” raises and in fact announces, for Derrida, that the “risk” inherent in 
Heidegger’s thinking is justification of not just any history but the history of nazism. 
There is a serious and disturbing connection between Heidegger’s strange reduction of 
spirit-world-history-Dasein and the justifying of nazism:  
In the Rectorship Address, this risk [of spiritualizing nazism] is not just a risk run.  
If its program seems diabolical, it is because, without there being anything 
fortuitous in this, it capitalizes on the worst, that is on both evils at once: the 
sanctioning of nazism, and the gesture that is still metaphysical. (OS 40/66) 
The diabolical element in Heidegger’s articulation of spirit that comes to justify nazism has 
everything to do with what remains metaphysical in Heidegger, with his commitment to and 
simultaneous denial of the gathering, reductive power of the subjective sphere.  This 
commitment was expressed clearly in his insistence on hierarchy which takes the ontological 
difference as primary.  The metaphysical gesture always attempts to take itself as primary.  It in 
fact has no substance outside this attempt.  Heidegger thus remains metaphysical insofar as he 
argues that history, the world, and humanity are reflections of a distinctly humanistic “spirit.” 
This metaphysical gesture pushes Heidegger’s thinking towards “the worst” for it allows him to 
justify the historical occurrence of nazism and, more seriously still, it allows him to posit this 
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history as a necessary reflection of the world as such.  Note that what leads Heidegger’s thinking 
toward the worst is not just its seeming justification of the historical occurrence of Nazism in 
Germany in the 1930’s.  Rather, it is the way that its equivocation of spirit-Dasein-history-world 
presents Nazism as reflecting somehow or other a structural necessity in the essence of the world 
and humanity.  Here Derrida’s analysis echoes his concern with divine power in Benjamin.  
There too it was a claim to purity (which is always already a claim to priority) which opened 
irrepressibly the possibility of the worst: “The temptation to think of the holocaust as an 
uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence” (FoL 298/145).  Derrida also here walks in the 
path of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger which, one will recall, worried over the justification of a 
certain history as a reflection of the truth of the world and humanity. 
 The stakes of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger, and in truth his critique of phenomenology 
generally, lay in the tendency of these forms of thinking to naturalize the existing world.  This 
naturalization was part and parcel of the anti-dialectical bent of phenomenology and 
Heideggerian thought.  The anti-dialectical insistence on the ontological difference necessarily 
identifies entities with Being and violently excludes the material lives of entities.  This exclusion 
of life emerges as a naturalizing of the categories of the subjective in opposition to the objective 
as well as a naturalizing of history as the expression of these categories.  This naturalizing of 
history and the subsequent justifying of the world as it appears, for Derrida, connects the critique 
of spirit to the possibility of the worst and to absolute evil.   Adorno reaches the same conclusion 
and returns us to the issues of non-violence with which we started this chapter.  
In his Lectures on Metaphysics, Adorno speaks of the possibility of critical thinking and 
radical evil: 
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One will not survive by preserving some so called higher sphere […] which 
reflection is not allowed to touch, but by pushing the process of de-
mythologizing, or enlightenment, to the extreme.  Only in this, if at all, is there 
any hope that the philosopher, through his self-reflection, will not end by 
consummating triviality, the consummation of which is absolute horror.  For no 
matter how one may view the works of Hannah Arendt, and I take an extremely 
critical view of them, she is undoubtedly right in the identification of evil with 
triviality.  But I would put it the other way round: I would not say that evil is 
trivial, but that triviality is evil—triviality, that is, as the form of consciousness 
and mind which adapts itself to the world as it is, which obeys the principle of 
inertia.  And this principle of inertia truly is what is radically evil.  I would say, 
therefore, that if metaphysical thinking today is to have any chance […] it will 
have to cease being apologetic and pointing to something one can hold onto and 
never lose, and think against itself. (M 115/180) 
The hope of critical thinking and of philosophy hangs on the possibility of adopting a mode of 
thought that declines to accept the world as it is.  Forms of consciousness that merely mirror the 
current world, modes of thinking that accept things as they are, these are the seat of radical evil.  
On the face of it, the notion of “inertia” as radically evil seems odd.  In a world full of rape, 
murder, domestic violence, war, genocide, abuse, slavery, hunger, exploitation, and all manner of 
other evils, inertia seems to be the least of our problems.  But Adorno’s is here referring to a 
larger claim: that this world, with all its violences, is the only possible world.  Inertia is radically 
evil because it justifies implicitly all violence and suffering.  The only hope of resisting this 
tendency of thought toward inertia is, as I outlined at the beginning of this chapter, to think 
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through in the most dedicated and extreme ways the relationship between thought and the world.  
Thought must “think against itself,” that is, one must refuses to ignore the violence inscribed in 
the relationship of one’s thought to the world.  The hope and promise of thought resides in 
thought’s unwillingness to accept as final or beyond question its own characterization of the 
world.  Adorno resists the discourses of phenomenology and ontology not because they remain 
committed to a notion of conceptualization, but because, by suppressing their inherent reliance 
on dialectics, they refuse to admit that commitment.   This denial then leads them to ontologize 
and, more terrifyingly, to naturalize the world as it is.  It is this deception that neither Derrida nor 
Adorno can accept.  Adorno’s critique of phenomenology and particularly of Heidegger then 
serves to highlight the nature of his relationship to discourse of non-violence as well as to mark 
the contours of his concern for life, his relationship to Derrida, and the possibilities of a critical 
ecology. 
 
III: There is No Natural Violence, Only Naturalizing Violence. 
 Exploring Adorno’s work from the perspective of its relationship to violence reveals a 
number of things: First, it clarifies Adorno’s thinking of non-violence as well as beginning to 
trace what Adorno means by “redemption.”  It shows the way in which a “non-violent” thinking 
would not be one free from violence, but rather one that attempts however problematically to 
acknowledge its violence.  This is, as Adorno says at the end of Minima Moralia, “the simplest 
of all things” and yet “the utterly impossible thing” (MM 247/281).  Thought must attempt to 
fashion perspectives “without velleity or violence, entirely from the felt contact with its object.”  
It must develop its perspectives from its embeddedness in the world, without the distorting force 
of expectation, desire, or teleology.  Yet, it cannot do without this force.  It is “marked […] by 
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the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape” (MM 247/281).  I have argued that 
this commitment to the paradoxical and autoimmune character of thought structures Adorno’s 
work and particularly his unwillingness to sanction a thinking that would claim to act beyond 
violence.  For Adorno, thinking, critique, and action are not non-violent activities.  Yet this does 
not mean, as Drucilla Cornell concludes, that Adorno is left with only a negative, diagnostic 
position.   
 Adorno is absolutely clear that one can work to resist violence: “The need to lend a voice 
to suffering is a condition of all truth” (ND 18/29).  The act of thinking, the critical act of 
following out the relationship between thought and the world necessarily works to address 
suffering.  This is because a truly critical thought does not shy away from its own relationship to 
violence.  Such a position is no magic solution to the question of violence.  Thought, even 
critical thought cannot guarantee that it will alleviate violence.  It is as Derrida says in “Violence 
and Metaphysics” “very little—almost nothing” (WD 80/118).  Yet it is not a wholly negative 
project.  It is, for Adorno, a project that necessarily contests the current system of capitalist wage 
labor.  It is a project that contests the relationship of humans to themselves, to each other, and to 
all other living creatures, insofar as it destabilizes the notion of anthropocentrism.  It is a project 
that attempts to think through what it means to have a positive project at all, and is it therefore 
not entirely alien to positivity.       
 Second, it shows that fundamental to negative dialectical method is not only a concern 
for violence but for the way in which the categories of conceptualization circumscribe and 
determine violence in opposition to non-violence.  Whether in his concern for identity and 
exchange or his critique of Heidegger, Adorno argues consistently that thinking is always 
entangled with a determination of violence.  The question of naturalization is the most obvious 
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site of this determination, the circumscribing of what will count as legitimate and not, what will 
be seen as tolerable and not, are all ways of asking what violence is acceptable and what is not.  
Hence, Adorno’s thinking is throughout an exploration and contestation of violence.  In fact, one 
could say that the question of violence is the driving force of critical theory, marking both its 
orientation and stakes. 
 Third, the centrality of violence in Adorno’s thinking allows one to clarify the connection 
between Adorno’s philosophical and metaphysical project and his political and ethical 
interventions.  As I argued in Chapter Four, the detail with which Adorno marks the concrete 
dimensions of his critique of identitarian logic, particularly though the notions of exchange, 
domination, and fungibility fundamentally contests the longstanding critique of Adorno as 
problematically metaphysical, theological, or aesthetical.  This is not to suggest that there is not 
important work to be done to develop the exact political and social nature as well as possibilities 
of critical theory.  This project is in small part and attempt to do just that.  However, it is clear 
that Adorno does not fail to provide a clear picture of the logic that connects his critique of 
identity to his concern over suffering and violence.  In particular, it is the exclusion, distortion, 
and destruction both of living human beings and the possibilities of life.  It is the moment of 
identity that determines what forms of life can be recognized as life.  It is the logic that 
determines who or what gets included in the community of the living.  This focus on life and the 
violence done to life both in the logic of identitarian thinking and the system of capitalist wage 
labor, however, does more than merely answer certain of Adorno’s critics.  It also exposes the 
relationship between Adorno’s work and Derrida’s. 
 Fourth, I have argued that the question of violence, tracing the modes, figures, and 
operation of violence in both Derrida’s and Adorno’s writings, allows one to see great 
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similarities in their modes of inquiry.  This similarity rests primarily on two shared axioms.  
First, that there is no form of thinking, signification, or action that does not, by its very logic, 
entail violence, which is to say the violent exclusion of that which is other than thought. There is 
no breaking out or getting beyond this violence.  Second, the stakes of this violence have 
everything to do with life and the possibilities and denial of life.  Violence always circles more 
or less closely living and surviving.  I have attempted to show how these two axioms arise in 
their work in ways that constantly overlap and intersect.  One see this intersection in the way in 
which they both articulate the logical violence of identity and writing as emerging through the 
figures of exclusion and the justifying or naturalizing of that exclusion, the way in which the 
Adorno’s critique of ideology and Derrida’s critique of logocentrism emerge as fundamentally 
critiques of primacy and origin, and the way in which Adorno’s emphasis on the self-destructive 
character of the subject’s relationship to is own moment of objectivity mirrors Derrida’s notion 
of autoimmunity.  However, one also sees this intersection in their profound concern for life.  
Both their projects are oriented toward the question of life.  Hence, I have argued that if one were 
to ask the question, “why does Derrida’s and Adorno’s work proceeds in the way it does.?”  
“Why do they remain consistently critical of thinkers that do not proceed in a deconstructive or 
immanent manner?”  “Why must we worry about the way that we philosophize at all?”  The 
answer to each of these questions would inevitably return us to the figure of life, of life affirmed 
or life denied, of what it means to live or continue to live in this world, here and now.  Hence, 
one finds in Adorno’s work the very orientation towards ecology that I marked in Derrida’s at 
the end of Chapter Three.                       
To take up Adorno’s concern for identity, exchange, and naturalization returns us to the 
question of life.  This question will certainly involve the question of human life, of what human 
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life has become under industrial capitalism and contemporary culture.  However, it will also 
involve the question of non-human life, the circumscribing of life in the broadest sense.  There is 
a way in which critical theory calls always already for a challenging of the categories of the 
animal and the human.  Hence, we see here the “gleam” of the “critical ecology” that Derrida 
suggests at the end of his Frankfurt.  We can see now why Derrida would claim that “the most 
crucial paths in the future reading of Adorno” must lead to “what we call in the singular […] the 
Animal” (Derrida, PM/F 180/54).  It is the terrifying reduction of life to the singular, the claim 
that this is the only form of life there is or the only form of life that matters that Adorno 
constantly thought against.  Yet, although we can see here the reason that Derrida would claim 
that Adorno’s work, along with his own, calls for a new “critical” or “deconstructive ecology,” 
we have yet to develop the exact character or implications of that ecology.  In addition, we have 
yet to discuss the many differences between Adorno’s and Derrida’s thinking, difference which I 
will argue are more complimentary than divisive.  My conclusion addresses these two issues.   
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Conclusion: 
 Toward a Deconstructive and Critical Ecology 
 
“Fascism begins when you insult an animal, 
including the animal in man”127 
--Jacques Derrida 
 
 This project has had three aims.  First, I wanted to expose the way that questions of 
violence and life shape fundamentally the character and orientation of Derrida’s and Adorno’s 
projects.  It is my contention that their thinking is, in a general sense, inspired by and directed 
toward a concern for the entanglement of life with violence.  Tracing this entanglement offers a 
means to explore and articulate the interconnection between their theoretical concerns and their 
ethical, social, and political engagements.  I have thus been at pains to show that noting the 
various places where violence emerges in their work, particularly as it relates to questions of life, 
contributes to the scholarly debate surrounding their practical thinking.  Secondly I have sought 
to demonstrate how their shared concern for violence and life constitutes a remarkable affinity 
between Derrida’s and Adorno’s works.  I find a marked continuity between the deconstructive 
endeavor and critical theory, a continuity that encompasses many of the central figures and 
concerns of both these modes of inquiry.  Thus, for example, I have argued that there is an 
important intersection between the critiques of Heidegger by Adorno and Derrida over the issue 
of Heidegger’s disavowed commitments to the force of subjectivity and the categories of 
conceptualization.  This is but one of the many points at which my project has marked a 
resonance between Adorno’s and Derrida’s thought.  My third purpose returned me to Derrida's 
suggestion at the end of his Adorno Prize Address that an important future path of inquiry into 
Adorno's work will explore the role of the Animal.  Inspired by that suggestion and in light of the 
                                                 
127 F 181/56. 
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prominent role in the thinking of both men of questions concerned with life and animality, I end 
this project by outlining what one might call a “critical” or “deconstructive” ecology. 
 I find that the thought of Derrida and Adorno is ecological through and through and that 
it contributes to the growing conversation on violence, environmentalism, and ecology that can 
be heard across the sciences and humanities.   In developing this argument, allow me to revisit 
briefly the similarities I have traced in Derrida’s and Adorno’s thought and to address a number 
of significant differences.  I am interested in the way these thinkers diverge on questions of 
sovereignty and ideology along with the series of related concepts: legitimacy, naturalization, 
law, and history.  I maintain that this divergence is complementary rather than divisive and 
therefore does not disrupt the fundamental affinity between their works.    
I have argued that Derrida and Adorno share an interest in the way in which all practices 
and systems of signification, meaning, and thought emerge and operate through a logic of 
exclusion.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida names this logic “reparatory violence.”  It marks both 
the delimiting of the originary difference that establishes the possibility of appearance and the 
protective “morality” that works through hierarchization to protect appearing against non-
appearing, presence against absence, the inside against the outside, and non-violence against 
violence.  Reparatory violence is the irreducible “economic moment,” the moment of exclusion 
that produces and justifies this object or this world, here and now, while excluding other possible 
appearances of the object and the world (G 7-8/17).  Similarly, Adorno argues that the process of 
conceptualization works by excluding the unique spatio-temporal aspects of an object and 
simultaneously naturalizes this exclusion by attributing the abstracted elements of the concept to 
the object as its essence.  Dialectics, like reparatory violence, names a paradoxical double logic 
that allows for appearance but only at the price of violent exclusion.  This basic logic of 
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exclusionary violence, I have argued, orients Derrida’s and Adorno’s projects in that both 
deconstruction and critical theory take shape as immanent critiques of such logic.  This is not to 
suggest that deconstruction and critical theory are reducible to one another.  However, they do 
emerge in relationship to a common concern and, more importantly, they articulate this concern 
in a remarkably similar fashion.  The centrality of exclusionary violence to the orientation and 
development of Derrida’s and Adorno’s thought marks a fundamental affinity in their work.  
This shared concern for the necessity of exclusionary violence also links each of their projects to 
a critique and rethinking of the discourses of non-violence. 
 Chapters two and four explored Derrida’s and Adorno’s critiques and appropriations of 
the notion of non-violence and their resistance to discourses of non-violence, understood as 
attempts to demarcate powers or spaces free from violence. This resistance emerges from their 
mutual worry that establishing the purity of the non-violent forecloses the question of violence.  
To identity clearly a non-violent space or force assumes a claim to know what violence and non-
violence are.  Such discourses, therefore, presuppose an answer to the question of violence which 
for Derrida and Adorno is impossible given the irreducibility of exclusionary violence. 
 Derrida traces this impossibility via the figure of sovereignty, showing that discourses of 
non-violence can substantiate their closure of the question of violence only through recourse to 
an unjustifiable sovereign decision.  I argued that one can understand Derrida’s notion of 
“sovereignty” as primarily a deciding on and establishing of the border and consequently the 
character of the violent and the non-violent.  The Schmittian notion of the sovereign as “he who 
decides on the exception” is, thus, interpreted by Derrida in terms of the violence of this 
 175
“excepting.”128  To decide on the exception decides which violence will be condoned, which is to 
say, it separates illegitimate from legitimate force or separates violence from force.   
Adorno traces this impossibility through the notion of dialectics and ideology.  The 
discourses of non-violence can, he argues, foreclose the question of non-violence only by 
suppressing the dialectic between the violent and non-violent.  I traced this concern through his 
critique of Bergson, Husserl and particularly Heidegger.  The sticking point for Adorno is the 
inherently anti-dialectical character of claims to purity whether understood as the purity of 
human access to the non-conceptual or the purity of a non-violent space or force.  He maintains 
that with the suppression of dialectics comes an ideological reduction of the objective world to 
the categories of the subjective.  This reduction is another way of talking about the foreclosing of 
the question of violence.  Ideology establishes the primacy of thought over objects in a way that 
justifies thoughts domination of and violence towards objects.  Where there is ideology, there is 
an implicit separation of the violent from the non-violent, a separation of what is primary and 
superior from what is secondary and inferior. 
Hence for both Adorno and Derrida, discourses of pure non-violence render themselves 
untenable through their claim to have established a clear separation of the violent and from the 
non-violent—to have halted, through sovereignty or conceptualization, the dialectical 
relationship between violence and non-violence.  However, the crucial issues in the stakes of this 
resistance to non-violence lies in the way suppression of the question of violence tends toward 
the worst violence, a point which warrants further clarification.     
 Chapter Four shows that the worst is associated for both Derrida and Adorno with a 
certain justification or naturalization of the world as it is.  This concern harks back to the critique 
                                                 
128 Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Translated by George Schwab. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985, 5. 
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of non-violence, where it showed up as an issue regarding the attempt by discourses of non-
violence to justify or naturalize certain notions of violence and non-violence by putting an end to 
the question of violence.  Derrida associates this move with the “silence” and “darkness” of the 
worst.129  Writing in his essay on forgiveness, of a “new cosmopolitics of the cities of refuge,” 
Derrida says: 
[l]et us not proffer an example [of the victims of violences worldwide], for there 
are too many; and to cite the best known would risk sending the anonymous 
others back into the darkness (mal) from which they find it hard to escape, a 
darkness which is truly the worst and the condition of all others” (CF 6).130   
The “worst” is tied irreducibly to the darkness and silence of unannounceability.  Every 
acceptance of an exclusive or absolute interpretation of an event or of the world “risks” calling 
down this darkness and silence.  This risk occurs, as Derrida says in Writing and Difference, 
every time a “discourse” attempts to “reappropriate” its violence.131  What leads the discourses 
of non-violence toward the worst is their attempt to foreclose the question of violence, to offer 
some exclusive content to the figure of violence, and thus to reappropriate their own moment of 
sovereign decision.   
Adorno is even more explicit concerning the character of worst, defining it as “a principle 
of inertia [Prinzip der Trägheit]” (M 115/180).  To accept this world as it is constitutes the 
worst, for acceptance justifies implicitly all the violence and suffering of this world.  The 
                                                 
129 See WD 130/191. 
130 On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Translated by Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes. New York: Routledge, 
2001. 
131 “Discourse, therefore, if it is originally violent, can only do itself violence, can only negate itself in order to 
affirm itself, make war upon the war which institutes it without ever being able to reappropriate this negativity […] 
Necessarily without reappropriating it, for if it did so, the horizon of peace would disappear into the night (worst 
violence as previolence).  This secondary war, as the avowal of violence, is the least possible violence, the only way 
to repress the worst violence, the violence of primitive and prelogical silence, of an unimaginable night which would 
not even be the opposite of day, an absolute violence which would not even be the opposite of non-violence: 
nothingness or pure non-sense” (WD 130/190-191).  
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discourses of non-violence, by attempting to put an end to the question of violence, ask us to 
accept that the question of violence has been solved.  Derrida and Adorno then resist the 
discourses of non-violence as mere reappropriations of violence replete with the invitation to 
accept violence unquestioningly.  However, as I have argued, the real stakes of their concern for 
the worst and worry over the exclusionary violence that undergirds it are everywhere tied to the 
question of life.   
For both Derrida and Adorno, the exclusionary violence of the “reparatory” or of 
“dialectics” was from the start entangled with life, was violence to life.  Derrida insists that 
logocentrism is inescapably bound up with ethnocentrism and that the critique of “presence” was 
always a critique of the “living present [présent vivant]” (SP 6/5).  That violence and life are 
interwoven is nowhere clearer than in Derrida’s notion of sovereignty.  I have contended that 
sovereignty is one of the names Derrida gives to the power of identity.  It is the force that 
determines the inside from the outside and, consequently, the violent from the non-violent.  In so 
far as it is a decision on violence, it demarcates who or what belongs on the inside, marks whose 
or what’s suffering or death counts as an ethical issue, and which life can be sacrificed with 
impunity.  In another instance, his 2001 interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco entitled “Violence 
Against Animals,” he says, “[a]ll the deconstructive gestures I have attempted to perform on 
philosophical texts […] consist in questioning the self-interested misrecognition of what is called 
the Animal in general, and the way in which these texts interpret the border between Man and the 
Animal” (FWT 63).132  Indeed all of Derrida’s work and, in fact, every deconstructive operation 
bears on the question of life.  It asks for an accounting of the terms, concepts, and logic by which 
a text delimits the border between the human and the animal.  This delimiting is necessarily 
                                                 
132 Derrida, Jacques, and Elisabeth Roudinesco. For What Tomorrow… A Dialogue. Translated by Jeff Fort. 
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 178
violent insofar as it is always a “self-interested misrecognition.”  Every deconstructive gesture 
interrogates the logic by which the creature called human defines itself in opposition to the 
animal and shows this logic necessarily to be violent and self-serving.  This namer of animals, 
this Adam, simultaneously names himself and establishes his character as the creature who will 
have dominion over what is other than self—animal.  Derrida names this “self-interested 
misrecognition” sovereignty and establishes the direct bearing on life of this question of 
violence.  
Adorno's work also exhibits this co-arising of concerns for violence and life.  His 
assertion that the purpose of philosophy is to “address suffering” already implies a concern for 
life, for only living, animate objects seem to suffer.  This concern is clearer in his tracing of the 
logic of conceptualization and the relationship between subjects and objects.  What he finds at 
stake in the ideological bent of thought is the domination of objectivity by subjectivity.  In its 
inescapable tendency to take itself as primary in relation to all objectivity, thought attempts to 
dominate objectivity by reducing all objectivity to itself, including the objectivity that is the 
living subject.  He maintains that the logic of thinking always tends toward violence against the 
living subject or against what is living in the subject.  He locates this violent reduction of life in 
the social figures of “exchange,” “wage labor,” and in the “experience” of fungibility.  He traces 
how the logic of identity and exchange violently circumscribes and reduces life to the categories 
of the “wage laborer.”  He finds that where there is identity and exchange, there is always a 
reduction of life, a shoring off of the forms, modes, and expressions in which life can appear.  
Life as such becomes limited.   Fundamentally at stake in both Derrida’s and Adorno’s analyses 
then is the question of violence to life and the many forms that this violence takes. 
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However their shared concern is expressed in very different terminological and 
conceptual lexicons.  In addressing violence, Derrida emphasizes terms such as “writing” and 
“sovereignty” which leads to a very different conceptual and terminological constellation than 
does Adorno’s emphasis on “dialectics” and “ideology.”  Derrida’s use of “sovereignty” relates 
immediately to a lexicon of subjectivity, ipseity, decision, legitimation, law, the nation-state, and 
God.  Adorno’s notion of “ideology,” on the other hand, relates more immediately to dialectics, 
identity, exchange, conceptualization, domination, naturalization, history, and capitalism.  As a 
result of this difference, Derrida’s work articulates a much more developed critique of political 
sovereignty and law, while Adorno expounds a more thorough critique of ideology, the culture 
industry, and perhaps most obviously capitalism.  Much has been made of these differences both 
by those who see continuity in Adorno’s and Derrida’s projects and those who see a fundamental 
impasse between their thinking.  It is outside the purview of this project to take up all the 
ramifications of these differences.  However, I would contend in light of their overarching 
concern for the entanglement of violence with life, that these differences can be read generally as 
complimentary rather than divisive.  
Despite their very different terminological and conceptual lexicons, I have tried to show 
that Derrida’s and Adorno’s thinking is oriented and inspired by a fundamental assertion: there is 
no form of thinking, signification, or action that does not, by its very logic, entail the violent 
exclusion of life.  The brevity of this claim is deceptive, for as I have argued, Derrida and 
Adorno contend that this assertion calls into question all of its requisite parts.  It encompasses 
questions of what is meant by violence, life, thinking, action, human, animal, exclusion, 
sovereignty, ideology, and a host of other things.  Thus from the perspective of this shared 
commitment, I would argue that there is nothing inherently contradictory in the differences 
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between the terminological lexicons of Derrida and Adorno.  For example, I find much in 
Adorno’s critique of  “Herrschaft” in the Dialectic of Enlightenment or “autonomy” in Aesthetic 
Theory that resonates with Derrida’s critique of sovereignty.133  Additionally, Derrida’s concern 
for the “violence of economy” would, I think, move him closer to an Adornian style critique of 
capitalism.134  I do not mean to reduce the differences that would certainly emerge in these 
analyses.  Rather, my contention is that, insofar as Derrida’s and Adorno’s thinking remains 
committed to an immanent critique of the entanglement of life and violence, their projects offer 
one another resources rather than obstacles.  This also is true within the very lexicon of their own 
work, which brings me to the question of my own choices within this project.  
 In tracing the question of violence in Derrida’s and Adorno’s thinking, I have been led to 
privilege certain terms and certain texts over others.  I was directed in these choices by Derrida’s 
suggestions at the end of his Adorno Prize Address and by the desire to explore as clearly as 
possible what seemed to me the fundamental role of violence in their critical approaches.  In the 
case of Derrida, I started from some of his earliest texts, outlining the role of violence from the 
beginning of his thinking.  Out of the themes I discovered there (exclusion, ethnocentrism, 
animality, the unavoidability of violence) I proceeded to explore the question of violence in 
Derrida’s corpus more generally.  Interestingly, my reading of Adorno proceeded in almost the 
opposite direction, beginning with his final text and looking back to some of his first writings.  I 
chose this path because Negative Dialectics is Adorno’s clearest and most sustained articulation 
of his project as a whole. 
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134 See Catherine Malabou’s “Economy of Violence, Violence of Economy (Derrida and Marx)” 
 181
 My purpose was to illustrate the essential role questions of violence have for negative 
dialectical method and critical theory more generally.  I maintain my chosen modus operandi has 
been appropriate and effective, but I acknowledge that it came at a price.  It excluded certain 
terms and texts which were passed over completely or appeared only briefly. I dealt hardly at all 
with Adorno’s extensive writings on art and music or Derrida’s explicitly political texts, Politics 
of Friendship and Specters of Marx.  These omissions resulted from the sovereign and 
ideological gesture of my own analysis and were made practically for the sake of manageability.  
Clearly I have not given an exhaustive or complete account of violence or life in Derrida’s or 
Adorno’s work.  I could have picked other terms, other trajectories, which would have benefited 
and suffered in other ways from this sovereign and ideological gesture.  My own process thus 
bears out the claim of Derrida and Adorno regarding violence and life: that it (life, thought, the 
world) could be otherwise, that insofar as something is at all, some life is excluded.  One can 
always start from other terms or sites of engagement.  Yet upon closer examination every site is 
always different than it appears, leading one to proceed differently than intended.  Neither 
Derrida nor Adorno pretends to escape the gravity of this uncertainty or this tendency toward 
violence against life.  Yet, they refuse to take these unavoidable limitations as a justification for 
doing nothing.  They insist, in fact, that something must be done.  This returns us to their 
commitment to acknowledging the unavoidability of violence in order to discover the truth that 
the logic of exclusionary violence is productive as well as destructive, positive as well as 
negative, active as well as passive.  Before turning to sketch a critical ecology, it seems worth 
lingering with this question of passivity (can one ever do anything else?). 
 As I emphasized at the beginning of my reading of Derrida and Adorno, the unavoidable 
character of exclusionary violence means that there is always violence.  Violence against life, the 
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exclusion of life, cannot be done away with through some power or force of decision or 
conceptualization.  All such attempts draw their power to identify and demarcate the possibility 
of non-violence, the possibility of their success, from the violent logic of identity or sovereignty 
from which they seek to escape.  This was the guiding theme of Derrida’s and Adorno’s 
resistance to the discourses of non-violence.  They remind us constantly that violence is going to 
happen whether one wants it to or not.  Given the unavoidability of violence, every act carries 
within it a profound passivity that exists as an irreducible inability for any act to secure itself 
beyond failure.  On the one hand, it is crucial to remain aware of this passivity, this limit to 
action, this possibility for failure lest we repeat, or worse, extend violence.  On the other hand, 
both Derrida and Adorno insist that we must not refuse to think and act, for refusal would tend 
toward the silent and dark inertia of the worst.  What are we to do with this paradoxical 
imperative?  How are we to understand this passivity that amounts to violence within every 
action?  To answer that question, both Derrida and Adorno begin by associating passivity with 
the past, finitude, and history, all terms that relate to limiting, circumscribing, and bounding 
action.   
Speaking of passivity in relation to speech in Of Grammatology, Derrida writes: 
This passivity is also the relationship to a past, to an always-already-there that no 
reactivation of the origin could fully master and awaken to presence.  This 
impossibility of reanimating absolutely the manifest evidence of an originary 
presence refers us therefore to an absolute past.  That is what authorized us to call 
trace that which does not let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present. (G 
66/97) 
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Derrida relates passivity to the “past [passé]” and to an “absolute past [passé absolu].”  Passivity 
marks a fundamental limit to activity’s claim to presences, completeness, and ahistorical 
absoluteness by showing its relationship to a finite history and the history of the finite as such.  
Passivity limits the ability to “reactivate” the possibility of a fully present mastery or control.  It 
shows something in all activity that escapes being “summed up” by that activity, here and now.  
Hence, passivity marks the limit of any particular action and the utter limit of the sovereign 
pretences of activity as such.  It is important to note that passivity does not mark the destruction 
of all possible action, but rather shows that actions are never as absolute, final, and decisive as 
they would claim to be.  Thus to follow out the figure of passivity as fundamentally challenging 
the identitarian and sovereign pretenses of action requires rethinking the relationship between 
passivity and action in terms of its connection to the past, finitude, and history.    
 In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida describes this rethinking of the possibility of 
action as a “combating” violence with “a certain other” violence.  He says, “this vigilance is a 
violence chosen as the least violence by a philosophy which takes history, that is, finitude 
seriously; a philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects […] aware of itself, as 
Levinas says in another sense, as economy” (WD 117/172).  Here Derrida articulates more 
clearly a form for critical activity.  He argues that such activities require a “vigilance” that 
acknowledges “finitude.”  Such vigilance holds onto an explicit awareness of action’s historical 
nature.  It is a constant reminder that all action is limited or made finite by the fact that it is 
historical through and though.  Every action is finite in that it occurs here and now, in a certain 
location, having a certain history, speaking a certain language.  Every action is determined by 
things it did not choice or decide, relationships it did not pick or determine.  Vigilant action calls 
for awareness of all these things. 
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 Derrida also describes this kind of vigilant activity as being conscious of itself as an 
“economy.”  Recall from chapter one that Derrida describes reparatory violence using the term 
“economy.”  Hence critical activity may also be understood as action that requires the 
recognition of its own exclusionary violence.  On this account, vigilant action never ceases 
posing to itself questions of violence, the question of its own violence, and the question of the 
very categories of violence as such.  Such action never ceases asking about its own violence, but 
also about the very nature of activity, passivity, decision, action, etc.  Clearly it does not give up 
the categories of decision, activity, passivity, etc.  Rather it relentlessly challenges both itself and 
the category of action.  Discussing the autoimmune and always violent character of 
performatives, Derrida writes in Rogues:  
What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a 
freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without 
autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive 
decision.  We would thus have to rethink the philosophemes of the decision, of 
that foundational couple of activity and passivity, as well as potentiality and 
actuality.  It is thus rational, legitimately rational, to interrogate or deconstruct—
without however discrediting—the fertile distinction between constative and 
performative. (R/V 152/210.  My Italics) 
Given the always violent nature of all claims to activity, action requires that one “think […] 
something like a passive decision.”  Derrida is unwilling to give up the language of activity 
altogether, unwilling to give up the lexicon of “decision.” Instead, he argues that we must rethink 
it along a different path.  To return to Writing and Difference, this is a path related to “finitude” 
and “history.”  Understanding passivity as related to finitude allows one to see this “passive 
 185
decision” as something like a historical activity, a deciding that is open to be acted upon, 
augmented, and changed.  This decision admits that its scope is limited fundamentally not just by 
other decisional forces but by its own history.  As Adorno describes the possibility of philosophy 
in Negative Dialectics: 
Disenchantment [Entzauberung] of the concept is the antidote of philosophy.  It 
keeps it from growing rampant and becoming an absolute to itself […] 
philosophical content can only be grasped where philosophy does not impose 
them.  The illusion that it might confine the essence in its finite definitions will 
have to be given up. (ND 13/24.  My Italics) 
To counteract the tendency of critical thought toward violence involves refusing its tendency to 
take itself as absolute.  To disenchant the concept is to deny thought the illusion that its 
definitions could be anything other than finite.  Disenchantment thus becomes another name for 
passivity, in the sense that it functions to limit the identitarian and sovereign tendencies of 
thought. 
 I have argued that for Derrida and Adorno the unavoidability of exclusionary violence, 
the irreducible passivity at the heart of action, should be understood in many ways as a more 
emphatic call to action.  It is a call for critical activity that challenges all within action that would 
blind it to its finitude and history, all that would convince it of its unconditional sovereignty.  A 
“passive decision” therefore is one that by its nature calls for ever more vigilant action.  Having 
established the necessary link between violence and life, having shown that violence to life is 
unavoidable, we come now to the concern for ecology inherent in the idea of vigilant action and 
in the thought of Derrida and Adorno as a whole. 
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 Ecology is about coexistence.  It is about how existing things relate to one another and to 
their environment at large.  It concerns itself with the innumerable relationships between living 
and non-living things.  Thus, my claim that Derrida’s and Adorno’s thinking is inherently 
ecological says no more at the start than that their thinking is immanently concerned with 
relationships involving life.  Their shared claim that there is no form of thinking, signification, or 
action that does not entail the violent exclusion of life amounts to the claim that there is no form 
of thinking, signification, and acting that is not ecological—concerned with coexistence and the 
violence of coexistence.  This broad assertion of course brings up questions regarding the very 
categories of living thing, ecology, coexistence, violence etc.  It is thus the case that to call their 
thinking ecological in no way limits its scope to the scientific, sociological, or academic 
discourses of Ecology.  It does, however, suggest that they might have something to offer those 
discourses and, perhaps, those discourses have something to offer their thinking as well.   
 To that end, let us look at the how this inherent ecological orientation aids in developing 
the character of vigilant action.  Put simply, the ecological dimension orients vigilant action, 
insofar as such action emerges only within an ecological mode of thinking.  Recall that the 
concern for vigilant action came out of a commitment in both Derrida and Adorno to the 
unavoidability of violence.  Recognition of the sovereign and identitarian character of all 
performativity led them to rethink the meanings of activity and passivity in order to begin 
developing a response to the dangers and violences of sovereignty and identity.  I have outlined 
their connection of passivity to the past, finitude, and history, a move that reveals the passivity at 
the core of all performativity and establishes that this passivity limits and disrupts performativity 
but does not destroy it.  This understanding leads to the notion of vigilant action as a kind of 
deciding open to its limitations, open to the way it is oriented beyond its control.  In the context 
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of ecological thought and a basic concern for the unavoidability of violence, the limitations and 
openness of vigilant action can be seen as directly related to questions of life.  
Vigilant action is action oriented by and toward questions of life.  For a performative to 
be vigilant in challenging its inherent identitarian and sovereign dimensions, it must be vigilant 
of questions of violence to life.  The force of this claim does not reduce all performativity to 
questions of life but marks that questions of life are entangled in all performativity.  On Derrida's 
and Adorno's accounts, the very distinction between passivity and activity, constative and 
performative always demarcates life and violence.  The fact that one does not think of it this way 
does not make it not the case.  Hence what makes vigilant action “vigilant” is that it takes the 
question of life as its central concern.  Stated slightly differently, vigilant action asks 
continuously, “What fuels my life?  On what do I live?”  Derrida and Adorno both suggest that 
when a system or structure of meaning, signification, or action fails to acknowledge that it eats 
and to recognize what it eats, that system is doomed to a repetitive and ever intensifying cycle of  
the violence however vigorously it may contest against violence.  Was this concern not the very 
stakes of their critiques of Heidegger in particular?  Derrida and Adorno are pointing out that the 
question of life resides at the root of the ability to question as such.  It sits at the heart of every 
attempt to determine what is human and other than human.  Human, animal, self, speech, 
writing, concepts, techné, mourning, laughter, nakedness, love, community, ethics, politics, 
thinking, music, mimesis, and on and on constitute questions whose every determinable answer 
must perpetrate some violence against life, by deciding who or what is counted among those 
whose life has meaning.  There is something painfully obvious about this fact.  Obvious yet 
profoundly necessary (and perhaps under-theorized).  One wonders what might happen if we 
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follow Derrida and Adorno here.  What might we see?  What new questions might appear from 
even the slightest attempt at this kind of vigilance?  Who or what could it hurt?  
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